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ABSTRACT 
This Article proposes a positive bargaining theory for intellec-
tual property-based technologies in the post-World Trade Organi-
zation (“WTO”) era.  It focuses on negotiations between patent-
sensitive industries and developing countries over legal endow-
ments and access conditions in an archetypical patent-sensitive in-
dustry, namely the pharmaceutical industry.  The ability of devel-
oping countries to issue, or threaten to issue, compulsory licenses 
over pharmaceutical products serves as a working example. 
This Article’s analysis of the bargaining power possessed by 
developing countries combines a conventional assessment of mar-
ket size with a qualitative analysis that highlights the effects of 
these countries’ propensity to innovate.  The ensuing bargaining 
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situation yields numerous insights, the primary ones being as fol-
lows:  First, innovation in intellectual property-based technologies, 
such as within the fields of pharmaceuticals, software, information 
communication technologies (“ICTs”), and plant genetics, creates a 
paradoxical effect within the group of innovative Newly Industria-
lized Countries (“NICs”).  The paradox is based on the notion that 
innovation weakens, rather than boosts, the countries’ bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the prospect of bargaining retaliations.  This is con-
spicuously the case of the prospect of issuing compulsory licenses 
over pharmaceutical patents. 
Second, the resulting bargaining dynamic deemphasizes the 
practical significance of the Least-Developed-Country (“LDC”) 
carve-out contained in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) and other WTO agreements.  Specifical-
ly, it is argued that distributive justice policies contained in TRIPS 
should be geared toward a broader group of weak developing 
countries extending beyond the group of LDCs.  This theory points 
out a tentative threefold typology of developing countries defined 
based on their bargaining power.  Accordingly, developing coun-
tries are modeled as HBPs, MBPs, and LBPs depending on whether 
they are relatively high, medium, or low-bargaining power coun-
tries, respectively. 
In its conclusion, this Article contends, based on the model pre-
sented, that strong protection of intellectual property rights could 
have significant negative allocation consequences for developing 
countries.  Such is the case without contributing to—and even im-
peding—their technological development.  Arguably, the HBP-
MBP-LBP underlying developmental inequality shifts the optimal 
balance between static and dynamic efficiencies.  In that sense, 
TRIPS may prove ineffective in promoting dynamic long-term in-
novation policies for developing countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This Article proposes a positive bargaining theory for intellec-
tual property-based technologies in the post-World Trade Organi-
zation (“WTO”) era.  It focuses on negotiations over legal endow-
ments and access conditions in an archetypical patent-sensitive 
industry, namely the pharmaceuticals industry.  The ability of de-
veloping countries to issue, or threaten to issue, compulsory li-
censes over pharmaceuticals serves as a working example.  A com-
pulsory license forces the patentee to license the patent to the 
issuing government, thus permitting local production or importa-
tion of generic copies of the drug for payment of below-market 
compensation to the patentee. 
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The WTO-sponsored TRIPS agreement contains numerous loo-
pholes that provide plasticity for national governments to respond 
to political exigencies.1  In reality, these loopholes consist of flex-
ibilities and safeguards that allow WTO members to minimize the 
potential negative effects of intellectual property protection.2  From 
among such loopholes, the authorization for WTO members to 
compulsorily license patents is of particular relevance.  While 
TRIPS mandates that all WTO members enact and enforce TRIPS-
compliant patent laws in their territories, in limited circumstances 
it also allows national governments to force the patentee to grant 
use of the patent for payment of below-market royalties.3  Yet, the 
issuance of a compulsory license is largely dependent upon wheth-
er the country possesses sufficient bargaining power, notwith-
standing the existence of legal loophole. 
In the post-WTO era, it is commonly thought that the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (“GATT”)/WTO system has prov-
en increasingly subject to legal, rather than political, control.4  In-
deed, the Uruguay Round of negotiations that ended in 1994 “lega-
lized” the international negotiations.5  One of the alleged 
 
1 See Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 
INT’L ORG. 385, 392 (2000) (exploring the “variation in the use and consequences of 
law in international politics”). 
2 See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry 
Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal 
Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1079, 1096 
(1996) (describing how intellectual property became a central component of the 
free trade agenda and how this affects the Third World). 
3 See Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: ‘Adequate Remuneration’ For Non-
Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927 passim (2008) (exploring how to 
interpret amendments to the TRIPS Agreement in light of WTO dispute resolution 
laws and the broader legal framework, which includes human rights and invest-
ment law). 
4 See Peter M. Gerhart & Archana Seema Kella, Power and Preferences: Develop-
ing Countries and the Role of the WTO Appellate Body, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
515, 562–72 (2005) (noting that the WTO’s appellate body has taken on a judicial 
posture while remaining aware of sensitive political issues).  See generally JOHN H. 
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-11 (2nd ed. 1997) (comparing the new 
rule-based system of the WTO after the Uruguay Round with the prior power-
oriented system of GATT). 
5 See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54(3) INT’L ORG. 401, 
409 (2000) (exploring the three components of legalization, obligation, precision, 
and delegation, their variability, and combination).  
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achievements of the Uruguay Round was that it promoted a reduc-
tion in the power held by developed countries.6  That assertion is 
often grounded on a set of treaty provisions that were purportedly 
designed to limit the use of power, both in the context of dispute 
resolution and more broadly in trade negotiations.7  The establish-
ment of legal rules, such as those set forth for instance under the 
TRIPS Agreement, begs the use of legal discourse.8  Consequently, 
even where disagreement exists over the exact interpretation of a 
rule, negotiations can no longer be carried out exclusively in terms 
of interests and power.9  However, as this Article demonstrates, in 
the context of bargaining between patent-sensitive industries and 
developing countries, the demise of the power-based system is in 
many ways unlikely.  As is to be argued, the basis on which the re-
levant law is made is best understood through a power-based sys-
tem.10  This reality explains the usefulness of applying bargaining 
theory as an analytical tool.11 
 
6 In this Article, the term “developed countries” includes the United States, 
Canada, European Union countries, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Israel, Japan, South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand.  See Data-
base—WEO Groups and Aggregates Information, INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft 
/weo/2008/02/weodata/groups.htm#ae (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (depicting the 
various “Advanced Economies”). 
7 See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 11, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/safeguards_02
_e.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) (providing the text of the Prohibition and Elimi-
nation of Certain Measures, which prohibits unilateral action as it relates to trade 
relations).  See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter WTO, Un-
derstanding] (describing channeling disputes between countries that concern 
WTO obligations into the dispute settlement procedures). 
8 Abbott, supra note 5. 
9 Id.  See also Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 247, 257–62 (2004) (noting 
that various competing doctrines influence judicial decision-making).  
10 See Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Or-
ganization, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 9 (2003) (exploring the external, participa-
tory vision of the constitutional legitimacy of the WTO, which is consistent with 
the economic model, but emphasizes the democratic nature of the WTO); Joseph 
Straus, The Impact of the New World Order on Economic Development: The Role of the 
Intellectual Property Rights System, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10 (2006) 
(referring to the power-based system within the FTAs and TRIPS-Plus agree-
ments); Joseph Straus, Comment, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case 
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Equally important is the notion that the bargaining situation of 
developing countries has typically been understood from a rela-
tively narrow standpoint.  Conventional analysis measures power 
by a ballpark estimate of market size that is based on the overall 
size and diversity of each country’s economy.12  It adopts the pers-
pective of governments, which treat domestic market opening as a 
cost, and foreign market opening and associated increases in ex-
port opportunities as domestic political benefit.13  In both theory 
and practice, however, this framework is flawed in two ways.  
First, it tends to ignore the broader options before each developing 
country in the course of the bargaining process.  Bargaining theory 
illuminates these options by describing two additional factors 
beyond the issue of market power.  The first of these factors is the 
country’s ‘outside option’, which entails its expected payoff in the 
absence of an agreement with the patentee.  The identification of 
the outside option is significant, for instance because reaching an 
agreement with the patentee may become unappealing if the alter-
native, the unilateral issuance of a compulsory license, is sufficient-
ly attractive.14  The second factor relates to the country’s ‘inside op-
tions’, which are the actions that the country may take in order to 
 
for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property 
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 91, 95 (1998) (describing the effect of the 
TRIPS Agreement on international trade and the flexibility it gives nations to ex-
ploit patents). 
11 See Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institu-
tional Approach, in POWER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130, 133–40 (Michael Barnett 
& Raymond Duvall eds., 2004) (analyzing how the United States, EU, and consti-
tuents within them advance their interests within the WTO); Richard H. Steinberg, 
In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO, 56(2) INT’L. ORG. 339, 342–43 (2002) (explaining how consensus deci-
sion-making operates in practice in the GATT/WTO legislative context and why 
the consensus rule has been maintained). 
12  Steinberg, supra note 11, at 347. 
13 Id. 
14 See Abhinay Muthoo, A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory, 1 
WORLD ECON. 145, 159 (2000) [hereinafter Muthoo, Non-Technical Bargaining] (ex-
ploring the fundamentals of bargaining theory, including: sources of bargaining 
power, bargaining strategies, variables affecting negotiating outcomes, and factors 
affecting negotiation speed); ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 274 
(2000) (referring to the outside option as a party’s “threat value”).  See generally 
LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR (2nd ed. 2001) (re-
ferring to the outside option as the “reservation value” or “disagreement value”).  
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derive positive payoffs while temporarily disagreeing in the course 
of the bargaining process.15  Developing countries make use of an 
inside option, for instance, when they avoid de facto protecting in-
tellectual property rights while formally complying with the TRIPS 
Agreement.16 
A second way in which the GATT/WTO system is flawed in its 
attempt to explain the bargaining situation of developing countries 
in the post-WTO era relates to two special characteristics of con-
temporary intellectual property-sensitive bargaining.  The first fea-
ture is that innovation in intellectual property-sensitive technolo-
gies creates a paradoxical effect within the group of innovative 
Newly Industrialized Countries (“NICs”).  The paradox lies in that 
innovation weakens, rather than boosts, their bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the prospect of bargaining retaliations.  This conspicuous-
ly is the case of the prospects of issuance of compulsory licenses 
over pharmaceutical patents.  The second insight deemphasizes the 
practical significance of the Least-Developed-Country (“LDC”) 
carve-out contained in TRIPS and other WTO agreements.  Specifi-
cally, as this Article shows, distributive justice policies contained in 
TRIPS should be geared toward a broader group of weak develop-
ing countries extending beyond the group of LDCs.  This theory 
points out to a tentative threefold typology of developing countries 
based on their bargaining power.  Accordingly, developing coun-
tries are modeled as HBPs, MBPs, and LBPs depending on whether 
they are relatively high, medium, or low-bargaining power coun-
tries, respectively. 
 
15 Muthoo, Non-Technical Bargaining, supra note 14, at 149, 157–60.  
16 See Robert M. Sherwood, Global Prospects for the Role of Intellectual Property 
in Technology Transfer, 42 IDEA 27, 30 (1997) (noting that the judicial systems in 
perhaps eighty percent of the countries of the world are simply not up to the task 
of supporting intellectual property rights, much less dealing effectively with other 
matters); Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 37, 37 (2002) (“[I]ntellectual property systems involve a high de-
gree of administrative and judicial discretion.  Unless those who operate these 
systems hold a belief that they serve local interests, international rules, however 
derived or enforced, are likely to achieve little.”); Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [herei-
nafter TRIPS Agreement] (defining the four key tenets of national enforcement 
provisions, which are largely modeled on American intellectual property law). 
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Part 2 describes the transition between the pre- and post-WTO 
legal and institutional frameworks pertaining to intellectual prop-
erty bargaining.  It claims the new framework crystallized a two-
tiered bargaining situation over the conditions of access by devel-
oping countries to intellectual property-based products and tech-
nologies generated in developed ones.  In this two-tiered bargain-
ing situation, developing countries bargain simultaneously with 
governments of developed countries (Tier-1 bargaining) and with 
the industry (Tier-2 bargaining).17  Against this backdrop, post-
WTO international intellectual property regulation generally influ-
enced the bargaining power of developing countries, but unequally 
so.  This lays the conceptual foundations for the description of the 
bargaining situation of developing countries in terms of their out-
side option, inside options, and market power.  The pharmaceuti-
cal industry, being a prototypical patent-sensitive industry, serves 
as a working example in which to apply this framework. 
Part 3 employs concrete case studies to propose a conceptual 
shift.  That shift would usher the analysis from the current dicho-
tomous view of a developing-developed country typology, into a 
more complex one that divides developing countries in three cate-
gories, namely High-Bargaining Power Countries (“HBPs”), Me-
dium-Bargaining Power Countries (“MBPs”), and Low Bargaining 
Power Countries (“LBPs”).  While limited to assessing the coun-
try’s ability to circumvent TRIPS provisions through compulsory 
licenses, this typology highlights:  the distinctive position of NICs 
in comparison to the remainder of developing countries; the exis-
tence of unequal levels of innovation within parts of the develop-
ing world, particularly within certain NICs; and perhaps most im-
portantly, the notion that distributive justice policies contained in 
TRIPS should be geared toward a broader group of countries. 
Part 4 concludes with a set of policy ramifications.  It contests 
the institutional favoritism of LDCs over a broader group of devel-
oping countries, such as within the 2005 Hong Kong declaration.  
In addition, it argues that the HBP-MBP-LBP underlying develop-
 
17 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games, 42(3) INT’L ORG. 427, 434–36 (1988) (discussing the two-level approach 
to international decision-making); Ravi Ramamurti, The Obsolescing ‘Bargaining 
Model’? MNC-Host Country Developing Country Relations Revisited, 32 J. INT’L BUS. 
STUD. 23 (2001) (discussing under which circumstances tier-1 and tier-2 bargaining 
manifest). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/5
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mental inequality shifts the optimal balance between static and 
dynamic efficiencies.  In that sense, TRIPS may prove ineffective in 
promoting dynamic long-term innovation policies for developing 
countries. 
2. THE POST-WTO IPR BARGAINING SITUATION 
2.1. Overview 
The post-WTO intellectual property regulation framework 
weakened the bargaining power of developing countries, but une-
qually so.  This argument can be broken into two subsets.  First, the 
legalization of international intellectual property regulation under 
TRIPS reduced the transactions costs for beneficiaries of intellec-
tual property protection in the developed world to promote favor-
able action by their governments.  This is true regarding the is-
suance of trade sanctions, but also more broadly with respect to 
diplomatic pressure.  As such, the TRIPS Agreement and the post-
WTO framework in general crystallized a two-tiered bargaining 
dynamic over the conditions for access by developing countries to 
intellectual property-based products and technologies generated in 
developed countries.18 
In what is the first tier of negotiations, bargaining involves only 
national governments.19  Typically, such “Tier-1” bargaining tends 
to oppose net exporters and importers of intellectual property-
based products and technologies.20  Simultaneously, developing 
countries undergo a second tier of negotiations.  “Tier-2” bargain-
ing involves governments of developing countries and the indus-
 
18 See Putnam, supra note 17. 
19 See Ramamurti, supra note 17. 
20 See, e.g., Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, Pandemics and Panaceas: 
The World Trade Organization’s Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to 
AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. BUS. L. J. 353, 363–82 (2004) (discussing Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and its impact on international patent protection).  But see G. Richard 
Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World 
Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 843–44 (1995) (highlighting historical anta-
gonism between Europe and the United States over the need for a strong, binding 
system of dispute resolution for the GATT).  See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2nd ed. 2003) (analyzing the 
TRIPS Agreement by providing a summary of the negotiation, commentary, and 
dispute-settlement cases).   
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try.21  Because nowadays holders of intellectual property rights, 
and patentees in particular, are commonly multinational enterpris-
es (“MNEs”), the bargaining between the technology ‘haves’ and 
the ‘have-nots’ typically cuts transnationally as well.22  In practice, 
one of the most important aspects of this two-tiered bargaining 
dynamic is that it consolidates a two-tiered sanctions cost structure 
that may be levied against developing countries.  To illustrate, de-
veloping countries that issue compulsory licenses run the risk of 
being sanctioned at both bargaining levels.  In what are Tier-1 
sanctions, such developing countries may be sanctioned by the 
governments of developed countries; and in what are Tier-2 sanc-
tions, they may be sanctioned by the industry as well.  This dual 
sanction cost structure is in reality the main way in which the post-
WTO intellectual property framework may be said to have general-
ly reduced the bargaining power of developing countries. 
Second, the disempowerment of developing countries has not 
been uniform.  Proponents of TRIPS usually claim that the agree-
ment positively affects Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”), trade 
and innovation within developing countries.  However, the way in 
which these variables play out in developing countries primarily 
depends on localized and country-specific considerations.  In this 
respect, a development inequality principle23 suggests, first, the ex-
istence of a divide between NICs and the remaining developing 
countries.  NICs differ in that their large and fast-growing domes-
tic markets position them as strategic destinations for FDI and 
trade.  To a certain extent, NICs can make use of this advantage ir-
respective of their general institutional framework or their intellec-
tual property framework.24  In addition, this development inequali-
 
21 See Ramamurti, supra note 17; see also Putnam, supra note 17. 
22 PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS 
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 10–13 (2002) (explaining why states would give up so-
vereignty over fundamental property laws and sign the TRIPS Agreement); Eyal 
Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 184–96 
(1999) (describing, among other things, transnational trade and its implications for 
developing economies). 
23 For more information on the “development inequality principle,” see dis-
cussion infra Parts 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
24 See Ha-Joon Chang, Institutional Development in Historical Perspective, in 
RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 499, 503–06 (Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003) (ex-
ploring, through a historical approach, how developing countries can establish 
institutions that will aid in development).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/5
BENOLIEL.DOC 11/15/2010  9:09 PM 
2010] POST-WTO IP BARGAINING THEORY 275 
ty principle reveals that there is another divide within developing 
countries, namely the divide between innovative and non-
innovative developing countries.  Yet, and perhaps to the surprise 
of the TRIPS aficionados, the number of innovative developing 
countries remains extraordinarily small. 
2.2. Bargaining Transition in the Post-WTO Era 
2.2.1. Development Inequality Principle 
Policy and academic analyses of TRIPS often give little atten-
tion to the various ways in which the agreement affects different 
developing countries.25  Traditional approaches typically proceed 
from the well-known North/South dichotomy, or some variation 
thereof.26  This framework highlights the asymmetries between 
Northern countries, which are deemed to generate innovative 
products and technologies, and Southern countries, which are gen-
erally deemed to consume them.27  A closer look at developing 
 
25 See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., http://www.wipo.int 
/portal/index.html.en (last visited Oct. 6, 2010); U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. 
AFF., http://www.un.org/en/development/desa /index.shtml/ (last visited Oct. 
6, 2010).  For theoretical and empirical studies, see Helge E. Grundmann, Foreign 
Patent Monopolies in Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis, 12 J. DEVT’L. STUD. 
186 (1976) (arguing that patent protection in developing countries is not beneficial 
because of the strong focus on advanced technologies which are inaccessible to 
developing countries); Douglas F. Greer, The Case against Patent Systems in Less-
Developed Countries, 8 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 223 (1973) (arguing that strong patent 
protection impedes technological and economic advancement in less-developed 
countries); Constantine Vaitsos, Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing 
Countries, 9 J. DEVT’L STUD. 71, 89–90 (1972) (comparing countries with “prior ex-
aminations” of patents to countries without “prior examinations” of patents).  But 
see Daniel C. K. Chow, The Role of Intellectual Property in Promoting International 
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH 187, 197–99 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (noting that China has power to draw 
in investment from foreign sources despite its weak intellectual property rights); 
F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1971) 
(analyzing issues of industrial growth through a study of structural constraints of 
industrial organization). 
26 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, A Model of Technology Transfer, and the World Distri-
bution of Income, 87 J. POL. ECON. 253, 254–55 (1979) (analyzing the TRIPS Agree-
ment via the innovating North and non-innovating South). 
27 See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 5–6 (2000) 
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countries, however, reveals that the effects of the TRIPS Agreement 
are much more varied and can hardly be understood along this bi-
polar, North/South line alone.  Developing countries differ not on-
ly in their propensity to attract FDI, trade, and technology, but also 
in their abilities to innovate and to make use of intellectual proper-
ty protection as a tool that fosters domestic innovation.  This set of 
circumstances, which unequally affects the bargaining power of 
developing countries, is herein referred to as the development in-
equality principle. 
There has been a sharp divide in the economic development 
strategies employed within the developing world in the period 
preceding the adoption of TRIPS worldwide.  A few countries, par-
ticularly Japan and the East Asian “tigers” of Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, have managed to successfully adopt 
an export promoting industrialization (“EP”) strategy, rather than 
an import substituting (“IS”) strategy.28  Successful implementation 
of the EP strategy helped these countries receive higher levels of 
sustained inflows of FDI and derive more benefits from this in-
creased FDI inflow.29  By the turn of the last century, the East Asian 
Tigers were no longer deemed developing countries, but rather 
developed countries.30  In the course of their transition toward be-
coming exporters of technology-based products, the East Asian 
Tigers rapidly foresaw the benefits of adhering to the TRIPS pack-
age.  
Most of the remaining latecomers to post-World War II indu-
strialization embraced IS strategies.31  Academics debate about 
whether IS was merely a poor policy choice or a natural conse-
 
(describing the asymmetrical distribution of technological innovation and con-
sumption between Northern and Southern countries). 
28 HOWARD HANDELMAN, THE CHALLENGE OF THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
297–300 (5th ed. 2009). 
29 JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WIND OF THE HUNDRED DAYS: HOW WASHINGTON 
MISMANAGED GLOBALIZATION 37–46 (2000). 
30 See Int’l Monetary Fund, Country Composition of WEO Groups, WORLD 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, DATABASE—WEO GROUPS AND AGGREGATES INFORMATION 2-3 
(Oct. 2008) (categorizing Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as 
“Newly Industrialized Asian Economies” instead of “Emerging and Developing 
Economies”). 
31 See Cláudio D. Shikida, Brazil: From Import Substitution to the 21st Century. 
What is Left to Do? 2 (Ibmec MG, Working Paper No. WP30, 2005) (providing a de-
tailed description of import substitution strategies). 
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quence of local economic, political and social conditions that pre-
vented countries from pursuing EP strategies.32  Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that IS proved a less successful path than EP.33  
Grounded on dependency theories of development, IS theorists 
concluded that freer trade would immiserate countries of the “pe-
riphery.”34  Local policies responded accordingly, and these coun-
tries grew increasingly suspicious of foreign investment and trade 
liberalization.  In the past two decades, however, fears of economic 
integration within the developing world have given way to far 
greater optimism.35  In what has been referred to as an ironic rever-
sal, anti-globalization sentiments now seem to be more prevalent 
in wealthier countries than in poorer countries.36  In fact, as of the 
1980s and 1990s, most developing countries had opened their mar-
kets to foreign investment and trade, leaving behind decades of 
inward-oriented industrialization policies.  Predictably, the results 
of adhering to free market policies were generally uneven.37 
Although most developing countries had reservations about 
strengthening intellectual property rights, signing the TRIPS 
Agreement was a condition for participating in the WTO.  Being a 
WTO-member was, and still is, generally viewed as an essential 
component of their participation in the international wave of trade 
 
32 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 24, at 499–522 (describing external political and 
economic limitations which can hinder institutional development). 
33 BHAGWATI, supra note 29, at 143. 
34 See Raul Prebisch, International Trade and Payments in an Era of Coexistence: 
Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 251, 251–52 
(1959) (providing examples of reasoning used by “periphery” countries which fos-
ter an aversion to increasing free trade); FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO 
FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 149–71 (1979) (describ-
ing the tension between nationalist and populist political agendas in Latin Ameri-
ca and the influences of this tension on international trade policies).  
35 BHAGWATI, supra note 29, at 144. 
36 JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 8–10 (2004). 
37 This is true even if one assumes, as many do, that this “new” form of capi-
talism benefits everyone; a proposition that we neither accept nor dispute.  See id. 
at 10-11 (suggesting that unrelated changes in circumstance may be an alternate 
cause of positive business growth polls).  But see DIANE COYLE, PARADOXES OF 
PROSPERITY: WHY THE NEW CAPITALISM BENEFITS ALL 148 (2001) (explaining why 
twenty-first century “New Capitalism” has the potential to be more beneficial and 
more equitable than its predecessor). 
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and prosperity of a globalized world.38  The TRIPS Agreement con-
sists of a broad, but controversial, reform agenda for an intellectual 
property regime that applies almost flatly to all WTO-members.39  
The mandatory adoption of TRIPS standards creates two impera-
tive costs for developing countries, namely reduced access to new 
technologies, knowledge, and higher royalty payments.40  Against 
that backdrop, defenders of TRIPS have tried to cast intellectual 
property protection as a central pillar of modern economic policy 
and a catalyst for development, an argument that is twofold.41  
First, intellectual property protection is said to explicitly encourage 
domestic innovation in developing countries, similar to the devel-
opment of protections that took place in the early history of the 
United States.42  Second, intellectual property protection is thought 
to induce more inward technology transfer, particularly by means 
 
38 See John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Cri-
sis: Finding the Proper Balance between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 
WID. L. SYMP. J. 175, 187–88 (2001).  
39 See, e.g., MICHAEL BLAKENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: FROM THE PARIS CONVENTION TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 13–
22 (2003) (detailing the large number of generally applicable provisions and prin-
ciples within the TRIPS Agreement). 
40 See Christopher S. Gibson, Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: 
Balancing Concerns of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Stan-
dards, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1403, 1404–06 (2007). 
41 See SHAHID ALIKHAN, SOCIO-ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-9 (2000) (arguing that intellectual proper-
ty protection is an integral part of the technological and economic development at 
a national and international level); KAMIL IDRIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A POWER 
TOOL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2d ed. 2003) (introducing the argument that intel-
lectual property is a powerful force to benefit individuals and nations); Ali Imam, 
How Patent Protection Helps Developing Countries, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 377, 379–80 (2005) 
(detailing the social and economic benefits of stronger patent protection in devel-
oping countries). 
42 See Robert M. Sherwood, Human Creativity for Economic Development: Pa-
tents Propel Technology, 33 AKRON L. REV. 351 (2000) (discussing the way in which 
communities chose to protect technology so that the entire community could prof-
it throughout different stages of intellectual property development).  But see F. M. 
Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 205 (2009) (arguing that the historical parallel to 
the United States “also overlooks the fact that during the first 47 years of its exis-
tence, the United States provided strong patent protection to domestic residents, 
but denied patents to foreigners, whereas LDCs were being asked under TRIPS to 
increase the scope of their patent protection to both domestics and foreigners”). 
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of enhanced FDI and trade carried out by multinational enterprises 
(“MNEs”).43  According to this theory, the availability of intellec-
tual property protection would be akin to a “passive” industrial 
policy—it would stimulate innovation without requiring large in-
vestments of public funds often lacking in the developing world.44 
This uniform analysis when broadly applied to all developing 
countries, however, overlooks the fact that the pro-TRIPS and anti-
TRIPS considerations play out dissimilarly in different parts of the 
developing world.  First, the existence of an intellectual property 
protection-innovation link is in many cases highly questionable.  
Historically, a strong intellectual property system appears to have 
been neither necessary nor sufficient for progress at national and 
company level.45  In fact, it is a well-recognized fact that broad in-
 
43 See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 11 (2000) (arguing that stronger patent protection benefits international 
trade and FDI); Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, How Trade-Related are Intel-
lectual Property Rights?, 39 J. INT’L ECON. 227, 229–30, 237–43 (1995) (determining 
that intellectual property rights directly influence the flow of trade).  See generally 
Daniel J. Gervais, Information Technology and International Trade: Intellectual Proper-
ty, Trade & Development: The State Of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 517–21 (2005) 
(analyzing the effects of intellectual property protection on bilateral trade and 
“inward” FDI); Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 174–76 (1994) (arguing that developing countries opt 
into the international property system because it is in their self-interest to do so); 
Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Di-
rect Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109 (1998) [he-
reinafter Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights] (describing the various 
factors involved in improving a nation’s FDI); Carlos A. Primo Braga and Carsten 
Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 163 (1998) (describing the influence of strong IP 
protection on the levels of FDI). 
44 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 247, 271 (1994) (discussing the economic repercussions of intellectual 
property protection and the economic policies which influence patent law); Robert 
D. Cooter and Hans-Bernd Schaefer, Solomon’s Knot: How Law Can End the Po-
verty of Nations (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress .com/robert_cooter/151 (discussing the role of innovation 
in the economic growth of developing nations). 
45 See, e.g., Ove Granstrand, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 284 (Jan Fagerberg et al. eds., 2006); ERICH 
KAUFER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 25 (1989); Josh Lerner, The Econom-
ics of Technology and Innovation: 150 Years of Patent Protection, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
221, 221–25 (2002) (describing different models of intellectual property regimes); 
Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 
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tellectual property protection in cumulative innovation processes 
can stifle subsequent innovation.46  Moreover, more modern re-
search on the contributions of strong intellectual property systems 
internationally, and the TRIPS Agreement in particular, have also 
failed to demonstrate how a more stringent intellectual property 
regime can foster innovation in the developing world at large.47  
Innovation springs from the creative application of knowledge, but 
its underlying conditions are necessarily complex; many are not 
easily altered by policy; and some are the result of cultural evolu-
tionary processes which extend beyond the reach of short-term po-
licymaking.48  
 
J. ECON. HIST., May 1950 at 1, 24 (arguing that, historically, strong patent protec-
tion has a stifling effect on innovation because it deprives society of the flow of 
information from more widespread use of ideas); Petra Moser, How Do Patent 
Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1214 (2005) (analyzing data on innovations that occur with and with-
out patent protections in order to consider the effects of patent law on innova-
tion). 
46 See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the 
Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51, 68 (2002) (describing the 
obstacles to innovation which can be created by the implementation of broad in-
tellectual property rights); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits 
and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. 
POL’Y 273, 281 (1998) (stating that the large economic costs imposed by strong pa-
tent protection do not outweigh the benefits of such a system); Robert P. Merges & 
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
839, 894–97 (1990) (analyzing the effects that patents had on cumulative technolo-
gy products such as automobiles and airplanes throughout American history); 
Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29, 37 (1991) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of protecting cooperation and collective works when determining the scope 
of patent protection laws).  But see Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of 
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267 (1977) (sustaining that broad patents 
stimulate further developments and enhance the public welfare); see also Jerry R. 
Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On The Division Of Profit In Sequential Innovation, 26 
RAND J. ECON. 20, 31 (1995) (explaining circumstances in which even ex ante 
agreements may not prevent intellectual property protection from hindering in-
novation); Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving away Se-
crets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1884 (2003) (showing that in some circumstances, the ini-
tial inventor—especially in the case of cumulative innovations—will prefer a 
narrow patent). 
47 Granstrand, supra note 45.  
48 See generally DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY 
SOME ARE SO RICH AND SOME SO POOR (1998) (describing the numerous climatolog-
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In addition, there is now evidence that the weight of domestic 
research and development on productivity is largely dependent on 
the market size of an economy.49  Since Romer’s endogenous 
growth models were proposed,50 development economics has in-
creasingly focused its attention on endogenous technological 
change to explain the growth patterns of world economies.  In en-
dogenous growth models, as Ulku notes:  
[T]echnological innovation is created in the research and 
development (R&D) sectors using human capital and the 
existing knowledge stock.  It is then used in the production 
of final goods and leads to permanent increases in the 
growth rate of output.  At the heart of these models is their 
postulation that endogenously determined innovation 
enables sustainable economic growth . . . .51  
Recent studies suggest, however, that a key determinant of in-
novation is the potential market size of users.52  That is, the availa-
bility of a large domestic market significantly determines the abili-
ty of a country to increase its innovation by investing in research 
and development.53  It follows that larger developing countries can 
potentially derive higher benefits from intellectual property protec-
tion.  Second, “whether IPR protection is an important determinant 
in the locational competition for FDI in R&D remains unsettled.  
 
ical, historical and cultural circumstances which had a significant and complex 
influence on the economic development of various nations throughout the world). 
49 See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Linn, Market Size and Innovation: Theory and 
Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry, 119 Q. J. ECON. 1049, 1049–50 (2003) (ex-
ploring the effect of potential market size on the entry of drugs into the market); 
Hulya Ulku, R & D, Innovation, and Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis 4 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 04/185, 2004) (determining whether innova-
tion is created in the R&D models and whether it creates sustainable economic 
growth). 
50 See Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 
(1994) (recounting the two primary paradigms for understanding the develop-
ment of endogenous growth theory); Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technical Change, 
98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S71 (1990) (determining that the stock of human capital de-
termines rate of growth); Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 
94 J. POL. ECON. 1002, 1002 (1986) (presenting a model of long-run growth in which 
knowledge is an input in production that has increasingly marginal productivity). 
51 Ulku, supra note 49, at 4. 
52 Acemoglu & Linn, supra note 49, at 1050. 
53 Ulku, supra note 49, at 4. 
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Theoretical reasoning and empirical investigations point to an am-
biguous relationship between IPR protection and the distribution 
of FDI across countries.54   
Host-country characteristics are significant because intellectual 
property protection has weaker effects in countries with strong 
market-related pull factors for FDI, such as large markets of abun-
dant natural resources.55  There is also some evidence that FDI re-
sponds to intellectual property protection only in host-countries 
that have reached a minimum threshold of development and have 
a capacity to imitate inventions.56  Naturally, the impact of intellec-
tual property protection is stronger in human-capital and technol-
ogy intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and 
health care products, chemicals, machinery and equipment, and 
electrical equipment.57  Nevertheless, even in these industries, in-
vestment decisions remain contingent on many other factors.58  It 
must also be noted that intellectual property law is not the only 
mechanism for protection of knowledge and information, and at 
 
54 Peter Nunnenkamp & Julius Spatz, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign 
Direct Investment: The Role of Industry and Host-Country Characteristics 2 (Kiel Instit. 
for World Econ., Working Paper No. 1167, June 2003).  See generally Comm’n on 
Intellectual Prop. Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy 22–23 (2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs 
/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter Comm’n on IPR] (examining the dy-
namics of the relationship between intellectual property rights protection and faci-
litating development). 
55 Nunnenkamp & Spatz, supra note 54, at 12–13. 
56 Id. 
57 See Beata S. Javorcik, The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and Protec-
tion of Intellectual Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH 133, 134 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) (noting that in in-
tellectual property rights play an important role in high-technology sectors); Car-
los A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, International Transactions in Intellectual Property 
and Developing Countries, 19 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 35, 38–42 (2000) (explaining that 
intellectual property rights protection will have a strong affect on trade in know-
ledge-intensive goods).  But see Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, 
Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer 27 (Int’l Fin. Corp. Discussion Paper No. 
19, 1994) (interviewing executives who believe that intellectual property protec-
tion is not a major criteria for investment). 
58 See Comm’n on IPR, supra note 54, at 23 (noting that intellectual property 
rights may not be as important in investment decisions as other factors). 
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times not even the most important.59  This statement remains true 
even for patent-sensitive industries, and remarkably so.60  In the 
chemicals industry, for instance, there is evidence that MNEs tend 
to prefer stand-alone operations abroad and to employ a relatively 
small number of workers as a means of knowledge protection.61  
Another important patent-sensitive industry that tells a similar sto-
ry is the bio-agriculture and plant genetics.  As such industry, the 
scientific industrial nature of agricultural biotechnology noticeably 
shifts agriculture from land-based farming to the interdisciplinary 
patent-based industries of therapeutics, pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals, and thus is of central importance to the Post-WTO bar-
gaining model and the developing countries inequality principle 
herein.62 
With agricultural biotechnology, therefore, the inequality prin-
ciple is thus also ever-present.  The International Union for the Pro-
tection of New Varieties of Plants (“UPOV”) establishes the plant 
variety protection (“PVP”) framework known as the Plant Breed-
 
59 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 261 
(2004) (arguing that a sensible patent policy is compatible with some free flow of 
information); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE L.J. 369, 444 (2002) (describing the growth of peer-produced knowledge); 
Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of 
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 222 (2003) (describing the im-
portance of congressional constraints on exclusive private rights in order to re-
duce costs to democracy and autonomy). 
60 See generally Henrique M. Barros, The Impact of the Distribution of R&D Ex-
penses on Firms’ Motivations to Patent 1 (INSPER Working Papers No. 148, 2008) 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ibm/ibmecp/wpe_138.html (demonstrating 
that development-oriented firms do not always pursue patents). 
61 Nunnenkamp & Spatz, supra note 54, at 34. 
62 See SHELDON KRIMSKY & ROGER P. WRUBEL, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SCIENCE, POLICY, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 227 (1996) (noting the 
blurring of the traditional distinction between agriculture and chemical manufac-
ture); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 12 (1988) (arguing that biotechnology has an impact on 
agricultural practices).  To be sure, the TRIPS Agreement brings animals, plants, 
and plant varieties within the scope of patentable protection, subject to the indi-
vidual members’ regulatory choice.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 
27.3(b) (dealing with patentable subject matter).  In relation to plant varieties, in 
particular, it offers members the option to choose modes of protection between 
“patents or . . . effective sui generis system or . . . any combination thereof.”  Id.  
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ers’ Rights (“PBRs”) regime for UPOV member states.63  PBRs pro-
vide a site for understanding intellectual property’s role in the in-
tersection between the international agriculture regime, traditional 
agricultural practices (“TAPs”) deployed by indigenous and local 
farming communities, and food security.  In this regard, since the 
1980s, the FAO has been involved in the juridical evolvement of 
the concept of “farmers’ rights” as a counterbalance to PBRs.64  
Farmers’ rights, to be sure, are integral to a regime of open access 
to genetic resources in ex situ public seed banks.  The International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(“ITPGRFA”) regulates them.65  With time, regrettably, the usage of 
these resources, noticeably in regard to access to the genetic re-
sources from the putative common pool, created a crisis of confi-
dence between the developed and the underdeveloped world, but 
unevenly so.66  In addition, farmers’ rights are subject to pre-
existing national laws and bilateral treaty obligations of differing 
financial effect.  For the most part, these include PBRs and patents 
 
63 See INT’L UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES OF PLANTS HOME 
PAGE, http://www.upov.int/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (stating the 
purpose is to protect new varieties of plants by an intellectual property right). 
64 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties: An 
Overview with Options for National Governments (Food & Agriculture Organization 
of the U.N., Legal Papers Online No. 31, 2002), available at http://www.fao.org 
/Legal/Prs-OL/lpo31.pdf. 
65 See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agricul-
ture [hereinafter International Plant Treaty], art 1.1 (opened for signature Nov. 3, 
2001), available at http://www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/033t-e.htm (noting that the 
purpose of the Treaty is to conserve and sustain use of plant genetic resources for 
food).  A chief example for the latter is the well-known International Agricultural 
Research Centers (“IARCs”) designed to preserve the world’s scarce genetic re-
sources for food and agriculture.  For other seed banks, see Report of the Confe-
rence of Food and Agriculture Organization, Nov. 5-23, 1989, International Under-
taking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, art. 1, 22nd Sess., U.N. 
Doc. C/83/REP (1983) (Nov. 23, 1989); Report of the Conference of Food and 
Agriculture Organization, FAO Res. 5/89, U.N. Doc. C/89/24 (1989) cited in In-
ternational Environmental Law Research Center, IELRC Briefing Paper 2003-2, 
available at http://www.ielrc.org/content/f0302.htm. 
66 Chidi Oguamanam, Agro-Biodiversity and Food Security: Biotechnology and 
Traditional Agriculture Practices at the Periphery of International Intellectual Property 
Regime Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV 215, 246 (2007).  
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both under the UPOV and the TRIPS standards.67  The ability of 
farmers’ rights to serve as an effective balancing regime to PBRs in 
particular and intellectual property rights in general hence remains 
further unsatisfactory for the underdeveloped world.68 
Consequently, a major study conducted in NIC countries pri-
marily, found little correlation between the range of plant material 
available to farmers or increased innovation and PVP protection.69  
More broadly, in the United States there was no evidence that total 
R&D activity had increased as a result of the introduction of PVP.70  
The great majority of private research is conducted in NICs in Asia 
and Latin America.  Of worldwide private research expenditure 
over bio-agriculture and plant genetics totaling $11.5 billion, only 
$0.7 billion is attributable to developing countries at large.71  More-
over, research expenditures by these countries grew at 5–7% an-
nually between 1976 and 1996, while they stagnated in Sub-
Saharan African.72  Although the joint public (FAO-UNDP) and 
 
67 See International Plant Treaty, supra note 65, art. 9.3 (noting that farmers 
still have rights to save and sell farm-saved seed and propagating material, but 
these rights subject to the appropriate national laws). 
68 See Chidi Oguamanam, Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Genetic Resources: 
Farmers’ Rights and Food Security of Indigenous and Local Communities, 11 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 273, 275–76 (2006) (exploring how farmers protect their knowledge of 
dealings with plant genetic resources for agriculture and food). 
69 See Jeroen van Wijk, The Impact of Plant Breeders’ Rights in Developing Coun-
tries: Results of a study in five Latin American countries, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND AGRICULTURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 8, 12–16 (Jeroen van Wijk & 
Walter Jaffé eds., 1996) (discussing the various ways in which implementation of 
plant breeders’ rights have affected access of plant material for farmers and com-
panies).  
70 See generally Anwar Naseem et al., Does Plant Variety Intellectual Property 
Protection Improve Farm Productivity? Evidence from Cotton Varieties, 8 J. 
AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. & ECON., No. 2, Art. 6, available at 
http://www.agbioforum.org/v8n23/v8n23a06-oehmke.htm (describing how re-
searchers observed some impact on soy beans and wheat).   
71 Philip G. Pardey & Nienke M. Beintema, Slow Magic: Agricultural R&D a 
Century After Mendel 10 (Int’l Food Pol’y Res. Inst. 2001), available at 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/research/stp/papers/pardey-Slow_magic_Text 
_Oct_01_Final.pdf. 
72 Id. at 4.  As for the public sector, investment in R&D is more present.  As 
compared to medical research, there is a great deal more agricultural R&D under-
taken by, and of relevance to, developing countries.  In 1995, total expenditure by 
the public sector on agricultural research in developing countries, although un-
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private agricultural research at large, commonly referred as the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(“CGIAR”)73 spends approximately $572 million per year,74 fund-
ing by the donor community, has deduced substantively since 
1990.75  Moreover, while funding from the aid donor community 
has stagnated, little private sector R&D in bioagriculture is directed 
to poor farming in developing countries.   
Similarly, in the software industry, there is no flat trend sug-
gesting an increase in overseas R&D spending in any correlation 
with IPRs policies in the underdeveloped world.  With respect to 
the United States, the most recent data from the National Science 
Board actually shows a “re-concentration” of investments in high 
technologies:  “strong growth in U.S. companies’ domestic R&D fi-
nancing (up to 10%), coupled with a 7% decline in industry’s over-
seas R&D spending, reduced the overseas share to 8.9% of U.S. 
companies’ funding total.”76  Out of this given small amount, de-
veloping countries capture only a marginal 6%.77  With emphasis 
on software, the OECD Information Technology Outlook describes 
the situation as such that with very few exceptions, work out-
sourced does not involve “the development of mission-critical ap-
plications, nor do projects involve very sophisticated technolo-
gy”.78  Instead, the OECD Report adds, “[f]rom a life-cycle 
perspective, systems requirements, high-level design, and installa-
 
evenly distributed, amounted to $11.5 billion dollars compared to the $10.2 billion 
spent in developed countries.  Id.  
73 Established in 1971, CGIAR is a strategic partnership, whose 64 members 
support 15 international Centers worldwide.  Who We Are, CONSULTATIVE GROUP 
ON INT’L AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, http://www.cgiar.org/who/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2010).  
74 Originally CGIAR led the Green Revolution, and they presently act as the 
guardian of the world’s largest collection of genetic resources.  See id.  (stating that 
eleven of CGIAR Centers maintain international gene banks that preserve a wide 
range of plant genetic resources).  
75 See Pardey & Beintema, supra note 71, at 9 (noting that international donor 
and aid agencies do not contribute the resources to agriculture they once did). 
76 See NAT’L SCI. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 59–60 (2000), 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind00/start.htm (discussing R&D funding levels 
in the United States and abroad). 
77 Id. 
78 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
OUTLOOK 2000: ICTS, E-COMMERCE AND THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 137–38 (2000), 
available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/56/1939833.pdf. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/5
BENOLIEL.DOC 11/15/2010  9:09 PM 
2010] POST-WTO IP BARGAINING THEORY 287 
tion and testing are typically not outsourced.”79  To summarize, the 
various means by which intellectual property rights influence FDI 
are subtle, and intellectual property protection alone does not 
clearly generate sufficient incentives for MNEs to invest in a devel-
oping country.80 
This set of considerations explains why the effects of the TRIPS 
Agreement are too often highly inconsistent.  Focusing on the ef-
fects of TRIPS on FDI and trade on one hand, and on innovation on 
the other, the development inequality principle sets out two divid-
ing lines within the developing world.  The first line is drawn be-
tween larger economies, particularly NICs, and the remaining de-
veloping countries.  The category of NIC is a socioeconomic 
classification applied to several countries by geographers, econo-
mists, and political scientists.  Manufacturing must account for a 
significant fraction of the NIC’s gross domestic product, but aside 
from that, there is no undisputed or official set of criteria that allow 
a country to be labeled an “NIC.”81  According to Bradford, the 
emergence of NICs is a “generalized historical movement in which 
industrialized countries vacate intermediate sectors in industrial 
production in which advanced developing countries are currently 
more competitive and advanced developing countries, in turn, va-
cate more basic industrial sectors in which the next tier of develop-
ing countries have a relative advantage.”82  NICs are therefore 
 
79 Id. 
80 See Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 43, at 128 (ex-
plaining that the MNEs are primarily concerned with the likelihood that FDI will 
raise expected profits). 
81 See ANIS CHOWDHURY & IYANATUL ISLAM, THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING 
ECONOMIES OF EAST ASIA 4 (1993) (stating that the criteria necessary for being clas-
sified as a NIC is arbitrary but lists four suggestive criterion, including a require-
ment that manufacturing account for at least twenty percent of the NIC’s gross 
domestic product); see also NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: NEW 
PATTERNS OF TRADE, PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT 312 (1989) (noting there is no 
definitive list of NICs, but that many countries that have recently met this classifi-
cation are small developing countries that are major exporters of manufactures).  
82 Colin I. Bradford Jr., The Rise of the NICs as Exporters on a Global Scale, in THE 
NEW INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES: TRADE AND ADJUSTMENT 7 (Louis Turner & Neil 
McMullen eds., 1982).  Accordingly, NICs tend to be more advanced than other 
developing countries, and less so than developed countries.  There is no official or 
undisputed set of criteria to define an NIC, so each author sets a list of countries 
according to her own criteria and methods.  See generally MAURO F. GUILLÉN, 
MULTINATIONALS, IDEOLOGY, AND ORGANIZED LABOR, THE LIMITS OF CONVERGENCE 
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those countries that fulfill the intermediary stages in the interna-
tional division of labor; and since this division is ever changing, the 
categorization of a country as a NIC changes as well.83  A popular 
method of categorization would treat as NICs only Brazil, Mexico, 
South Africa, China, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Turkey,84 and would refer instead to the archetypical East Asian 
tigers of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan as “de-
veloped.”85 
Essentially, NICs differ from the remaining developing coun-
tries because they possess large and relatively diversified domestic 
economies.  This fact awards them the status of being strategic and 
fast-growing markets in and with which MNEs typically cannot re-
frain from investing or trading.86  Consequently, NICs capture a 
disproportionately large portion of the FDI that flows to develop-
ing countries.87  In turn, the remaining developing countries re-
ceive proportionally much smaller shares of FDI.  Such is the case 
not only for LDCs, but also for a much broader group of develop-
ing countries.  Accordingly, bargaining power within NICs is gen-
erally greater than among the remaining developing countries. 
This market size approximation, however, fails to recognize a 
second divide that exists within developing countries—that is, the 
divide between innovative and non-innovative developing coun-
tries.  While all developing countries are innovative on some level, 
only a small fraction of them is innovative in the area of intellectual 
property-based technologies.  China and India are effectively the 
 
(2003); N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, (4th ed. 2006); DAVID 
WAUGH, GEOGRAPHY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH. (3d ed. 2002). 
83 GUILLÉN, supra note 82.  
84 Id.  See generally MANKIW, supra note 82; WAUGH, supra note 82.  
85 See PAWEL BOZYK, GLOBALIZATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN 
ECONOMIC POLICY 164 (2006) (stating that these countries have accelerated their 
growth rate and made substantial changes to their economic structure). 
86 See Technology in Emerging Economies, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2008, at 75 
(noting the fact that China already has the same number of mobile phone users as 
the whole of Europe, namely five hundred million).  
87 See, e.g., Ilene Grabel, International Private Capital Flows and Developing 
Countries, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 325, 327-28 (Ha-Joon Chang 
ed., 2003) (explaining that financial liberalization enables NICs to capture a large 
portion of the FDI that flows to developing countries because these countries con-
tain attractive short-term speculative investments and opportunities for privatiza-
tion, mergers, and acquisitions).  
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only developing countries that, aside from being scientifically pro-
ficient, are also able to produce technology-based products in pa-
tent-sensitive industries in large scale.88  Yet, and regrettably for 
TRIPS enthusiasts, these countries do not display the highest stan-
dards of TRIPS compliance within the developing world. 
 One could still abide by dependency theories upholding that 
developing countries at large—that is, Southern countries—are al-
most exclusively consumers of technology.  Consistent with that 
claim, vertical industrial policies were widely applied in China and 
India in their steady, and yet uncertain, process of “catch up.”89 
Again, academics sharply disagree on the value of such vertical 
policies, and positions range from claims that these policies were 
crucial to claims that they created more harm than good.90  Either 
way, the causes of the “miracle” in India and China are of no con-
cern here; what matters is the conclusion that TRIPS plays out dis-
similarly in the developing world, including with respect to its in-
teraction with innovative activities.   
At any rate, the remaining developing countries, NICs bear an 
advantage not only in terms of their ability to attract FDI and trade, 
but also in their ability to promote endogenous innovation.  How-
ever, this reality does not mean that all NICs make use of their 
theoretical or potential ability to innovate in the same fashion.  Al-
though helpful, the availability of large domestic markets is far 
from a sufficient condition for a developing country to become in-
novative.  In fact, there is a sharp divide between the “innovative” 
 
88 See Press Release, Rand Corporation, Rand Study Says Advanced Coun-
tries Will Benefit Most from Progress in Technology, with Lesser Benefits to Other 
Nations (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.rand.org/news/press.06 
/06.01.html (noting that China and India are the two countries with the best prob-
ability of catching up to other scientifically advanced countries).   
89 See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 301-04 (1993) (explaining that East Asia’s productivity “catch up” was dri-
ven by a view that a world market for goods and services presented an opportuni-
ty for economic growth and productivity could be increased by importing tech-
nology through DFI or other methods like licensing or knowledge acquisition).   
90 See generally ALICE AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE 
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989) (defending the exceptionalism of industrial policy in 
East Asia); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE 
ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990) (defending the 
exceptionalism of industrial policy in East Asia).  But see Bhagwati, supra note 29; 
Cooter & Schaefer, supra note 44 (critiquing exceptionalism of industrial policy in 
East Asia).  
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and the “non-innovative” NICs.  As will be argued later in this Ar-
ticle, the divide between innovative and non-innovative NICs re-
sults in sharp counterintuitive effects on each NIC’s bargaining 
power over legal endowments and access conditions to intellectual 
property-based technologies. 
2.2.2. The Case of Bargaining Power in Pharmaceutical Patents 
The pharmaceutical industry is the prototypical patent-
sensitive industry; and for that reason, it serves well as a working 
example in which to apply the development inequality principle.  
In negotiations over patented products and technologies, the bar-
gaining power of a developing country essentially hinges on three 
variables, namely, the country’s outside option, inside options, and 
market power.  First, the outside option represents the country’s 
expected payoff in the absence of an agreement.  The identification 
of the outside option is significant, for instance because reaching an 
agreement with a patentee may become unappealing if the alterna-
tive, the unilateral issuance of a compulsory license, is sufficiently 
attractive.91  Secondly, the developing country’s bargaining power 
also depends on the availability of inside options.  Under bargain-
ing theory, inside options are the actions that a party may take in 
order to derive positive payoffs while temporarily disagreeing in 
the course of the bargaining process.92  An inside option differs 
from an outside option in that as a result of the latter negotiations 
break up and the parties stop bargaining, whereas the former as-
sumes continued bargaining.93  Developing countries make use of 
an inside option, for instance, when they avoid de facto protecting 
IPRs while formally complying with TRIPS.94  Third, a developing 
 
91 See Muthoo, Non-Technical Bargaining, supra note 14, at 159 (discussing the 
importance of the strength of outside options to bargaining power in the context 
of divorce). 
92 See id. at 149, 157-60 (explaining, in the contexts of selling a home and di-
vorce, how inside options would allow parties to continue bargaining while re-
taining benefits, whereas exercising outside options would terminate bargaining).  
93 Abhinay Muthoo, BARGAINING THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS 137 (1999) [he-
reinafter Muthoo, BARGAINING THEORY] (“The payoff that the seller obtains while 
the parties temporarily disagree is her inside option. . . . In contrast, her outside 
option is the payoff she obtains if she chooses to permanently stop bargaining.”). 
94 See Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing 
Countries, 37 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 491, 495 (1997) [hereinafter Sherwood, The TRIPS 
Agreement] (describing how TRIPS requirements fall short of the robust protection 
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country’s bargaining power depends also on the extent of its mar-
ket power, if any exists.  A developing country purchasing a pa-
tented product or technology will be deemed to have market pow-
er insofar as it is able to profitably pay less than the competitive 
price.95 
2.2.2.1. Outside Option: Instrumentality of Patent 
Compulsory Licenses 
In voluntary exchanges, a bargaining problem arises because 
the parties have to negotiate ex ante the allocation of the coopera-
tive surplus that is expected to be generated ex post by their deci-
sion to cooperate.96  When this problem is not solved, mutual co-
operation and agreement fails to take place.  Bargaining theory 
commonly refers to this alternative as the “outside option,” be-
cause it is the best alternative available for a country should it de-
cide or be pushed to withdraw from negotiations.97  Naturally, to 
reach an agreement, each party must expect to receive a payoff 
higher than that of its outside option.98 
In bargaining over the purchase price of pharmaceuticals, the 
issuance of a compulsory license can be viewed as an outside op-
tion available for developing countries.  In this case, the payoff 
 
necessary to encourage the highest levels of innovation in developing countries, 
however “full TRIPS implementation will give many developing countries a con-
siderably improved ability to stimulate particular kinds of activity generally bene-
ficial to national economic growth and development.”). 
95 See ORG. FOR ECON. DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION, ROUNDTABLE ON 
MONOPSONY AND BUYER POWER – NOTE BY THE UNITED STATES, DAF/COMP 
/WD(2008)79 at 3, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/ussubs 
.shtm (Oct. 13, 2008), [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE ON MONOPSONY] (“’[M]arket pow-
er’ refers to the ability of a seller profitably to charge more than the competitive 
price for what it sells or to the ability of a buyer profitably to pay less than the 
competitive price for what it purchases.”). 
96 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & ECONOMICS 78-80 (4th ed. 
2004); Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1982) (discussing co-
operative surplus).  See generally THOMPSON, supra note 14 (describing negotiation 
strategies and behaviors). 
97 See Muthoo, Non-Technical Bargaining, supra note 14, at 149, 154-60 (discuss-
ing how it is better for a bargainer to take the outside option when the bargainer’s 
outside option is greater than the expected outcome of negotiations). 
98 See COOTER, supra note 14, at 274 (describing how candidates in legislative 
elections must give the people what they want, or face the risk of having the 
people choose another candidate who will). 
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represented by the issuance of a compulsory license is mainly a 
function of three variables.  First, are the expected net savings that 
arise upon the issuance of the compulsory license; second, are the 
expected sanctions costs, which are the retaliatory costs that paten-
tees and their home governments can impose on the country that 
issued compulsory licenses; and third, are the expected administra-
tive costs associated with the more lax IP institutional framework 
suggested or created by the issuance of the compulsory license. 
Net savings, the first variable determining the payoff 
represented by an outside option, are in reality the expected bal-
ance of direct costs and benefits that the country expects to obtain 
with the issuance of the compulsory license.  A country issuing a 
compulsory license avoids the payment of royalties to the patent 
holder; but issuing a compulsory license will only be cost-effective 
if that country is able to either buy or produce the drugs at a lower 
cost.99  This first variable determining the outside option value 
tends to play out more favorably in larger and more industrialized 
developing countries, such as NICs.  These countries potentially 
obtain larger net savings upon the issuance of a compulsory license 
primarily because they possess unique features that render them 
suitable places for the development of an indigenous generics pro-
duction capacity.  The term “generics” refers to drugs that can be 
obtained from multiple sources, as opposed to drugs that are sold 
only by the originator company or its exclusive licensees.100  The 
establishment of a viable and competitive generics pharmaceutical 
industry requires large consumer markets, local technical capacity, 
and proper manufacturing conditions.101  In addition, “[e]ven for 
 
99 See Warren A. Kaplan & Richard Laing, Local Production: Industrial Policy 
and Access To Medicines 1 (World Bank, HNP Discussion Papers, 2005) 
(“[I]nvestments in local medicine production will be efficient only if pharmaceuti-
cals can be produced more cheaply locally than they can be imported on the open 
market.”).  
100 See Andreas Seiter, Pharmaceuticals: Local Manufacturing 2 (World Bank, 
HNP Brief No. 3, 2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org 
/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-1109774792596 
/HNPBrief_3.pdf (“The term ‘generic drugs’ is used in this paper for all drugs 
that in principle can be obtained from multiple sources, as opposed to drugs that 
are sold only by the originator company or its exclusive licensees.”).  
101 See Rep. of the Secretariat of the World Health Org., Manufacture of Anti-
retrovirals in Developing Countries and Challenges for the Future, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
EB114/15 (Apr. 29, 2004), available at www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files 
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generic drugs, some research and development is necessary for the 
manufacture of high-quality products, and the expenses and time 
incurred are often underestimated.”102  Together, these considera-
tions explain why a generics production capacity cannot be repro-
duced easily in most places in the world.  
The availability of a generics manufacturing capacity can great-
ly increase the net savings of the country issuing a compulsory li-
cense.  The reason for the increase is essentially that such a capaci-
ty lends credibility to the threat of issuing a compulsory license.  
Unlike the calls for distributive justice often put forth by countries 
with no such manufacturing capacity,103 the ability to produce ge-
nerics empowers a country to make use of compulsory licenses if 
and when necessary.104  In fact, for many years it “appeared that 
the only practical use of compulsory licenses was as a negotiating 
tool.”105  With a credible threat of compulsory drug licensing and 
the local manufacture of them, governments are able to press pa-
tent holders to grant large discounts on drugs.106 
Generic medicines are typically priced at considerably lower 
rates than the brand drugs.107  As such, their availability generally 
 
/EB114/B114_15-en.pdf [hereinafter World Health Report] (“Pharmaceutical 
plants need a huge initial capital outlay and take many years to construct; they 
tend to be located in countries with a good infrastructure, reliable utilities and 
access to technical expertise.”).  See also Kaplan & Laing, supra note 99, at 34-35 
(concluding that unless developing countries can obtain adequate production fa-
cilities, join with other small economies to create economies of scale, and manu-
facture with cost efficiency, it does not make sense for them to domestically pro-
duce medicines). 
102 World Health Report, supra note 101, at 1. 
103 See AMRITA NALIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT AND WTO 77 (2003).  
104 See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Ac-
tion, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 345, 358 (2008) (detailing Brazil’s threat to issue compul-
sory licenses for pharmaceutical patents). 
105 See Brent Savoie, Thailand’s Test: Compulsory Licensing in an Era of Epidemi-
ologic Transition, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 238 (2007) (describing the history of compul-
sory licenses as a negotiating tool). 
106 See Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic 
Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 563, 571 (2002) (noting that when there is a credible 
threat of compulsory license, pharmaceutical companies are more willing to nego-
tiate price cuts in a purchasing agreement with governments).  
107 But see Seiter, supra note 100, at 2 (stating that the prices of some local 
branded generics are equal to or higher than the price of originator product.) 
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reduces a country’s dependence on drugs supplied by big pharma-
ceutical companies.  To illustrate, in Brazil, 56% of AIDS drugs dis-
tributed in 2001, commonly known as ‘antiretrovirals’ (“ARVs”), 
were locally produced.108  While these drugs were not protected by 
patents,109 their production as generics made possible a price re-
duction of 82% in the period between 1996 and 2001.110  Other 
countries have followed a similar path.  For instance, “Thailand’s 
Government Pharmaceutical Organization has been producing ge-
neric AZT for a quarter of the price of the brand name version for 
several years.”111  
The case of Brazil illustrates how a local generics manufactur-
ing capacity can serve as a powerful strategic tool to increase net 
savings through price negotiations.112  Brazil’s state-owned labora-
tory, Far-Manguinhos, produces seven of the fifteen medicines 
used in the antiretroviral ‘cocktail’ freely offered in the country.113  
The Brazilian government has largely premised its price negotia-
tions with the international pharmaceutical industry on the credi-
ble threat of locally producing generics.114  Brazil repeatedly 
threatened to “issue compulsory licenses for AIDS medicines only 
to retract at the last minute after achieving what was widely per-
 
108 Alexandre Grangeiro et al., Sustentabilidade da Política de Acesso a 
Medicamentos Anti-Retrovirais no Brasil [Sustainability of Brazilian Policy for Access to 
Antiretroviral Drugs], in REVISTA DE SAÚDE PÚBLICA 40, 60, 64 (2006).  
109 Comm’n on IPR, supra note 54 at 43. 
110 Grangeiro et al., supra note 108, at 64. 
111 Judy Rein, International Governance through Trade Agreements: Patent Protec-
tion for Essential Medicines, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 379, 402 (2001)  
112 See Jorge A. Z. Bermudez et al., WHAT IS AT STAKE? INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT: CHALLENEGES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
36 (Jorge Bermudez & Maria Oliveira eds., 2004) [hereinafter “CHALLENGES FOR 
PUBLIC HEALTH”] (detailing the benefit of compulsory licensing in negotiations be-
tween the U.S and Brazil).  See also Comm’n on IPR, supra note 54, at 42-43 (noting 
how Brazil has been able to avoid costs). 
113 Comm’n on IPR, supra note 54, at 43.  For more information on Far-
Manguinhos, which is a part of the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation–FIOCRUZ, a non-
profit research foundation linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Health, visit 
http://www.fiocruz.br. 
114 Benjamin Coriat & Fabienne Orsi, Pharmaceutical Patents, Generic Drugs and 
Public Health under the TRIPS Agreement, Background Paper to the Concluding 
Roundtable Discussion on IPR at the Druid Summer Conference 2003 on Creating, 
Sharing and Transferring Knowledge, 13 (Danish Research Unit for Industrial 
Dynamic, 2003) (demonstrating the importance of Brazil’s capabilities to manufac-
ture generic drugs to improve their bargaining position).  
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ceived as a negotiation victory.”115  A recent study concluded that 
in the period from 2001 to 2005 Brazil saved approximately USD 
$1.2 billion solely in ARVs used for treatment of infection by retro-
viruses, primarily HIV.116  In spite of its numerous threats, Brazil 
thus far has only issued one compulsory license, in 2007. 
The second variable influencing a country’s outside option re-
lates to its expected sanctions costs.  Generally speaking, these are 
the costs that may be imposed on a country that unilaterally breaks 
pharmaceutical patents.  Big pharmaceutical companies often de-
velop concerted efforts with their home governments in order to 
build a dual structure of sanctions costs.  In the post-WTO two-
tiered patent bargaining framework, sanctions costs may come 
from governments of the developed world, in what is defined in 
this Article as Tier-1 sanctions, or from the pharmaceutical indus-
try itself, in what is defined in this Article as Tier-2 sanctions. 
An alleged breach of TRIPS may give rise to the submission of 
a complaint to the WTO.  TRIPS rules on compulsory licenses are 
ambiguous as to what constitutes sufficient grounds authorizing 
the issuance of a compulsory license over pharmaceuticals, leaving 
an open flank that may be explored through litigation in most cas-
es.117  The outcome of such litigation may be the authorization to 
impose trade sanctions on the country deemed to have acted ille-
gally.118  Although the Doha Round broadened the legally accepta-
ble scope of compulsory licensing, the possibility of authorization 
by the WTO to apply trade sanctions remains a tangible risk.  The 
 
115 Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons 
from Intellectual Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
400, 421 (2007). 
116 Amy S. Nunn et al., Evolution of Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazil in the 
Context of Free and Universal Access to AIDS Treatment, 4 PLOS MED 1803, 1804 
(2007).  See also Jane Galvão, Access to Antiretroviral Drugs in Brazil, 360 THE 
LANCET 1862, 1864 (2002) (illustrating how Brazil has used compulsory licensing 
as a bargaining tool). 
117 See Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS Agreement, 22 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 307, 334 (2004) (explaining that developing countries 
will not misuse their right in implementing compulsory licensing). 
118 Id.  See also Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPs Agreement and 
New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 5 
(2004) (detailing the problems which TRIPS may pose to developing nations); G. 
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the 
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 843-44 (1995) (explaining that the WTO 
has a system to enforce trade sanctions). 
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dearth of case law by the DSB on the topic adds an additional ele-
ment of uncertainty regarding the outcome of such litigation. 
Government-imposed Tier-1 sanctions may also originate from 
unilateral state action.  In recent decades, the United States took a 
leading role in attempting to shape and increase international pa-
tent protection.119 Even in the post-WTO era, the United States 
Trade Representative (“USTR”) retains powers to act unilateral-
ly,120 and uses them to persuade other countries, particularly de-
veloping countries, to enhance their intellectual property protec-
tion system.  Such unilateral sanctions can be traced back to the 
mid-1970s, a period when intellectual property-sensitive industries 
pressed the United States government to set up an aggressive un-
ilateral intellectual property agenda designed to curtail piracy and 
recover part of what were perceived to be unfair economic 
losses.121  Unilateral initiatives of this kind, however, remain a 
mostly non-legalized aspect of patent bargaining that takes place in 
the shadows of the WTO rule-based international system. 
Similarly to net savings, trade sanctions also do not affect all 
developing countries in the same manner.122  Primarily, countries 
with more diversified economies tend to be less vulnerable to trade 
sanctions on specific products.123  In addition, some emerging 
 
119 See Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in Inter-
national Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 277, 284 (2001) (explaining the strengthening protections for intellec-
tual property rights). 
120 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2242 
(2006). 
121 See Cheek, supra note 119, at 292 (stating that USTR could impose sanc-
tions if a country did not improve its intellectual property regime); Robert Krupka 
et al., Section 337 and the GATT: The Problem or the Solution? 42 AM. U. L. REV. 779, 
783 (1993) (arguing that some countries want to eliminate remedies provided by 
section 377); Paul C. B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on Intellectual Property Negotia-
tions and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 89 (1994) (examining how 
U.S. industries affect the outcome of international intellectual property negotia-
tions); Judith Bello & Alan Holmer, “Special 301”: Its Requirements, Implementation 
and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 259, 259 (1989-90) (reviewing the implemen-
tation of special 301). 
122 See Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Econo-
mies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 334 (2006) (detailing how BRIC economies have coped 
with the threat of trade sanctions). 
123 See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Distributive Politics and Interna-
tional Institutions: The Case of Drugs, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21, 27 (2004) (dis-
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/5
BENOLIEL.DOC 11/15/2010  9:09 PM 
2010] POST-WTO IP BARGAINING THEORY 297 
economies are large enough to pose a genuine threat of counter-
retaliatory trade sanctions imposed by developed countries.  Such 
was noticeably the case in the dispute between the United States 
and China over the latter’s intellectual property laws, a situation 
that in the mid-1990s almost led to a trade war.124  Another impor-
tant aspect of trade sanctions is that as world powers compete for 
geopolitical influence, distinctive strategic advantages may reduce 
the prospects of employing sanctions among certain developing 
countries.125  To use the example of China again, during the afore-
mentioned dispute, the United States bore a specific interest in 
preventing China from selling nuclear technology and equipment 
to Iran, Pakistan, and Algeria, which enhanced China’s bargaining 
position.126   
Aside from governments, the pharmaceutical industry itself 
may also be in a position to impose sanctions costs on countries 
that issue compulsory licenses.  Compulsory licenses undermine 
the overall intellectual property protection system of a country, af-
fecting IP-sensitive industries such as chemicals, computer soft-
 
cussing the importance of allowing developing nations the ability to access cheap-
er medicines). 
124 See Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on In-
tellectual Property, 6 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 318-19 (1996) (detailing China’s 
ability to retaliate to U.S. sanctions); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting 
Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 142 
(2000) (providing examples of how China has retaliated against the United 
States.); Richard J. Ansson, Jr., International Intellectual Property Rights, the United 
States, and the People’s Republic of China, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 4 (1999) (ex-
amining the effect recent intellectual property negotiations have had on China vis-
à-vis the United States). 
125 See William P. Alford, How Theory Does—And Does Not—Matter: American 
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 21-23 
(1994) (explaining that applying external pressure to developing countries will not 
necessarily improve intellectual property protection).  See also Barry E. Carter, In-
ternational Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 1162, 1162 (1987) (explaining how the United States’ regime concerning sanc-
tions on foreign governments requires reform); Martine de Koning, Why the Coer-
cion-Based GATT Approach is Not the Only Answer to International Piracy in the Asia-
Pacific Region, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 59 (1997) (evaluating the United States’ 
trade remedies). 
126 See Carter, supra note 125, at 1174 n.40 (stating that the United States’ re-
strictions on the export of nuclear technology to South Africa, India and Pakistan 
failed to convince those countries in accepting multilateral safeguards). 
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ware, and pharmaceuticals.127  Pharmaceutical patentees that either 
are harmed by the licensing, or receive a credible threat of compul-
sory licensing of their patents, can retaliate in a number of ways.  
Depending on the circumstances, they can impose sanctions costs 
through reduced FDI, reduced technology transference and local 
R&D, and reduced trade.128  In addition, and because innovation in 
pharmaceuticals is largely deemed to be patent-sensitive, a local 
pharmaceutical industry, while it exists, can also impose sanctions 
costs, most notably in the form of reduced innovation.  In India, for 
example, the issuance of a compulsory license could send a dis-
turbing signal to the innovation-prone sectors of its home pharma-
ceutical industry, which would probably be prompted to reduce 
innovation efforts.129  The example of India actually illustrates why 
the existence of an indigenous, innovative pharmaceutical industry 
can ironically impair the bargaining power of some developed 
countries, as will be further discussed later in this Article.  
The extent of industry-sponsored sanctions costs, also referred 
herein as Tier-2 sanctions costs, are particularly difficult to predict.  
This is mainly because of the conceptual divide between static and 
dynamic efficiency, a theme that arises almost unavoidably in a 
discussion of patent policies.130  Effective patent protection entails a 
 
127 See Gervais, supra note 43, at 523.  See generally HA-JOON CHANG, 
GLOBALISATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 286-88 (2003) 
(discussing whether private intellectual property rights incentivize generation or 
disclosure of knowledge). 
128 See Elhanan Helpman, Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights, 
61 ECONOMETRICA 1247, 1249 (1993) (arguing that the analysis of intellectual prop-
erty protection should be carried out through at least four dimensions, namely the 
terms of trade, the interregional location of manufacturing, product availability, 
and research and development investment patterns). 
129 See PADMASHREE GEHL SAMPATH, COMMIISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES AFTER 2005: PRODUCT PATENT PROTECTION AND EMERGING FIRM 
STRATEGIES IN THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 5 (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/PadmashreeSampathFinal.pd
f (stating that “emerging strategies of Indian firms will continue to be dictated 
mostly by survival needs and not by issues related to access to medicines of the 
general public, whether in India or other least developed countries”). 
130 See, e.g., J. M. Clark, Static Models and Dynamic Aspects, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 
450 (1955) (arguing that dynamic theory accepts indeterminateness of various 
kinds); Simon Kuznets, Static and Dynamic Economics, 20 AM. ECON. REV. 426 (1930) 
(also noting that the distinction was first introduced into economic theory by J. S. 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/5
BENOLIEL.DOC 11/15/2010  9:09 PM 
2010] POST-WTO IP BARGAINING THEORY 299 
tradeoff between static losses arising from monopoly rents of pa-
tentees, and potential dynamic gains to society at large due to en-
hanced innovation.131  The problem of industry-specific sanctions 
mirrors this discussion in that sanctions costs can be evaluated in 
terms of both welfare effects in equilibrium and welfare effects 
during the transition process toward equilibrium.132 
Regardless of how Tier-2 sanctions costs are measured, middle-
income developing countries are generally less likely to receive 
such sanctions than lower income countries.  International phar-
maceutical companies typically cannot afford to lose or alienate 
large markets that contain, or potentially contain, lucrative middle 
classes.133  A recent report by Price Waterhouse Coopers predicts 
that by 2020, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and 
Turkey will represent one-fifth of global pharmaceutical sales, an 
increase of 60% since 2004.134  As the economy in these countries 
improves, local populations are expected to face the kinds of 
chronic health issues that are typical in wealthier countries.  In ad-
dition, changes in environmental conditions may cause the spread 
of diseases that are more prevalent in the developing world such as 
cholera and malaria, among others.  At the same time, longer life 
expectancy in these countries tends to influence drug sales posi-
tively. 
The case of Brazil’s intellectual property law illustrates the 
lower levels of vulnerability of NICs to Tier-2 sanctions.135  Brazil 
 
Mill, who in his turn took it from Comte).  See also CHANG, supra note 127, at 184-
90 (providing a more modern discussion); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy 
of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974) (analyzing competitive 
rent seeking and its effect on an economy). 
131 See Cooter & Schaefer, supra note 44, at 16 (justifying the grant of patents 
where the gains from increased inventions outweigh the temporary loss from mo-
nopoly pricing); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE 70-71 
(1969) (discussing the economics of a patent system). 
132 See Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the 
Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 61-62 (2002) (discussing the economic welfare 
impact of pharmaceutical patents on developing countries). 
133 Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 123, at 27. 
134 PriceWaterhoseCoopers, PHARMA 2020: THE VISION - WHICH PATH WILL YOU 
TAKE? (2007), available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/eng/about/ind/pharma 
/pharma2020final.pdf. 
135 See generally Industrial Property Law of Brazil, Law No. 9279, May 14, 
1996 (discussing Brazil’s requirements and procedures for obtaining patents).  
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enacted a TRIPS-compliant intellectual property law in 1997.136  
The law then enacted, however, incorporated a number of TRIPS 
flexibilities and contained several mechanisms that left room for 
future compulsory licenses.  For instance, the law included a “local 
working” provision which allows for subjecting a patent holder to 
compulsory licensing if, among other factors, she fails to manufac-
ture the product within Brazilian territory.137  Upon the enactment 
of this law, the pharmaceutical industry issued a communiqué stat-
ing that any actions furthering the issuance of compulsory licenses 
would ensure that companies whose patents are violated would 
not sell their next generation AIDS drugs, or any other medication, 
in Brazil.138  Unimpressed by such threats from the pharmaceutical 
industry, Brazil continued to negotiate drug discounts from inter-
national pharmaceutical companies premised on a threat of its 
own, namely the prospects of issuance compulsory licenses.  The 
Brazilian government finally issued a compulsory license in 2007; 
the realization of the pharmaceutical industry’s retaliatory threats 
remains improbable. 
Finally, a developing country’s outside option depends on a 
third consideration.  Aside from the net savings and the sanctions 
costs involved, the outside option is also a function of the effects of 
the issuance of a compulsory license on administrative costs, which 
operates in two ways.139  On one hand, a country issuing a compul-
sory license has, by definition, a less stringent intellectual property 
system.  Thus, the compulsory license can be said to contribute to a 
reduction in the overall costs related to the administration of the 
intellectual property system.  On the other hand, a country issuing 
 
136 See Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira et al., Brazilian Intellectual Property Legisla-
tion, in CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 155, supra note 112 (noting however that 
under TRIPS, Brazil could have made use of a transition period but waived this 
prerogative). 
137 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 115. 
138 See Ubirajara Regis Quintanilha Marques et al., Brazil’s AIDS Controversy: 
Antiretroviral Drugs, Breaking Patents, and Compulsory Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 471, 474 n.26, 476 (2005) (discussing Brazil’s threats of compulsory pharma-
ceutical patents licenses and the industry’s response). 
139 See James Love, Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Ac-
cord: Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 74, 75-77 (Peter Drahos 
& Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) (noting that the TRIPS Agreement is  flexible in allow-
ing compulsory patent licenses and that litigation costs can be prohibitive). 
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a compulsory license faces the risk of incurring costly litigation, a 
meaningful consideration for poorer developing countries.140  This 
risk of litigation is enhanced by the fact that, under TRIPS, applica-
tions for compulsory licenses must be considered on their individ-
ual merits.141  Taking both sides into account, the net impact of the 
issuance of a compulsory license on administrative costs is not only 
difficult to measure but also difficult to predict.142  However, it is 
clear that litigation costs at WTO’s DSB can be a deterrent only for 
smaller and poorer developing countries.143   
2.2.2.2. Inside Options: National Opportunism Within TRIPS 
The outcome of a bargaining process, although constrained by 
the outside option, is also determined by the inside options availa-
ble to the parties.  Inside options are actions that provide positive 
payoffs while bargaining is still underway.  Inside options are 
therefore resources available to the parties during the course of ne-
gotiations.144  A desirable outside option demonstrates why a de-
veloping country can genuinely threaten to terminate cooperation 
with patentees if it is solely able to obtain a larger payoff through 
 
140 See Cotter, supra note 117.  See also Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public 
Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS 
and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 459, 471-72 (2004) (describ-
ing how developed countries can influence the decisions of developing countries 
and force settlements due to high litigation costs).   
141 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 333 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 
(1994). 
142 See Carlos M. Correa, New International Standards for Intellectual Property: 
Impact on Technology Flows and Innovation in Developing Countries, 24 SCI. & PUB. 
POL’Y 79, 85 (1997) (discussing administrative costs of implementing the TRIPS 
Agreement).   
143 Cf. Paul Rothstein, Moving All-In with the World Trade Organization: Ignor-
ing Adverse Rulings and Gambling With The Future of the WTO, 37 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 151, 166-67 n.95 (2008) (noting that larger countries, unlike developing 
countries, can afford litigation expenses but that developing countries can gain 
leverage by the threat of litigation). 
144 See Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 345, 399-400 (2000) (stating that desirable inside options bolster the 
credibility of a party’s threat to temporarily stop bargaining, providing that party 
with greater bargaining power). 
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the issuance of a compulsory license.  Conversely, the availability 
of desirable inside options shows why a developing country can 
credibly threaten to temporarily suspend or prolong negotiations 
in order to hold out for a better offer.145 
A compulsory license can function both as an outside option 
and as an inside option.  As described in the previous subsection, 
at a Tier-2 level, the level in which developing countries negotiate 
with the pharmaceutical industry over drug prices, inter alia, the 
compulsory license is the outside option par excellence.  As was 
shown earlier, the issuance of a compulsory license typically re-
flects the preferred option of a developing country when negotia-
tions with patentees break down.  Yet, the issuance of a compul-
sory license can work as an inside option as well.  In order to 
understand why, consider the Tier-1 level negotiations in which 
countries bargain over the legal endowments that will be set forth 
under domestic and international intellectual property laws.  Dur-
ing the course of such negotiations, the issuance of a compulsory 
license potentially permits a country to obtain a positive payoff 
without leaving the negotiations table, where a legal endowment 
may be at stake.  For instance, during the course of the negotiations 
within the Doha Round, some developing countries indeed threat-
ened to issue compulsory licenses while not leaving the negotia-
tions table at the WTO. 
There are several additional inside options available for devel-
oping countries.  The ability of a developing country to make use 
of inside options, however, is to a large extent dependent upon the 
specific tenets of its national patent laws and regulations.  While 
the dominant legal rules affecting intellectual property systems are 
essentially extra-territorial in nature, the incorporation of TRIPS 
flexibilities by each country is not mandatory and has to be estab-
lished under domestic laws.146  Each state adjusts international 
standards to its own intellectual property policies and establishes 
 
145 Id.  See also Muthoo, Non-Technial Bargaining, supra note 14, at 149, 157-60 
(explaining that someone selling a house can exercise the inside option of remain-
ing in the house until he or she can agree on a sale price with a buyer). 
146 See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the Trips Agreement: 
The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual 
Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 62 (1998) (positing that the im-
plementation of legal rules for intellectual property systems varies widely be-
tween countries). 
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their enforcement level, thereby setting the ground for a bargain-
ing process in which political actors at the national and supra-
national level lobby in order to influence lawmaking at the national 
level.147  Nevertheless, recent studies have shown that many devel-
oping countries failed to fully incorporate TRIPS’ flexibilities into 
their national patent legislation, reducing the available inside op-
tions.148 
 TRIPS indeed contains authorizations for a number of outside 
options that may be utilized by developing countries.  First, in 
some cases developing countries can hinder patenting by foreign-
ers through discrete changes in legislation that are expressly per-
mitted under TRIPS.  Second, it is possible to narrow the legal de-
finition of patentability, or simply deny patentability altogether, 
for certain categories of products such as plants and animals.149  
 
147 See Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 123, at 29 (describing the bargaining 
between South Korea and the drug maker for a reduced price for an anti-leukemia 
drug after the United States lobbied to have an application for compulsory licens-
ing denied). 
148 See Rep. of the Secretariat, Antiretrovirals and Developing Countries, ¶5, 
U.N. Doc. EB 115/32 (Dec. 16, 2004) (stating that recent studies have shown that 
some Latin American countries have not used all of the flexibilities granted by 
TRIPS); B. K. Keayla, Regional Office for South-East Asia, Review of National Patent 
Legislations of India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka & Thailand: Measures to Safeguard Public 
Health (World Health Org. Sept. 2004), available at http://www.searo.who.int 
/LinkFiles/Reports_HSD-275-Patent.pdf (stating that India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka 
and Thailand have not fully taken advantage of licensing arrangements allowed 
under TRIPS); S. Moon, Implementation of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agree-
ment and Public Health: Technical Assistance - How to Get it Right (Médecins Sans 
Frontières), available at http://www.eldis.org /assets/Docs/12075.html (discuss-
ing “specifics of the Declaration, including how to resolve the ‘production-for-
export’ issue and put compulsory licensing into practice”)Phil Thorpe, Study on 
the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement by Developing Countries 1 (Comm’n on 
Intell. Prop. Rights, Study Paper No. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp7_thorpe_study.
pdf (noting that developing countries have not yet taken full advantage of the 
flexibilities offered by TRIPS); Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira et al., Has the Implemen-
tation of the TRIPS Agreement in Latin America and the Caribbean Produced Intellectual 
Property Legislation that Favors Public Health? 82 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. 815, 818-19 (2004) (concluding that a number of Latin American countries 
did not incorporate all of the mechanisms permitted by TRIPS in order to promote 
public health to the best extent possible);. 
149 One exception is for micro-organisms.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
16, art. 27(3)(b) (excluding plants and animals from the scope of patentable mate-
rials, apart from micro-organisms).  See also JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 93 (2001) (noting that 
countries may exercise discretion over what inventions may be patented).  
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Third, a country can emphasize the doctrine of prior user’s rights 
in order to lower licensing costs.150  This doctrine offers a personal 
defense for someone who non-publicly uses an invention under-
going the patenting process by another, and permits the prior user 
to continue using the invention.  Its practical effect is to authorize a 
party other than the patentee to continue usage of an invention 
that was created by the time the patentee’s application was filed.151  
A fourth inside option available to a developing country is the im-
position of supplementary disclosure obligations on patentees.152  
TRIPS authorizes a country to establish duties to disclose the origin 
of plant genetic resources used in an invention,153 to compel the pa-
tent offices to publish the application for a patent shortly after its 
submission,154 or to require that a patentee reveal the “best mode” 
for practicing the invention.155  A best mode provision requires the 
patent applicant to disclose the specific embodiment of the inven-
tion, thereby prohibiting inventors from disclosing only what they 
consider their second-best embodiment, while retaining the best 
for themselves.156  Other inside options available for developing 
 
150 Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion 
and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 280 (2003). 
151 See id. at 280 (stating that the prior user’s doctrine would allow an existing 
use of a patented invention by a non-patent holder to continue). 
152 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 62(1) (authorizing members to 
“require, as a condition of the acquisition or maintenance of the intellectual prop-
erty rights . . . compliance with reasonable procedures and formalities.”). 
153 See Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Re-
sources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing the 
TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371, 372 
(2000) (“[W]hat is at stake is the possibility of detecting commercial gains from the 
use of genetic resources, so that countries supplying those resources can demand 
their share in the benefits.”). 
154 See Heald, supra note 150, at 283 (“[S]ome patent offices publish the appli-
cation for a patent very soon after [filing].”).  
155 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 29(1) (“Members . . . may require 
the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to 
the inventor at the filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the priority date of 
the application.”); J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competi-
tion Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 33 (1997) (defend-
ing the implementation of the best mode requirement). 
156 See In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (granting a patent applica-
tion because the applicants had explicitly disclosed the best use of the pharma-
ceutical as required under the best mode provision of 35 U.S.C. §112).  See also Eli 
Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The best mode 
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countries under TRIPS include the use of counterbalancing regula-
tory measures in competition law,157 or the use of safeguards per-
mitted within the TRIPS Agreement.158   
A number of more commonly controversial inside option poli-
cies exist as well.  The TRIPS Agreement does not stipulate excep-
tions to the patent rights it protects.159  As a result, developing 
countries are able to deviously discourage patent applications by 
foreign firms by pursuing myriad alternatives, such as making the 
process of patenting overly costly, lengthy, and bureaucratic,160 or 
simply taking advantage of (and failing to improve) its judicial sys-
tem.  The latter alternative is closely related to the much broader 
context of failures in the rule of law,161 a familiar trait amongst de-
veloping countries.162  All of these alternatives avoid de facto pro-
 
requirement creates a statutory bargained-for-exchange by which a patentee ob-
tains the right to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention for a cer-
tain time period, and the public receives knowledge of the preferred embodiments 
for practicing the claimed invention.”). 
157 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 40(2) (“Nothing in this agreement 
shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation licensing practices or 
conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property 
rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.”). 
158 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 7 (setting out the purpose of 
TRIPS as the promotion of mutual advantages for both producers and users of in-
tellectual property). 
159 See Reichman & Lange, supra note 146, at 21; Frederick M. Abbott, The 
WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 385, 
399 (1996) (discussing the technological disparity between countries under 
TRIPS); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of 
the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 
275 (1997) (arguing that intellectual property law must be predictable to be effec-
tive, and proposing ways to codify the TRIPS Agreement); J.H. Reichman, supra 
note 155, at 34. 
160 Heald, supra note 150, at 250–51. 
161 See Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, at 493; see also Arie 
Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 775, 805 (1997) (hypothesizing that the new GATT appellate 
body can correct some of the previous problems in GATT rule of law); Luciana 
Gross S. Cunha, Rule of Law and Development: The Discourses on Institutional Reforms 
in the Justice System (Artigos Direito GV, Working Paper No. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.direitogv.com.br/interna.aspx?PagId=HTKCNKWI&IDCategory=2
6&IDSubCategory=146 (explaining different concepts of the rule of law). 
162 See Cooter & Schaefer, supra note 44, at 16–19; Richard A. Posner, Creating 
a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 The World Bank Research Observer 
1 (1998) (explaining how poorer nations have less property enforcement, which 
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tection of intellectual property rights, while formally complying 
with TRIPS.163 
In conclusion, the availability of inside options increase the 
bargaining power of developing countries by increasing their wil-
lingness to enter into an agreement with patentees and their home 
governments.164  In addition, the availability of inside options may 
reduce the short-term costs of compliance with the patent sections 
of the TRIPS Agreement, both by rendering patenting less attrac-
tive and by creating the conditions for a reduction in costs to con-
sumers of patented products.165  From the developing country’s 
perspective, the goal of discouraging foreign patenting is twofold.  
It aims at seizing the positive welfare effects offered by intellectual 
property laws, while at the same time reducing the cost to con-
sumers and local industry of complying with the TRIPS Agree-
ment.  All of this may be accomplished without deliberately 
breaching TRIPS.  What is more, this scheme/system often allows a 
developing country to recapitulate some of the rewards of foreign 
innovation while bearing as little of the cost as possible.166 
2.2.2.3. Market Power: Competition and Substitutes 
Finally, a developing country’s bargaining power is dependent 
on the extent of its market power, should it bear any.  In both eco-
nomics and law, market power generally refers to the ability of a 
seller to profitably charge more than the competitive price for what 
it sells, or the ability of a buyer to profitably pay less than the com-
 
allows richer nations to take advantage); Maria Dakolias, The Judicial Sector in Lat-
in America and the Caribbean: Elements of Reform (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 
319, 1996) (proposing judicial changes to strengthen property rights); Robert J. 
Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 THE Q. J. OF ECON. 407 
(1991) (explaining growth rates and factors for developing countries). 
163 Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, at 544. 
164 Muthoo, Non-Technical Bargaining Power, supra note 14, at 148–52. 
165 Heald, supra note 150, at 250. 
166 The Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement suggests this option and the merits 
of flexibility are trumpeted by the WTO itself.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
16, at ¶ 8(1) (“Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regula-
tions, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic 
and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement.”). 
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petitive price for what it purchases.167  In the case of pharmaceuti-
cal patents, market power would express itself in the ability on the 
part of a developing country buying a patented drug to gainfully 
pay less than the competitive price.168  Conversely, existing data 
suggests that situations such as this are quite rare.  The average 
wholesale drug prices are almost as high in developing as in de-
veloped countries, notwithstanding the fact that incomes are much 
higher in the latter.169  This data intimates that the market power of 
the overall group of developing countries is low.170  Similarly, a 
software industry requires an innovative-based infrastructure, 
such as electricity, computers and networks.  This in turn requires 
an educated labor force.  In addition, the developing country must 
already value intellectual property as a sellable commodity in or-
der for a software industry to materialize.  Because software is 
such an advanced form of trade, LBPs, especially African ones, are 
far from developing any profitable industry, let alone a profitable 
software industry.171  When viewed as a monolithic group, devel-
oping countries can be considered “price-takers.”172 
Yet, market power fundamentally varies among developing 
countries.  First, the availability of an indigenous pharmaceutical 
industry can serve as a powerful instrument for engendering com-
petition among drug suppliers at the national level.173  Second, the 
 
167 See ROUNDTABLE ON MONOPSONY, supra note 95, at 7. 
168 Id. 
169 Maskus, supra note 106, at 566; see F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-
TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Countries 8–10 (World 
Health Org. Comm’n on Macroecon. & Health, Working Paper No. WG4: 1, 2001) 
(analyzing drug pricing in the absence of patent protection). 
170 See Maskus, supra note 106, at 566 (offering several reasons for why drug 
prices might be high in developing countries); Scherer & Watal, supra note 169, at 
49–53 (analyzing price controls in developing and developed countries) 
171 See Mary Kopczynski, Robin Hood Versus the Bullies: Software Piracy and De-
veloping Countries, 33 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 299 (2007) (explaining that 
developing countries feel they are being bullied by developed countries, and thus 
resort to “Robin Hood” schemes). 
172 See, e.g., MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE & MINISTÉRIO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO, 
INDÚSTRIA E COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR, FÓRUM DE COMPETITIVIDADE DA ÇADEIA 
PRODUTIVA FARMACÊUTICA 2003–2006: O DESAFIO DE PROSSEGUIR (2007) [hereinafter, 
FÓRUM DE COMPETITIVIDADE] (discussing the pharmaceutical industry in Brazil). 
173 See C.P. Chandrasekhar & Jayati Ghosh, WTO Drugs Deal: Does it Really 
Benefit Developing Countries?, THE HINDU BUS. LINE: INTERNET EDITION (Sept. 9, 
2003), http://www.blonnet.com/2003/09/09/stories/2003090900140900.htm 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
BENOLIEL.DOC 11/15/2010  9:09 PM 
308 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
developing country’s market power depends equally on its pur-
chase volume, so developing countries with larger consumer mar-
kets tend to levy more market power.174  Third, in wealthier devel-
oping countries a sizeable share of the population will be covered 
by either public or private health insurance.  Governments or in-
surance companies in these countries will respond to a larger de-
mand, which could allow them to negotiate larger price dis-
counts.175  In addition, a buyer’s market power also depends on 
factors such as the availability of information and of substitute 
products, the buyer’s price sensitivity, and the differential advan-
tage of the products, all of which highlights the importance local 
factors.176 
In sum, measuring bargaining power is tricky.  Relative market 
size typically offers the best preliminary assessment tool, but a 
more comprehensive understanding requires taking into account 
other considerations that shape a country’s outside option, inside 
options, and market power.177  In the post-WTO era, trade and in-
tellectual property have merged into a single bargaining legal and 
institutional framework.  For that reason, international patent 
regulation became necessarily entangled within a broader agenda 
of trade liberalization, foreign investment, and innovation poli-
cies.178  This dynamic emphasizes the greater bargaining power of 
those countries that fulfill the intermediary stages in the interna-
 
(suggesting that, in regard to protecting developing countries, the TRIPS Agree-
ment does not deserve the “extravagant and fulsome praise” heaped upon it). 
174 Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 123, at 44 (discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of “middle income” developing countries’ market position). 
175 See Maskus, supra note 106, at 566 (noting that countries with smaller 
populations will not be able to “win price discounts”); see also WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. COMM’N ON MACROECON. AND HEALTH, HEALTH AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 49 (2002) (discussing various ways to improve developing countries’ 
access to pharmaceuticals). 
176 See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 108–22 (1980) (de-
tailing the factors which affect buyers’ strategy).  
177 See generally Steinberg, supra note 11, at 347–48 (discussing “market size as 
a source of bargaining power at the GATT/WTO”). 
178 See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third 
World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (1989) (“[T]he Unites States has threatened or imposed 
coercive economic measures on countries it regards as not providing adequate 
[patent] protection.”). 
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tional division of labor and industrial production, such as NICs.179  
At the same time, the propensity to innovate can sharply change 
the ability of developing countries to issue compulsory licenses, as 
will be argued in the next section. 
3. THE INNOVATION BENT OVER THE BARGAINING COST 
STRUCTURE 
3.1. Overview 
Insofar as the ability to issue compulsory licenses is concerned, 
the post-WTO intellectual property-based bargaining environment 
requires a conceptual adaptation of existing bargaining models.  
Tables 1 and 2 depict graphically the suggested shift.  Table 1 
represents the standard view that WTO members negotiate market 
access and other commitments essentially on the size and diversity 
of their economies.180  The assumption is that the members with the 
highest economic wealth and most diversified economies have 
more bargaining chips to offer, and less to lose, should negotia-
tions break down.  Bargaining power is therefore viewed as a con-
tinuum that largely reflects market size and economic diversifica-
tion.181  In contrast, as depicted in Table 2, this Article argues for a 
more nuanced view of bargaining power within the group of de-
veloping countries when intellectual property-based products and 
technologies are at stake.  This nuanced view takes into account the 
overall higher levels of bargaining power of NICs in comparison 
with the rest of the group of developing countries, but it also con-
siders the effects of varied levels of innovativeness in pharmaceuti-
 
179 See generally Bradford Jr., supra note 82 (examining how the United States 
and Western Europe will adjust to the NICs’ role as global exporters); 
CHOWDHURY & ISLAM, supra note 81 (commenting on the rise of four NICs, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan); GUILLÉN, supra note 82 (noting the globali-
zation’s dependence on economic growth). 
180 See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, 
NAFTA, and the WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 
231, 233 (1997) (comparing bargaining positions of different countries and the fac-
tors which effect those positions); Gerhart & Kella, supra note 4, at 522 (“The posi-
tion of developing countries in the WTO is as much a reflection of their lack of 
power as it is a reflection of their economic interests of integrating capacities.”). 
181 See Steinberg, supra note 11, at 341 (“When GATT/WTO bargaining is 
power-based, states bring to bear instruments of power that are extrinsic to the 
rules (instruments based primarily on market size) . . . .”). 
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cals within the group of NICs.  A typology emerges to divide de-
veloping countries into three groups.  As will be explained, inno-
vative NICs are categorized as Medium Bargaining Power coun-
tries (“MBPs”), and non-innovative NICs are categorized, 
somewhat paradoxically, as High Bargaining Power Countries 
(“HBPs”).  The remaining developing countries are represented 
collectively as Low Bargaining Power Countries (“LBPs”).   
 
Table 1: Conventional WTO Bargaining Model 
 
Least Developing 
Countries (LDCs) 
 
50 poorest countries 
 
Developing  
Countries 
 
[Default List] 
 
Developed  
Countries 
 
Most OECDs 
 
 
Table 2: Suggested Post-WTO Bargaining Model 
 
LBPs 
 
 
Developing Countries 
[Default List] 
 
MBPs (Inno-
vative NICs) 
 
China, India 
 
HBPs (Non-
Innovative NICs) 
 
Brazil, South Africa, 
Thailand 
 
Developed  
Countries 
 
Most OECDs 
 
 
The presence of innovation in pharmaceuticals, particularly, serves 
as a threshold between two groups of NICs.  These groups are the 
innovation ‘haves,’ sometimes referred to as ‘innovative develop-
ing countries,’182 and the innovation ‘have-nots.’183  Currently, only 
two NICs are undergoing the process of becoming pharmaceutical 
innovators.  This small group of innovative NICs effectively in-
cludes only India and China.  To be sure, this transition is clearer in 
India, which already displays robust signals of pharmaceutical in-
novativeness.  In China, though, there are indications that the 
 
182 See Carlos Morel et al., Health Innovation in Developing Countries to Address 
Diseases of the Poor, 1 INNOVATION STRATEGY TODAY 1, 2  (2005) (“IDCs have the 
capacity to develop, manufacture, ensure safety, and market new health 
products and to develop, test and introduce new health policies or strate-
gies.”). 
183 See Ulku, supra note 49, at 20 (noting that market size is an important fac-
tor in determining the effectiveness of Research & Development sectors). 
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country’s innovative industry is just as promising.  In this group of 
countries, pharmaceutical innovation plays a twofold role.  On the 
one hand, it boosts the countries’ technology-based economies, 
rendering them more competitive and efficient.184  On the other 
hand, pharmaceutical innovation restricts the ability of their gov-
ernments to issue compulsory licenses that would make drugs 
more affordable to their needy and sizeable populations.185   
In ‘innovative NICs,’ or MBPs, the issuance of compulsory li-
censes entails Tier-2 sanctions costs, that is to say, sanctions costs 
imposed by the pharmaceutical industry.  The issuance of a com-
pulsory license signals the existence of a less protective intellectual 
property system.  In MBPs, the booming local pharmaceutical in-
dustry would be prompted to reduce innovation efforts out of fear 
that a less protective legal and institutional environment would be 
available to future pharmaceutical inventions.  Such a reaction 
would certainly be the case for both the national pharmaceutical 
industry, as may be seen prominently in India, and for internation-
al MNEs performing R&D activities abroad, as is increasingly 
common in both India and China. 
Conversely, ‘non-innovative NICs,’ or HBPs, neither innovate, 
nor foresee becoming relevant pharmaceutical innovators in the 
immediate future.  Brazil186 and Thailand187 clearly qualify as 
HBPs, while South Africa is a threshold, or dubious, case.188  Coun-
tries such as Brazil and Thailand are like China and India—
 
184 See generally Shahid Yusuf, From Creativity to Innovation (World Bank, 
Working Paper No. 4262, 2007) (arguing that “[c]ommercially viable innovations” 
are increasingly important to a country’s economy). 
185 See, e.g., Overview of HIV and AIDS in India, AVERT, 
http://www.avert.org/aidsindia.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (outlining the ef-
fects of AIDS in India); HIV & AIDS in China, AVERT, 
http://www.avert.org/aidschina.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (describing the 
prevalence of AIDS in China). 
186 See FÓRUM DE COMPETITIVIDADE, supra note 172, at 77 (discussing Brazil’s 
technical innovations). 
187 See Savoie, supra note 105 (discussing the effects of compulsory licensing 
on Thailand’s innovativeness); see also Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths And 
Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42 GA. L. REV. 131, 172–192 (2007) (discussing how 
compulsory patent licensing can both reward innovation and provide increased 
access to medicines). 
188 Sykes, supra note 132, at 47–48 (“South Africa was the target of litigation 
initiated by a number of pharmaceutical manufacturers over South Africa’s Medi-
cines and Related Substances Control Act of 1997.”).   
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although on a smaller scale—in that they possess great bargaining 
power because of their large and diversified economies.  Therefore, 
it may be proffered that HBPs are at best mildly fearful of Tier-1 
sanctions costs.  However, because HBPs are non-innovative coun-
tries, the risk of industry-specific sanctions costs, or Tier-2 sanc-
tions costs, is minimal.  In these countries, a much less innovative 
pharmaceutical industry will be unable to impose sanctions costs 
through reduced innovation. 
3.2. The HBP Model: A Single-Sanction Cost Structure 
3.2.1. Introduction 
Among HBPs, overall weaker players are in a more favorable 
position to bargain than players who are stronger overall—a situa-
tion which is, at first glance, paradoxical.  HBPs like Brazil and 
Thailand generally possess less market power than larger develop-
ing countries like India and China; yet in the context of intellectual 
property bargaining they are stronger than the latter countries be-
cause of their ability to issue compulsory licenses.  Similarly, the 
most innovative applications of a government’s use of open source 
technology stem from HBPs.189  Examples include:  Citizen Service 
Centres in Brazil, ICT-based Electoral Reform in South Africa, and 
Philippine Customs Reform.  “Innovative solutions based on open-
source technologies enable faster diffusion of locally-innovated 
ICT.”190  The group of HBPs is composed of those countries that 
stand to benefit the most from bargaining around TRIPS through 
patent compulsory licensing.  Their high bargaining power is es-
sentially to the result of three features.  First, they are NICs, which 
implies relatively higher market power than developing countries 
at large.  Second, they do not innovate in pharmaceuticals and thus 
have lower innovation-related sanction costs.  Third, their current 
domestic laws contain limited TRIPS-plus provisions. 
 
189 Cf. Free Software in Developing Countries Vital to Future Prosperity and Good 
Governance: UNU Technology Experts, UNITED NATIONS UNIV. (Mar. 15, 2006), 
http://www.unu.edu/media/archives/2006/files/mre-iist-3-06.pdf [hereinafter 
Free Software in Developing Countries] (discussing the development of better open 
source desktops and increasing the number of open source programmers). 
190 Id. 
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This third point deserves highlighting and further explanation.  
Not every non-innovative NIC can be considered an HBP.  Mexico, 
for instance, a large non-innovative NIC, has a fairly limited ability 
to bargain with either developed countries or the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Mexico is bound by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”)191 and by an FTA, which it signed with the 
European Union in the year 2000.192  These agreements can render 
illegal issuances of compulsory licenses that would be legal under 
TRIPS alone.  As such, these agreements magnify the prospects of 
Tier-1 sanctions in the event compulsory licenses are issued. 
3.2.2. The HBP-MBP Regional Thresholds 
3.2.2.1. Brazil/South America 
The case of Brazil shows that the absence of local innovation in 
pharmaceuticals can, ironically, boost the bargaining power of a 
large developing country.  For decades, Brazil has been a leading 
voice for the developing world, in South America and beyond, in 
international trade and intellectual property disputes.  As such, it 
has opportunistically funneled its commercial interests into an ag-
gressive form of bargaining with developed countries. 
Brazil is herein categorized as an HBP primarily because it has 
a high value outside option in negotiations over the conditions for 
access to patented pharmaceuticals.  This outside option is availa-
ble to Brazil firstly because the country possesses a generics indus-
try that is in a position to produce patented drugs that may be 
compelled to obtain compulsory licenses.  Since the issuance of 
compulsory licenses in Brazil can generate net savings, threats of 
compulsory licensing become a powerful negotiation weapon.  
 
191 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 670 (1993) (discussing the standard of protection for intel-
lectual property rights per the agreement).  
192 See generally Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Coopera-
tion Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, Oct. 28, 2000, 2165 
U.N.T.S. 111 (intending to “establish a framework to encourage the development 
of trade in goods and services”); see also Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in 
FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 
215, 221 n.24 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006) (“Mexico has FTAs 
with over 42 countries, many of which were negotiated subsequent to NAFTA.”). 
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Second, a non-innovative NIC like Brazil faces a combination of 
mild to low Tier-1 and Tier-2 sanctions costs.  On a Tier-1 level, 
Brazil’s large and diversified economy grants the country the abili-
ty to endure retaliation threats from the developed world.  On a 
Tier-2 level, Brazil’s large and growing consumer markets guaran-
tee reasonable to high private investment levels in production.193  
At the same time, a less stringent patent regime does not sufficient-
ly harm its largely non-innovative pharmaceutical industry.194  
Third, a NIC such as Brazil can withstand the prospects of costly 
litigation upon the issuance of compulsory licenses. 
All of these factors have contributed to shaping Brazil’s aggres-
sive bargaining behavior.195  Brazil has also gained world renown 
for being the most successful developing country in tackling the 
AIDS epidemic.196  Key to the effectiveness of Brazil’s AIDS pro-
gram was the country’s aggressive negotiating stance designed to 
obtain large discounts on HIV/AIDS medication produced by big 
pharmaceutical companies.  Its strategy was largely premised on 
the issuance of compulsory licenses, or the threat thereof, on patent 
rights over these drugs.197 
 
193 See Steve Hamm, Tech’s Future, BUS. WK., Sept. 27, 2004, at 82 (discussing 
the growth of technology sales in emerging markets such as Brazil). 
194 See Carlos H. de Brito Cruz & Luiz de Mello, Boosting Innovation Perfor-
mance in Brazil 5 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 532, 2006) (showing that 
scientific and applied R&D are highly disconnected in Brazil, and thus the country 
is largely incapable of converting knowledge into productivity gains for its busi-
ness sector); see also ALAN WRIGHT, INNOVATION IN BRAZIL: PUBLIC POLICIES AND 
BUSINESS STRATEGIES (2008) (noting that Brazilian scientists and research institu-
tions produce knowledge in various fields yet innovation “remains largely absent 
in many sectors of the economy”). 
195 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 115, at 406 (“Brazil has been by far the most 
masterful in counteracting the economic and political influence of the United 
States over global intellectual property law.”); see also Yu, supra note 104, at 349 
(defining Brazil as the “poster child of the use of—or, more precisely, the threat to 
use—compulsory licenses to promote access to essential medicines”). 
196 See Brazil’s AIDS Programme: A conflict of goals, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2007, at 
42 (discussing Brazil’s successful HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment program); 
see also Ellen‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medi-
cines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 32 (2002) (ascribing the 
success of Brazil’s AIDS program to its ability to produce medicines domestically). 
197 See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—US Patents Code, 
WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001) (memorializing Brazil’s request to analyze the United 
States Patent Code for consistency with obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, 
suggesting violations of the agreement).  But see Shaffer, supra note 140, at 471 
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As part of this process, Brazil issued a compulsory license over 
Merck’s Efavirenz, an ARV, in 2007.198  The country seemingly suf-
fered only modest sanctions costs upon its issuance of the compul-
sory license.  To begin with, no sanctions were raised at the WTO 
or other international forums, as the compulsory license was large-
ly viewed as legal under international law.199  The Special 301 Re-
port issued by the U.S. Trade Representative criticized Brazil’s dis-
cussions with patent holders,200 but the United States did not 
impose formal sanctions.  Merck issued a press release stating that 
Brazil’s action was an “expropriation of intellectual property” that 
“will have a negative impact on Brazil's reputation as an industria-
lized country seeking to attract inward investment, and thus its 
ability to build world-class research and development.”201  True to 
Merck’s claim, there are no clear signs that the pharmaceutical sec-
tor in Brazil is revamping, particularly insofar as innovation is con-
cerned.  On the other hand, there are no obvious signs of reduced 
FDI in Brazil.  In fact, the opposite was true as of 2007:  Brazil’s 
share of FDI in 2007 totaled USD $34.6 billion, almost twice as 
much as the previous year, representing one of the highest shares 
 
(“Brazil and Canada each initiated one TRIPS complaint, but these were merely 
symbolic claims that they filed in response to WTO complaints brought by the 
United States and EC against them.”). 
198 See Celia W. Dugger, Brazil Overrides Merck Patent on AIDS Drug, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2007 (noting that Brazil opted to purchase a generic version of the 
drug from India); Brazil Gets Abbott Discount, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2007, at B7 (dis-
cussing how Brazil came to an agreement with the pharmaceutical company Ab-
bot on a significantly discounted price for one its drugs). 
199 See, e.g., Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Brazil Takes Steps to Import Cheaper AIDS 
Drug Under Trade Law, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH, May 7, 2007, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=614&res=1280&print=0 (“There appears to be a 
general agreement that Brazil is adhering to international trade law in what it has 
done.”).  
200 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2007 SPECIAL 301 
REPORT, 30, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload 
_file230_11122.pdf (discussing the need for Brazil to continue attempts to engage 
in open dialogue with foreign pharmaceutical companies in order to reach “mu-
tually satisfactory outcomes”). 
201 Richard Walker, Merck & Co., Inc. Statement on Brazilian Government's Deci-
sion To Issue Compulsory License for STOCRIN™, AIDSPORTAL, May 4, 2007, 
http://www.aidsportal.org/news_details.aspx?ID=4635; R.A. Malshekar, Dir. 
General, Council of Sci. and Indus. Research, Speech at 10th Zuckerman Lecture 
(June 11, 2003). 
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in the world amongst developing countries.202  In the pharmaceuti-
cals industry specifically, FDI reached USD $164.4 million in 
2007,203 which is consistent with the historic investment levels ob-
served in previous years.204 
In fact, Brazil’s aggressive bargaining behavior has manifested 
itself in areas where there are not specific TRIPS policies on phar-
maceuticals.  This may be demonstrated by three separate exam-
ples.  First, Brazil remains the only developing country that has ev-
er requested consultations pursuant to the WTO dispute settlement 
process with any developed country concerning the noncom-
pliance of intellectual property laws with the TRIPS Agreement.205  
Second, Brazil exercised aggressive leadership in GATT; alongside 
India and eight other developing countries,206 Brazil strongly op-
posed attempts to expand the mandate of GATT to cover substan-
tive intellectual property issues.207  Third, Brazil vigorously led the 
campaign to support the free and open source software movement, 
noticeably alongside developed countries such as Spain and Fin-
land.208  In fact, the open source movement’s largest concentration 
 
202 CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL, INVESTIMENTO ESTRANGEIRO DIRETO (2008) (on 
file with author). 
203 Id.; CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (2007) (on file 
with author). 
204 BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, DISTRIBUÍÇÃO POR ATIVIDADE ECONÓMICA DE 
APLICAÇÃO DOS RECURSOS (2007) (on file with author). 
205 See Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 197 (suggesting the 
United States violated the agreement). 
206 The other LBPs were Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, 
Tanzania, and Yugoslavia.  See Member States Agree to Further Examine Proposal on 
Development, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., Oct. 4, 2004, http://www 
.wipo.int/pressroom/en/html.jsp?file=/redocs/prdocs/en/2004/wipo_pr_2004_
396.html (discussing a proposal by Brazil and Argentina encouraging inclusion of 
a development agenda in the World Intellectual Property Organization); Member 
States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. 
(Oct. 1, 2007), www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/article_0071.html 
(discussing the adoption by the World Intellectual Property Organization of a de-
velopment agenda). 
207 See WATAL, supra note 149, at 19 (describing Brazil as one of the “hardlin-
er” developing countries that made a weakly supported proposal to exclude subs-
tantive intellectual property issues from the Uruguay Round of negotiations). 
208 See Brian Fitzgerald & Nic Suzor, Legal Issues for the Use of Free and Open 
Source Software in Government, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 412, 422 (2005) (discussing the 
decision of several nations, including Brazil, to use open source products in their 
government offices). 
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of supporting countries presently lies in South America, clearly 
under the leadership of Brazil.209 
“Brazil has also become the first country to require any compa-
ny or research institute that receives government financing to de-
velop software to license it as open-source, meaning the underly-
ing software code must be free to all.”210  Open source represents a 
small share of the global software market, but Linux and other 
open source solutions will find their biggest markets in developing 
countries, particularly in MBPs, like China and India, and HBPs in 
East Asia and South America.211  These countries have begun turn-
ing to open source for various reasons, including a desire not to be 
beholden to MNEs such as Microsoft.212  In turn, Microsoft has be-
come a progressively harsher opponent of the open-source soft-
ware model, in which the underlying code for software is freely 
shared for users to modify and distribute.  Similarly, to the fields of 
pharmaceutical patents and information and communications 
technology (“ICT”), it upholds that the open source approach un-
dermines innovation at large.213 
Fourth, Brazil serves as one of the leaders in the G-20 organiza-
tion, which essentially congregates the twenty largest economies in 
the world, both from within the developed and the developing 
 
209 See Daniel F. Olejko, Comment, Charming a Snake: Open Source Strategies for 
Developing Countries Disillusioned with TRIPs, 25 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 855, 858 
(2007) (noting that Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela have also displayed a 
wide acceptance of open source software in “both government and industry”). 
210 Todd Benson, Brazil: Free Software’s Biggest and Best Friend, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 29, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/29/technology/29computer 
.html.  
211 See Free Software in Developing Countries, supra note 189 (noting that if the 
number of open source programmers in developing nations remains low, that 
“developing nations will simply remain consumers of open source products ra-
ther than participants in the larger open source market”). 
212 See Brazil Gives Nod to Open Source, WIRED, Nov. 16, 2003, 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2003/11/61257 (discussing how Bra-
zilian government agencies are shifting to open source operating systems to cut 
costs). 
213 See SANJIVA WEERAWARANA & JIVAKA WEERATUNGA, OPEN SOURCE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 30 (2004), available at http://www.eldis.org/fulltext 
/opensource.pdf (discussing comments by Indian President Abdul Kalam sup-
porting the use of open source software despite Microsoft’s protests).  
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worlds.214  Brazil’s HBP-type leadership was also demonstrated in 
2003 at the Cancun Ministerial during the Fifth WTO Ministerial 
Conference, where Brazil, together with China and India, led a coa-
lition of twenty-one developing countries.215  Lastly, one year after 
the Ministerial in Cancun, Brazil was seated at the forefront of the 
process that led to the establishment of a development agenda 
within WIPO.216 
This Article thus suggests that Brazil’s strategy derives from a 
distinct set of incentives hidden within the TRIPS Agreement.  
These hidden incentives render it convenient for non-innovative 
NICs, such as Brazil, to use compulsory licenses as part of a hard-
line negotiation strategy with big pharmaceutical corporations.  
Brazil is able to obtain net benefits from such aggressive behavior 
mostly because it is able to produce generics locally, something 
that smaller and weaker developing countries are unable to do.  In 
turn, in a country with weak institutions and high taxation such as 
Brazil, the expected long-term effects of maintaining an overall 
weaker patent protection system in the pharmaceutical industry 
are less dramatic than those in more innovative countries, such as 
India.  Brazil, unlike India, is largely a non-innovative country, 
particularly in pharmaceuticals.  Consequently, the issuance of 
compulsory licenses in Brazil only modestly hinders innovation in 
the pharmaceutical industry over time, because such innovation 
tends not to occur for reasons more influential than the compul-
sory licenses. 
 
214 See G-20, WHAT IS THE G-20, http://www.g20.org/about_what_is 
_g20.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (providing the mandate of the G-20, along 
with a comprehensive membership list). 
215 See Pablo A. Ormachea, Agriculture Subsidies and the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 139, 149 (2007) (discussing how under the lea-
dership of Brazil, the Group of 21 was able to unify as a cohesive bargaining 
block). 
216 See Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., Member States Agree to 
Further Examine Proposal on Development, WIPO/PR/2004/396 (Oct. 4, 2004), 
available at www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2004/wipo_pr_2004_396.html (dis-
cussing a proposal by Brazil and Argentina encouraging the inclusion of a “De-
velopment Agenda” in the WIPO); Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., 
Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO, WIPO/PR/2007/521 
(Oct. 1, 2007), available at www.wipo.int/pressroom /en/articles/2007 
/article_0071.html (discussing adoption of a development agenda that included 
establishing a “Committee on Development and Intellectual Property” that will, 
amongst other things, “discuss IP and development-related issues”). 
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Overall, the case of Brazil does not demonstrate that patents are 
uncorrelated with innovation in pharmaceuticals.  Although it re-
mains a highly controversial topic, there is some evidence of the 
existence of a link between patent protection and pharmaceutical 
innovation.217  Indeed, the lack of a more stringent enforcement of 
intellectual property laws may well be one of the many causes for 
lack of innovation in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector.  Howev-
er, even supporters of stronger patent protection systems will con-
cede that “an effective IPR regime may not be sufficient in-and-of 
itself to attract pharmaceutical FDI.”218  Early adherence to TRIPS 
has failed to cause the emergence of technological innovation in 
the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry.  To generalize, in non-
innovative NICs, TRIPS does not operate as a “carrot” for more in-
novation; rather, it functions as a “stick” for less piracy. 
3.2.2.2. Thailand/Asia 
Thailand is arguably another HBP country.  The case of Thail-
and has a number of similarities to that of Brazil.  Like Brazil, 
Thailand has adopted an aggressive stance on both patent bargain-
ing and software protection.  In Asia, to illustrate, some of the 
highest overall Free/Libre/Open Source Software (“FLOSS”)-
related activity seems to be taking place in innovative developing 
countries; namely NIC countries like India, China, and Taiwan, fol-
lowed by South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.219  
 
217 See ANDRÉANNE LÉGER, THE ROLE(S) OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR 
INNOVATION: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 10 (2007), available at http://www.diw.de/documents 
/publikationen/73/61916/dp707.pdf (stating that there is “evidence that patent 
protection has a strong and pervasive influence of the willingness to perform 
R&D in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries”); see also Colleen Chien, 
Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharma-
ceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 856 (2003) (discussing the 
“perception that compulsory licenses harm the incentive for innovation”).  
218 DOUGLAS LIPPOLDT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, PHARMACEUTICALS 
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 7 (2005), available at http://www.gem.sciences-
po.fr/content/publications/pdf/lippoldt_IPRs_Pharma_FDI1106.pdf. 
219 See Frederick Noronha, Developing Countries Gain from Free/Open-Source 
Software, LINUX J., May 20, 2003, http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6884 (not-
ing that in Asia, countries such as India, China, South Korea, and Malaysia were 
found to have high FLOSS-related activity while countries from the Indian sub-
continent had medium-level activity). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
BENOLIEL.DOC 11/15/2010  9:09 PM 
320 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
Moreover, Thailand has been one of the few developing countries 
to actually carry out compulsory licenses of drugs.  It did so for the 
first time in 2006, with the compulsory license of Merck’s Efavi-
renz, the same drug on which Brazil imposed a compulsory li-
cense.220  Only a few months later, Thailand issued two more com-
pulsory licenses, one for Abbott’s Kaletra, an AIDS drug, and 
another for Sanofi-Aventis’ Plavix, a heart medicine.221  The com-
pulsory license over Plavix represents a particularly clear expres-
sion of high bargaining power on the part of Thailand, given that 
whether a heart disease drug meets the TRIPS criterion of “national 
emergence” is questionable as a matter of law.222  Such a compul-
sory license could have potentially given rise to Tier-1 sanctions 
authorized by the WTO which in fact never happened—but the 
Thai government acted irrespective of that risk. 
The dynamics of Tier-2 sanctions in Thailand are similar to 
those seemingly prevailing in Brazil.  First, Thailand is actually in a 
 
220 See Letter from Dr. Thawat Suntrajarn, Dir. Gen., Dep’t of Disease Control, 
to Manager, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (Nov. 29, 2006), reprinted in FACTS AND 
EVIDENCES ON THE 10 BURNING ISSUES RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS 
ON THREE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS IN THAILAND 47−48 (Vichai Chokevivat ed., 
2007), available at http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White%20Paper%20CL-EN.pdf 
(stating the Ministry of Public Health decided to use it patent rights to increase 
the accessibility of Merck’s Efavirenz “for public interests”).  
221 See Decree of Dep’t of Disease Control, Ministry of Pub. Health, Regarding 
Exploitation of Patent on Drugs & Medical Supplies by the Government on Com-
bination Drug Between Lopinavir & Ritonavir (Jan. 29, 2007), 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thai-cl-kaletra_en.pdf (invoking 
rights under the Thai Patent Act to permit compulsive licensing of Kaletra); An-
nouncement, Ministry of Pub. Health, Regarding Exploitation of Drugs and Medi-
cal Supplies for Clopidogrel (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.cptech.org 
/ip/health/c/thailand/thai-cl-clopidogrel_en.pdf (notifying the public of intent 
to permit compulsive licensing of Plavix). 
222 See, e.g., Editorial, Bangkok’s Drug War Goes Global, WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 7, 
2007, at 11 (arguing that Thailand is “exploiting vague language” in the TRIPS 
Agreement to issue compulsory licenses for a non-existent national emergency); 
Ronald A. Cass, Thai Patent Turmoil, WALL ST J. ASIA, Mar. 13, 2007, at 13 (arguing 
that “Thailand's assertion of a right under TRIPs to impose compulsory licensing 
rests on shaky ground”); Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Drug Company Reacts to Thai 
License; Government Ready to Talk, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH (Feb. 16, 2007), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=538&res=1280&print=0 (report-
ing that Sanofi-Aventis was surprised by the mandatory licensing of Plavix since 
the drug arguably did not treat a health concern that justified a compulsory li-
cense). 
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position to obtain net benefits with the issuance of compulsory li-
censes; mainly because it possesses an established manufacturing 
capability in pharmaceuticals.223  In fact, a state-run capacity to 
produce generics, particularly AIDS drugs, further enhances the 
ability of the country to pose a veritable threat of issuing compul-
sory licenses.224  Second, Tier-2 sanctions costs play out in Thailand 
in a similar fashion to that of Brazil.  Like Brazil, the pharmaceuti-
cal industry in Thailand is relatively small in comparison to other 
sectors of the local economy.  Moreover, the Thai pharmaceutical 
industry is mostly geared towards supplying the local market, ra-
ther than manufacturing for export.  In addition, the industry does 
not involve research and development of new drugs and compo-
nents.225  Over the coming years, “Thailand will likely remain an 
overall importer of medicines, with the trade balance further shift-
ing in favor of imports . . . .”226  Moreover, and although Abbott 
Laboratories recently withdrew seven registration applications for 
newly-developed pharmaceutical products in Thailand, the Thai 
government seemingly relies on the expectation that its markets 
are large enough to sustain sufficiently interested MNEs.227  Tier-1 
 
223 See Rein, supra note 111, at 402 (noting that Thailand has reduced drug 
prices by actively producing generic drugs and by “limited protection of exclusive 
marketing rights”).  
224 See Sanchai Chasombat et al., The National Access to Antiretroviral Program 
for PHA (NAPHA) in Thailand, 37 SOUTHEAST ASIAN J. TROPICAL MED. & PUB. 
HEALTH 704, 706 (2006) (explaining how Thailand’s National Access to Antiretro-
viral Program for People living with HIV/AIDS (“NAPHA”) increased patient 
access to affordable drugs). 
225 See AMES GROSS, NEW REGULATORY TRENDS IN THAILAND’S 
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET (1999), available at http://www.pacificbridgemedical 
.com/publications/html/ThailandMar1999.htm (stating that Thailand’s pharma-
ceutical industry involves little research and design and that it imports most of 
the ingredients used to make pharmaceutical drugs).  
226 Press Release, Research and Mkts., In Thailand’s Pharmaceutical Market 
Generics Are Likely to Be the Fastest-Growing Segment, Reaching US$1.63bn in 
2010 from US$1.1bn in 2005, (May 1, 2007), available at http://findarticles.com/p 
/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2007_May_1/ai_n27219824. 
227 See Press Release, Médecins sans Frontières, MSF Denounces Abbott’s 
Move to Withhold Medicines from People in Thailand (Mar. 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=55646135-15C5-
F00A-25D3DAC13D288586&component=toolkit.pressrelease&method=full_html 
(discussing Abbotts Laboratories’ “decision not to market its new medicines in 
Thailand”); see also Nicholas Zamiska, Abbott’s Thai Pact May Augur Pricing Shift, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2007, at A3 (noting that while Abbott Laboratories began sell-
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sanctions costs appear to play out favorably for Thailand as well.  
In recent negotiations with the United States, Thailand notably re-
jected a proposed FTA.228  This FTA would have, among other 
things, required a greater commitment by the Thai government to 
enhance patent protection.  This rejection again represents a typical 
HBP bargaining stance, paralleling that of Brazil.  After all, Brazil 
thus far has not agreed to the framework laid out by the United 
States for the intended Free Trade Area of the Americas (“FTAA”), 
which contains similar TRIPS-plus provisions.229 
To conclude, the similarities between the cases of Thailand and 
Brazil are abundant.  In spite of sharp differences in their political 
systems,230 to date the only developing countries that have 
 
ing the AIDS drug Kaletra in Thailand, it still refused to sell six other types of 
drugs to Thailand); Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Abbott To Stop Launching 
New Drugs in Thailand in Response to Country’s Compulsory License for Antiretroviral 
Kaletra, KAISER DAILY HIV/AIDS REPORT (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www 
.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=1&DR_ID=43558 (noting 
that Abbott Laboratories had announced plans to withdraw seven drug applica-
tions from Thailand in response to Thailand’s issuance of a compulsory license for 
the AIDS drug Kaletra). 
228 See, e.g., Sanya Smith, Thai Human Rights Commission Criticizes FTA with 
US, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Jan. 26, 2007, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2 
/twninfo492.htm (reporting that the National Human Rights Commission of 
Thailand issued a draft report concluding that the proposed free trade agreement 
between Thailand and the United States would “violate the human rights of the 
Thai people and affect the country’s sovereignty”). 
229 See Human Rights Watch – HIV/AIDS Program, Comment on the Draft 
Text of the Agreement on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (2003), available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/ftaa/hrw02272003.html (noting that these provisions 
“pose a significant danger to developing countries facing public health emergen-
cies”); Ormachea, supra note 215, at 145–46 (noting Brazil’s “unwillingness to ac-
quiesce to American interests in the context of FTAA negotiations”).  See generally 
Angelina Yearick Heimel, The Power of a Patent: The Impact of Intellectual Property 
Protections in the Free Trade Area of the Americas Agreement on the Plight of Prescrip-
tion Drug Availability and Affordability in Central and South America, 16 PACE INT'L L. 
REV. 447, 467 (2004). 
230 Thailand’s compulsory licenses were issued by a military government; 
Brazil’s compulsory licenses were issued by a democratic government. See general-
ly Roger Bate, Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars, AM. ENTERPRISE INST HEALTH 
POL’Y, Apr. 2007, available at http://www.aei.org/outlook/25890 (stating that one 
of Thailand’s military government’s goals is to strengthen domestic drug manu-
facturing, one of its strongest areas); Medical News Today, supra note 201 (dis-
cussing the Brazilian President’s issuance of a compulsory license to produce a 
generic version of Efavirenz). 
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achieved universal access to ARV therapy to AIDS patients have 
been Brazil and Thailand.231  In both cases, more ambitious health 
programs were made possible by aggressive price negotiations 
with big pharmaceutical companies, among other things.  This 
strategy, in turn, was largely premised on the issuance—or more 
commonly, the real threat of issuance—of compulsory licenses 
over patented drugs.232  The ensuing paradox, to insist on this 
term, lies also in that overall less powerful countries such as Brazil 
and Thailand are proving more successful in dealing with the 
AIDS epidemic than other countries that are more powerful over-
all, such as India and China.233  This situation arises in countries 
such as Brazil and Thailand not in spite of their lack of pharma-
ceutical innovation, but in part because of it. 
3.2.2.3. South Africa/Africa 
A third HBP to practice aggressive bargaining is South Africa.  
The country boasts the largest economy in the African continent, 
and enjoys noticeable political influence over other African coun-
tries.  In relative terms, it is expected to remain quite powerful vis-
 
231 See WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNAIDS, PROGRESS ON GLOBAL ACCESS TO HIV 
ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY: A REPORT ON “3 BY 5” AND BEYOND 36 (2006) (noting 
that Brazil and Thailand’s efforts have led to low mother-to-child transmission 
rates); Nathan Ford et al., Sustaining Access to Antiretroviral Therapy in the Less-
Developed World: Lessons from Brazil and Thailand, 21 AIDS S21, S21 (2007) (noting 
that Thailand and Brazil “are among the few developing countries that can be said 
to have achieved universal access to antiretroviral therapy”). 
232 See CHERI GRACE, THE  EFFECT  OF  CHANGING  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  ON 
 PHARMACEUTICAL  INDUSTRY  PROSPECTS  IN  INDIA  AND  CHINA: CONSIDERATIONS 
 FOR  ACCESS  TO  MEDICINE 15 (2004) (noting that a country’s threat to issue a com-
pulsory license compels many patent originators to lower their prices). 
233 See HIV and AIDS in Brazil, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/aids-brazil.htm 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (describing Brazil’s response to HIV and AIDS as a 
“success story”); HIV and AIDS in China, AVERT,  http://www.avert.org 
/aidschina.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (noting that China recently discovered 
the “danger of ignoring HIV and AIDS” and has implemented a program to com-
bat the epidemic); HIV and AIDS in India, AVERT, http://www.avert.org 
/aidsindia.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (discussing the difficulties in combating 
HIV/AIDS in India due to its high levels of illiteracy, poverty and citizens suffer-
ing from poor health); HIV and AIDS in Thailand, AVERT, http://www.avert.org 
/aidsthai.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (noting that Thailand is one of the very 
few developing countries in the world “where public policy has been effective in 
preventing the spread of HIV and AIDS on a national scale”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
BENOLIEL.DOC 11/15/2010  9:09 PM 
324 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
à-vis other developing countries.234  Similar to Brazil and Thailand, 
South Africa is engaged in little to no innovation on the ground, 
particularly in pharmaceuticals.  In that sense, it may be more nar-
rowly classified as a non-innovative NIC. 
There are three persuasive indications of South Africa’s HBP-
like bargaining situation.  First, alongside Brazil, South Africa was 
prominently involved in the negotiations235 that led to the Decision 
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.236  In retrospect, there is 
wide consensus that South Africa made an important contribution 
to what is sometimes regarded as a turning point in the TRIPS de-
bate.237  Second, the country has been noticeably influential in plac-
ing the issue of access to medicines on the human rights and public 
health agendas.238  
Third, South Africa withstood great pressure from the United 
States in the process of amending its intellectual property law.  In 
1997, South Africa passed the Medicines Amendment Act,239 allow-
 
234 See Jim O’Neill et al., Global Economics Paper No.134: How Solid Are the 
BRICs?, GOLDMAN SACHS ECON. RES., Dec. 2005, at 1, 19 app.3, available at 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/how-solid-doc.pdf (noting that, 
like the BRICs, South Africa is ranked 43, placing in the top half of the growth en-
vironment rankings for developing countries).  
235 See Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of 
Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 483, 496 (2007) (listing Brazil, India, and Pakistan 
as the three developing countries most “prominently involved” in negotiations). 
236 Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003). 
237 See, e.g., Ruth Mayne, The Global Campaign on Patents and Access to Medi-
cines: An Oxfam Perspective, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 244, 249 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne 
eds., 2002) (noting that South Africa’s decision to fight a lawsuit against its 1997 
Medicine Act “was a critical factor in generating global media interest”); SUSAN K. 
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 146, 181 (2003) (stating that the “HIV/AIDS pandemic . . . sped up the re-
velation of the negative consequences of TRIPS”). 
238 See Philippe Cullet, The Doha Declaration of the WTO and Access to Medicines 
(Int’l Envtl. Law Research Ctr., Briefing Paper No. 2002-1, 2002), available at 
http://www.ielrc.org/content/f0201.htm (discussing the legal consequences of 
South Africa’s attempt to “foster public health goals”). 
239 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 (S. 
Afr.). 
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ing for parallel imports of pharmaceuticals.240  Controversy 
erupted over this legislation, and the United States government 
threatened sanctions if the South African government put the Me-
dicines Amendment Act into full force.241  The United States Con-
gress included in its appropriations bill in 1998 a provision with-
holding aid monies for South Africa until the Medicines Amend-
Amendment Act was repealed.242  The Clinton administration 
eventually backed away from its original stance, even though it 
was heavily lobbied by the pharmaceutical industry–the latter hav-
ing reduced Tier-2-like sanction power vis-à-vis its HBP bargaining 
counterpart.  Unsurprisingly, South Africa did not back down.243  
The United States government later withdrew its legislation after 
the South African government asserted that it was legally able to 
utilize parallel imports and compulsory licenses under TRIPS.  On 
the South African side, the only compromise made was to repeat 
earlier promises that South Africa would abide by the WTO’s 
TRIPS Agreement.244 
 
240 See Mary Beth Walker, Assessing the Barriers to Universal Antiretroviral 
Treatment Access for HIV/AIDS in South Africa, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 193, 210 
(2004) (outlining the provisions of domestic law that were added to the 1965 Me-
dicines and Related Substances Control Act; effectively allowing parallel import-
ing). 
241 Id. at 211. 
242 See generally Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administra-
tion and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-
155 (1999) (expressly prohibiting the use of appropriated funds until the United 
States Government took steps to “work with the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa to negotiate the repeal, suspension, or termination of section 15(c) of 
South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 
of 1997. . . .”). 
243 See Hoen, supra note 196, at 31 (discussing the international public outrage 
over the U.S. drug companies’ legal challenge of the medicine laws in developing 
countries and the ensuing public pressure that resulted in the companies deciding 
to drop the case). 
244 See JAMES LOVE, FIVE COMMON MISTAKES BY REPORTERS COVERING 
US/SOUTH AFRICA DISPUTES OVER COMPULSORY LICENSING AND PARALLEL IMPORTS, 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/mistakes.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) 
(arguing that South Africa did not “back down” and listing the promise to abide 
by the TRIPS Agreement as its one and only concession); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
DIFFERENT NEEDS, DIFFERENT RESPONSIBILITIES: WHAT IS THE EU ASKING FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/december 
/tradoc_126493.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (stating that “advanced developing 
countries” include “the large emerging economies of the G20, who combine de-
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To conclude, the explanation for HBPs’ unique bargaining situ-
ation is threefold.  First, and most notable, HBPs stimulate a col-
lapse of the Tier-2 sanction costs.  This statement is true with re-
spect to MNEs, and at times local investors, both of which refrain 
from conducting R&D locally, even in the face of strong patent 
laws.  Furthermore, HBPs possess large consumer markets that 
tend to be highly desirable to large MNEs.  As can be expected, 
early adherence to TRIPS strict patent policies has failed to cause 
the emergence of research and development in innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry in HBPs.  Lack of innovation in ‘non-
innovative NICs’ has transformed economically weaker NICs into 
stronger bargaining powers in patent-sensitive products such as 
pharmaceuticals.  Such is the case when countries threaten to issue, 
or actually issue, patent compulsory licenses.  Second, the shortage 
of local innovation frees HBP governments, such as Brazil, Thail-
and, or South Africa, from pressures of a local industry that re-
quires more stringent patent protection.  This economic-political 
reality facilitates, rather than harms, HBPs’ power to issue compul-
sory licenses over pharmaceuticals.  Third, and more generally, in 
HBP countries, TRIPS does not effectively function as a “carrot” for 
more FDI or innovation, rather, it serves a “stick” to exert pressure 
in favor of Pax-American tailor-made intellectual property rights. 
3.3. The MBP Model: A Dual-Sanction Cost Structure 
3.3.1. Introduction 
Among NICs, innovative countries are those that benefit the 
least from bargaining around TRIPS through compulsory licenses 
or threats thereof.  Simply put, the main reason for this phenome-
non is that in these countries compulsory licenses discourage local 
innovation.  These countries paradoxically possess a weaker bar-
gaining position in terms of their ability to issue compulsory li-
censes, mainly because MBPs are subject to a “dual sanctions” cost 
structure.  First, on a Tier-1 bargaining level, a compulsory license 
can cause the United States government to impose sanctions.  
While strong in comparison to the rest of the developing world, 
MBPs remain dependent on strengthening their commercial ties 
 
veloping country status with high competitiveness in one or more export sector, 
such as Brazil (Agriculture), China (Manufacturing) and India (Services)”).  
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with the developed world.  Second, on a Tier-2 bargaining level, 
MBPs’ markets may be sanctioned, by either MNEs or national in-
vestors, particularly insofar as the issuance of compulsory licenses 
for pharmaceuticals may harm the MBPs’ innovation incentives.  
The Tier-2 sanction costs are also ever-present with the bio agricul-
ture and plant genetics patent-sensitive industries.  Developed 
countries’ support for extreme biotechnology measures that threat-
en to supplant the conventional intellectual property regime and to 
undermine food security in the underdeveloped world is ex-
pressed in manipulative genetic use restriction technologies 
(“GURTs”).  They are also jointly known as Terminator Technolo-
gy.245  These technologies are a genetic engineering method that 
limits genetic copy propagation by producing sterile seeds unfit for 
subsequent planting.246  Similar to Digital Rights Management 
(“DRM”) software technologies, it is a form of self-enforcing pa-
tents devoid of experimental use doctrines within patent law.247  
The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and noticeably 
Argentinean MNEs, are all active supporters of terminator tech-
nologies, and have continued to press for commercial exploitation 
of GURTs.248 
 
245 See, e.g., C. S. Srinivasan & Colin Thirtle, Impact of Terminator Technologies, 
in Developing Countries: A Framework for Economic Analysis, in ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 159, 161 (R.E. Evenson et al. eds., 
2002) (arguing that terminator technology is a remedy to intellectual property in-
fringement); John Vidal, World Braced for Terminator 2, GUARDIAN., Oct. 6, 1999, at 
14, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/1999/oct/06/gm.food2 (de-
scribing the tension between developing countries and Monsanto due to the ter-
minator technology). 
246 See Vidal, supra note 245 (explaining that in Monsanto’s version of the 
terminator technology, the seeds are soaked in tetracycline, which “ultimately in-
structs the plant to kill its own seeds”). 
247 See Convention on Biological Diversity, Subsidiary Body on Scientific , 
Technical and Technological Advice, Rep. of the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group 
Meeting on the Potential Impacts of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies on 
Smallholder Farmers, Indigenous and Local Communities and Farmers’ Rights, 
9th mtg., Nov. 10-14, 2003, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/9/INF/6 (Sept. 29, 
2003) [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity] (discussing the potentially 
negative effects of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies). 
248 See Press Release, Rural Advancement Found. Int’l Biodiversity Conven-
tion’s Terminator Decision Fails Biodiversity and Fails Farmers (June 28, 1999), 
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/sbstta/sbstta-09/information 
/sbstta-09-inf-06-en.pdf (reiterating the United States’ position that GURTs are 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
BENOLIEL.DOC 11/15/2010  9:09 PM 
328 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
With software in the United States, major MNEs align to lobby 
the government to enforce their interests under the umbrella of the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance (“IIPA”).249  The IIPA 
collects information about intellectual property piracy overseas 
and regularly reports it to the USTR.250  Overall, if the development 
economics history of developed countries should repeat itself, 
these MBPs eventually will want stronger intellectual property 
protection as an important means of transforming into fully devel-
oped countries.  Having demonstrated significant promise in carry-
ing out health innovation in particular,251 China and India are most 
likely to be the first to reach a point at which creating stronger pa-
tent protection will be in their pure self-interest.252 
 
more good than bad.  This raised serious concerns by the CBD and a majority of 
the international community); see also Convention on Biological Diversity supra 
note 247 (listing potential positive impacts of GURTs, such as increased agricul-
tural biodiversity and the reduction of problems with volunteer plants).  Within 
the realm of bio-agriculture alone, LBP Argentina should therefore exceptionally 
be considered as an MBP.  Id. 
249 See DESCRIPTION OF THE IIPA, http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2010) (explaining the role the Alliance plays in the private sector 
and providing examples of the Alliance’s work.). 
250 See id. (providing examples of instances where the IIPA submitted reports 
to the USTR).  See generally MEMBER ASSOCIATIONS, http://www.iipa.com 
/memberassociations.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (listing members of other 
alliances of industry specific groups such as: the Association of American Pub-
lishers (“AAP”), the Business Software Alliance (“BSA”), the Entertainment Soft-
ware Association (“ESA”), the Independent Film & Television Alliance (“IFTA”), 
the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), the National Music Pub-
lishers’ Association (“NMPA”), and the Recording Industry Association of Ameri-
ca (“RIAA”)). 
251 See Mashelkar, supra note 201, at 4 fig.1 (showing the relationship between 
a country’s economic strength and its innovative capability); Morel et al., supra 
note 182, at 2 (noting that developing countries have the “capacity to develop, 
manufacture, ensure safety, and market new health products”). 
252 See Yu, supra note 104, at 391 (stating that this is not surprising given that 
China and India were the “two largest economies in the world before the Indus-
trial Revolution”).  See generally, CHINDIA: HOW CHINA AND INDIA ARE 
REVOLUTIONIZING GLOBAL BUSINESS (Pete Engardio ed., 2007) (discussing the rise of 
“Chindia,” examining differences between the two countries in terms of market 
power and social and business culture, and reflecting on the problems that lie 
ahead); id. at 4–7 (exploring China’s strength in the manufacturing industry and 
India’s strength in its software and design industries); ROBYN MEREDITH, THE 
ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON: THE RISE OF INDIA AND CHINA AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR 
ALL OF US 63 (2007) (using the Philips case to exemplify the latitude that China has 
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3.3.2. India 
A number of fundamental advantages position India as the 
more promising incubator for pharmaceutical innovation within 
the developing world.253  With its “burgeoning science and tech-
nology sector, skilled workforce, [and a] democratic government . . 
. India presents a uniquely situated laboratory for advanced devel-
oping country patent systems.”254  Current academic work on the 
role of intellectual property law in advanced developing econo-
mies stills focuses more on China than on India.255  India however 
 
taken in using intellectual property to grow while not paying for the use of those 
rights); JAIRAM RAMESH, MAKING SENSE OF CHINDIA: REFLECTIONS ON CHINA AND 
INDIA (2006) (presenting thoughts on the relationship between China and India 
through a comparison of the two countries in the contexts of trade, investment, 
international relations, and public health); Shubham Chaudhuri & Martin Raval-
lion, Partially Awakened Giants: Uneven Growth in China and India, in DANCING WITH 
GIANTS: CHINA, INDIA, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 175 (L. Alan Winters & Shahid 
Yusuf eds., 2007) (examining the impact that uneven economic growth will likely 
have on the rate of poverty reduction in India and China); Daniel C.K. Chow, Why 
China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203, 208 
(2006) (proffering China’s ambitions “to eventually dominate trade in high-
technology sectors”); Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Global Economics 
Paper No. 99: Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, GOLDMAN SACHS ECON. RES., 
Oct. 2003, at 4, available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book 
/99-dreaming.pdf (“China could overtake Germany in the next four years, Japan 
by 2015 and the US by 2039.”). 
253 See Nicholas D. Kristof, They’re Rounding the First Turn! And the Favorite 
Is . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at A19 (predicting that India’s development will 
outpace China’s due to India’s stable financial and political infrastructure). 
254 Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of In-
dia’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 491, 503 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
255 See, e.g., Yu, supra note 104, at 391 (discussing the growth and develop-
ment of the Chinese economy and predicting that the country will eventually 
“move into the world’s high-end market”); see also Jeffrey A. Andrews, Pfizer’s 
Viagra Patent and the Promise of Patent Protection in China, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1 (2006) (proposing that recent cases demonstrate a growing accep-
tance of patent protection in China, although the concerns over infringement con-
tinue to be real and substantial); Ke Shao, Look at My Sign!—Trademarks in China 
from Antiquity to the Early Modern Times, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 654 
(2005) (exploring the evolution of trademark use in China); Robert Slate, Judicial 
Copyright Enforcement in China: Shaping World Opinion on TRIPS Compliance, 31 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 665 (2006) (analyzing the internet methods employed 
by the Chief Justice on the Intellectual Property Tribunal in China to influence 
public opinion on China’s compliance with TRIPS); Straus, Bargaining Around 
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falls similarly within the category of innovative NICs, and is there-
fore an MBP as well. 
The Indian pharmaceutical industry developed in a context of 
weak patent protection with the Indian Patent Act of 1970 denying 
product patent coverage altogether for pharmaceutical products 
and severely limiting process patents.256  The Indian industry fo-
cused mainly on reverse engineering and the production of gener-
ics,257 while it spent little on R&D in comparison with firms in 
Western countries.258  The generics industry that flourished in In-
dia allowed the country to gain its current rank as fourth globally 
in terms of medicine production (eight per cent of global output 
volume) and thirteenth in terms of value.259  India also boasts the 
largest number of manufacturing facilities approved by the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration anywhere outside of the United 
 
TRIPS, supra note 10 (examining the fragile balance between the protection of in-
tellectual property rights in China and international trade with other nations); Yu, 
supra note 124 (providing an overview of Chinese response to American intellec-
tual property policy; in particular, the actions taken by the Chinese government 
pursuant to the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding Between China and the 
United States on the Protection of Intellectual Property). 
256 See SAMPATH, supra note 129, at 24 (noting that process patents were li-
mited to the shorter of a period of seven years, or five years from the date of seal-
ing of the patent).  Moreover, the provisions on “local working” and licensing of 
rights further limited the scope of process patents by providing that: 
[A]ny pharmaceutical process on which a local patent was obtained had 
to be ”worked“ in India within three years from the date of sealing of the 
patent.  After three years of sealing, the patent owner was subject to the 
provision on “licensing of rights,” i.e., the patent owner was obliged to 
license his process to a local manufacturer in cases where the patent was 
not locally worked for a royalty not exceeding 4%.  The government also 
had the authority to grant a compulsory license on a process after three 
years from the date of sealing of the patent if the product was not availa-
ble locally at “reasonable” rates. 
Id. 
257 See V. C. Vivekanandan, HRD Intellectual Prop. Chair Professor, Nalsar 
Univ. of Law, Post TRIP: Emerging issues for Pharma Industry (July 11, 2008), availa-
ble at http://pharmexcil.com/data/uploads/Prof.Vivekanandan.ppt (noting that 
Indian pharmaceutical companies currently produce around 20-22% of the 
world’s generic drugs). 
258 See Sampath, supra note 129, at 31. 
259 Mashelkar, supra note 201, at 7; Morel, supra note 182; Vivekanandan, su-
pra note 257. 
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States.260  With this increase in production, part of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry started a slow but steady shift toward de-
veloping a capacity to innovate.261 
Major strengths of the Indian pharmaceutical market power in-
clude a cost-competitive manufacturing base that extends to clini-
cal studies, and extensive production skills in chemistry and 
process development.  The market also possesses the ability to 
manufacture over 50% of the bulk drugs needed for its pharma-
ceutical production activities locally.  There has also been an emer-
gence of a promising biotechnology industry.  In addition, India is 
known for its plethora of local scientists and high quality R&D per-
sonnel and a wide network of R&D.262  While the R&D expendi-
tures of large-scale Indian pharmaceutical firms (1.9% of total rev-
enues) is still relatively low in comparison with those of global 
pharmaceutical industries, the expenditures have been steadily 
growing at the rate of 18% per year.263 
India is also at the crossroads concerning its intellectual proper-
ty policies for the biotechnology sector.  For a start, it has ambi-
tious plans for a biotechnology industry and for its agricultural in-
dustry.  Presently it has the third-highest number of biotech 
companies in the Asia-Pacific after Japan and Korea.264  Converse-
ly, India witnesses an internal persistent disagreement to a streng-
thening of the patent system related to biotechnological inven-
 
260 See Jaya Prakash Pradhan, Overcoming Innovation Limits through Outward 
FDI: The Overseas Acquisition Strategy of Indian Pharmaceutical Firms, INSTITUTE FOR 
THE STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, July 2008, available at MPRA, Paper No. 
12362, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12362/1/MPRA_paper_12362.pdf (de-
tailing the acquisition strategies of five Indian pharmaceutical companies which 
engaged in an aggressive plan to acquire new products and technology). 
261 See Mashelkar, supra note 201 (describing India’s push to innovate). 
262 See Cheri Grace, The Effect of Changing Intellectual Property on Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry Prospects in India and China: Considerations for Access to Medicines 18 
(DFID-Health Systems Resource Centre, 2004) (describing the core competencies 
and cost advantages of Indian pharmaceutical companies). 
263 See SAMPATH, supra note 129, at 31 (noting that Indian pharmaceutical 
companies have steadily increased research and development spending); See also 
Vivekanandan, supra note 257 (analyzing the effect of the TRIPS Agreement on the 
pharmaceutical industry in India). 
264 Christoph Antons, Sui Generis Protection for Plant Varieties and Traditional 
Agricultural Knowledge: The Example of India, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 480, 480 
(2007). 
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tions.265  While India is only slowly and unwillingly opening the 
door to allow for a greater role of patents related to biotechnologi-
cal inventions, it has been positive in the development of fairly 
unique plant variety legislation in the form of its the Protection of 
Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act of 2001 (“PPVFRA”).266  
Lastly, within the software patent-sensitive industry, India further 
stands for an archetypical Tier-2 sanction costs fearful MBP.  Re-
cent studies show that India has experience “rampant software pi-
racy, because of high Tier-2 sanction costs.”267  In its 2005 Piracy 
Study, the Business Software Alliance (“BSA”) notes:  “India, 
whose IT exports are more than triple the size of its domestic IT 
market, still has a piracy rate of 74%—despite the strength of its 
world-class software development skills and government efforts to 
quell piracy.”268  This reality, stands as a central inhibitor to the 
growth of a local Indian packaged software industry.  
3.3.3. China 
China is already the second largest producer of pharmaceutical 
and agricultural products in the world.269  It is the world’s largest 
producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients,270 although the vast 
majority of this production is unpatented.  In fact, China is one of 
 
265 See id. (describing the struggle patentees face in India with respect to se-
curing patent rights).  
266 Id. at 482. 
267 Kopczynski, supra note 171, at 299-329 (citing Press Release, Business 
Software Alliance, New BSA Study Shows That India’s Dynamic IT Sector Could 
Nearly Triple by 2009 (Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.bsa.org 
/country/News%20and%20Events/News%20Archives/en/2005en-12082005-
globalpiracystudy.aspx) (proposing a forecast that shows how India’s economic 
growth will be fueled by cutting down on global piracy).  But see BMC Software to 
Invest $12 M in India, CYBER INDIA ONLINE LIMITED, (May 20, 2005), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050525225729/http://www.ciol.com/content/ne
ws/Investment/2005/105052001.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (reporting BMC’s 
plan to expand in India, investing in research and development and employing 
1,500 Indian workers); Intel Plans $1bn India Investment, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 
2005), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business /4499362.stm (describing 
Intel’s plan to expand its business in India).  
268 BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE & INT’L DATA CORP., SECOND ANNUAL BSA AND 
IDC GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY 3 (2005). 
269 See Grace, supra note 262, at 13 (stating China  is  the  largest  producer in 
the  world of penicillin, vitamin C, terramycin, doxycycline  and  cephalosporin,). 
270 Yu, supra note 104, at 363. 
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the world’s leaders in the production of counterfeit pharmaceuti-
cals.271  Given that MBP countries herein have also been referred to 
as ‘innovative NICs,’ the case of China requires further explora-
tion. 
The characterization of China as an MBP is essentially because 
it faces large Tier-2 sanctions costs for the issuance of compulsory 
licenses, and for two additional reasons.  The first reason is China 
is undergoing a somewhat uncertain, yet steady, process toward 
becoming an ever more innovative country.272  The days in which 
China only produced cheap products of low quality are rapidly be-
ing left behind.  To begin with, “[f]or the past three years China 
has also been the world’s largest exporter of [ICT].”273  Conse-
quently, 
[t]ensions have developed between China and the United 
States regarding trade and standards.  One point of conten-
tion concerns, on the one hand, China’s approach to stan-
dard setting, particularly for ICT goods, and on the other, 
the role of IP rights in international standard setting.  While 
the ICT industry increasingly demands harmonized stan-
dards to serve the imperatives of competition, interopera-
bility, and efficiency, particularly in networked environ-
ments, China has signaled its intention to follow a different 
direction.  By seeking to set its own domestic standards in-
stead of relying on international standards, China not only 
creates tensions but also raises trade law issues under WTO 
rules.274   
 
271 See Maria Nelson et al., Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: A Worldwide Problem, 96 
TRADEMARK REP. 1068, 1089 (2006) (noting that China remains one of the world’s 
largest sources of counterfeit pharmaceuticals). 
272 See Fang Xin, Member of Standing Committee, NPC, China, From Imita-
tion to Innovation: A Strategic Adjustment in China’s S&T Development, Seminar 
on Latin American, Caribbean, and Asian Strategies for Science, Technology, and 
Competitiveness (Apr. 7, 2005) (powerpoint presented at the Seminar on Latin 
American, Caribbean, and Asian Strategies for Science, Technology, and Competi-
tiveness), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/152771/Dr_Fang.pdf 
(discussing problems and solutions to China’s developing national innovation 
system). 
273 Technology in Emerging Economies, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2008, at 75.  
274 Gibson, supra note 40, at 1421. 
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Moreover, China possesses an innovative agriculture industry.  
This is due to fact that the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”) and China’s Ministry of Science and Technology 
(“MOST”) renewed a 2002 protocol that supports the United States’ 
policy to establish and expand science and technology exchanges 
with China to improve market access for agricultural products.275  
In sum, there is now clear evidence that research and development 
activities in the Chinese economy have been growing steadily over 
the past decade within these fields.276 
Lastly, in reference to this Article’s focal point, in pharmaceuti-
cals, an increase in the number of patents being filed locally is evi-
dence the country is gearing its economy toward becoming increa-
singly innovative.  To be sure, the overall annual research and 
development expenditures of Chinese pharmaceutical firms in 
2002 were still relatively low--corresponding to only 1.18% of turn-
over.  This number, however, should not obscure the broader trend 
showing that research and development investments in pharma-
ceuticals have increased five-fold in the period between 1995 and 
2004.277  In a patent-sensitive industry such as pharmaceuticals, the 
issuance of compulsory licenses would be expected to negatively 
affect such a trend. 
Second, the perception about the levels of patent protection in 
pharmaceuticals crosses over to other industries.  The decision to 
invest in R&D in any sector is partly based on the perception by 
 
275 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The U.S.-China Government 
Signing Ceremony Fact Sheet 1 (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://2001-
2009.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleases_FactSheets/PROD01_004906 
(noting that specific areas of cooperation include agricultural biotechnology, natu-
ral resource management, dairy production and processing, food safety, agricul-
tural product processing, biofuels research and development, and water-saving 
agricultural technology). 
276  See Gary H. Jefferson, R&D and Innovation in China: Has China Begun Its 
S&T Takeoff? (Aug. 11, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://people.brandeis.edu/~jefferso/HCR,%20August%2011,%2004a.pdf (dis-
cussing rapid acceleration in R&D intensity).  
277  See Huaiwen He & Ping Zhang, Impact of the Intellectual Property System on 
Economic Growth, WIPO—JPO—UNU Joint Research Project 7 (2007), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/wipo_unu_07_china.pdf (dis-
cussing how research and development expenditures increased with expanded 
sales revenue). 
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the investor of the overall legal and institutional environment.278  
Thus, the perceived level of protection in pharmaceuticals influ-
ences other industries, because the issuance of a compulsory li-
cense for a pharmaceutical product may negatively impact a deci-
sion to conduct research and development activities in other 
industries, particularly in other patent-sensitive industries.  The 
Chinese pharmaceutical industry remains less innovative, and 
grows less rapidly, than other patent-sensitive sectors of the Chi-
nese industries such as the semiconductor and biotechnology in-
dustry.279  The issuance of a compulsory license in pharmaceuticals 
could not only further delay the development of the pharmaceuti-
cal sector, but also that of other sectors. 
Clear evidence of this phenomenon can be observed in the ex-
ample of the North China Pharmaceutical Group Corporation 
(“NCPC”), China’s leading pharmaceutical exporter.280  Indeed 
NCPC has been increasing the number of its patent filings with 
China’s State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”).  However, even 
in the peak year 2005, its filings numbered less than twenty.281  In 
view of that fact, China has adopted what Professor Peter Yu refers 
to as a “schizophrenic” nationwide intellectual property policy.  
Accordingly, China seeks stronger intellectual property protection 
in areas such as entertainment, software, semiconductors, and se-
lected areas of biotechnology, while striving for weaker protection 
in less dynamic fields such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertiliz-
ers, seeds, and foodstuffs.282  This policy means that in the case of 
 
278 See, e.g., A.T. Kearney, New Concerns in an Uncertain World: The 2007 A.T. 
Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, THE GLOBAL BUS. POL’Y COUNCIL 
7 (2008), available at http://www.atkearney.com/images/global/pdf/FDICI 
_2007.pdf (noting that investor concerns over China’s investment environment 
include intellectual property, political and legal environment, and economic sta-
bility). 
279 See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intel-
lectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2007) (noting that 
China is more likely to prefer strong intellectual property rights in its fast growing 
industries such as semiconductors and biotechnology than slower growth indus-
tries such as pharmaceuticals). 
280 He & Zhang, supra note 277, at 9. 
281 See id. (describing the low number of NCPC’s patent filings in China).  
282 See Yu, supra note 279, at 25 (discussing China’s intellectual property poli-
cies). 
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China, Tier-2 sanctions costs for issuance of compulsory licenses 
over pharmaceuticals cross over to other sectors of its economy. 
3.4. The LBP Model: A Positional Bargaining Situation 
3.4.1. Introduction 
A third category of developing countries is defined herein as 
the Low Bargaining Power countries.  As a generalization, the LBP 
model maintains that every developing country, other than Newly 
Industrialized Countries, is an LBP (per Table 2 above, the ‘Default 
List Countries’).  This category logically includes the group of 
Least Developed Countries, which are the fifty poorest countries in 
the world, but includes many others as well, bringing the number 
of countries in the group of LBPs to over one hundred.  Similar to 
the abovementioned HBP and MBP categories, the LBP categoriza-
tion reflects a shift from market size approximation to a conceptua-
lization of a more complex bargaining situation.  The LBP model 
indicates that the market size approximation fails to describe the 
true bargaining situation in the post-WTO era.  Instead of defining 
developing countries along the lines of ‘market power,’ the real 
narrative of TRIPS, instead, sets the stage for a novel developing 
country categorization.  
The LBP model makes a dual claim.  First, it contends that the 
over one hundred countries in this group possess low bargaining 
power in terms of their ability to issue compulsory licenses.  That is 
to say, that they have a low outside option in price negotiations 
with pharmaceutical patentees.  Second, the LBP model suggests 
that the group of LBP countries also has low bargaining power in 
trade disputes more broadly.  This second claim represents, in fact, 
a partial conceptual shift in comparison to the MPB and the HBP 
models above.  The LBP model contains not only a specific analysis 
of the relative abilities of the countries within this category to issue 
compulsory licenses, but also a discussion of bargaining power in 
trade disputes more broadly.  In fact, this second claim – namely 
that LBPs have low bargaining power more generally, not only in 
terms of their power to issue compulsory licenses – serves the pur-
pose of illuminating the practical significance of the Least-
Developed-Country carve-out contained in the TRIPS and other 
WTO agreements.  This analysis shows that the LDC carve-out is 
too narrow and does not cover a large enough group of countries.  
More generally, the LBP model will reveal that the distributive jus-
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tice policies contained in TRIPS should be geared towards a broad-
er group of countries. 
In international trade, the usual assumption is that low levels 
of bargaining power are markedly the feature of LDCs.  The Unit-
ed Nations officially designates the poorest fifty countries in the 
world as LDCs.283  LDCs are defined by three basic macroeconomic 
parameters.284  These parameters include: a low-income criterion;285 
a human capital status criterion, involving a composite Human As-
sets Index (“HAI”);286 and an economic vulnerability criterion en-
tailing a composite Economic Vulnerability Index (“EVI”).287 To be 
added to the list, a country must satisfy all three criteria.  Since the 
definition of the LDC category recognizes the existence of structur-
al handicaps, it excludes large economies.  Thus, to be designated 
an LDC, the country’s population must not exceed seventy-five 
million.288  For the poorest countries, WTO agreements and TRIPS 
in particular contain some corrective and distributive justice poli-
cies, despite being largely procedural in nature. 
 In fact, the post-WTO era, with its two-tiered bargaining sit-
uation, demands the creation of a novel category of countries to in-
 
283 See Least-Developed Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG.,  http://www.wto.org 
/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (listing the thirty-two LDCs 
which are WTO members) (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) (showing who the current 
members are); U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE LEAST DEV. 
COUNTRIES, THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: THINGS TO KNOW, THINGS TO DO 1, 2 
(2009), http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/LDC%20Documents/Advocacy 
%20brochure%20english%20for%20web.pdf (discussing the criteria for designa-
tion as an LDC). 
284 There are two market power-based ways to become eligible for gradua-
tion.  First, a country’s “[GNI] per capita must exceed twice the threshold level,” 
and the “likelihood that the level of [GNI] per capita is sustainable must be 
deemed high.” U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE LEAST DEV. 
COUNTRIES, supra note 286, at 3.  Second, “a country must reach the threshold le-
vels for graduation on at least two of the aforementioned three criteria. . . .”  Id. 
285 This is based on a three-year average estimate of the GNI per capita (un-
der $745 for inclusion, above $900 for graduation).  Id. at 2. 
286 This is based on indicators of: (a) nutrition; (b) health; (c) education; and 
(d) adult literacy rate.  See id. 
287 This is based on indicators of: (a) population size; (b) remoteness; (c) mer-
chandise export concentration; (d) share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in 
gross domestic product; (e) homelessness owing to natural disasters; (f) instability 
of agricultural production; and (g) instability of exports of goods and services.  See 
id. 
288 Id. at 3. 
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clude both LDCs and the remaining non-NIC developing countries 
alike.  All of these countries arguably have little or no bargaining 
power in negotiations over patented goods, such as drugs, and 
thus, should be jointly modeled as Low-Bargaining-Power coun-
tries, or LBPs.  As this part of the article explains, a lack of bargain-
ing power is also what facilitates a distinct form of bargaining poli-
cy on the part of developed countries toward the group of LBPs, 
namely ‘positional bargaining.’  This form of bargaining is pre-
mised on a unilateral offer of stringent intellectual property laws as 
a package deal.  In addition, as a policy concern, existing TRIPS 
laws favoring LDCs as the poorest countries conceivably represent 
a discrepancy vis-à-vis the remaining LBPs.  This differential ap-
proach is clearly demonstrated within the 2005 Hong Kong decla-
ration, which arguably discriminated against most LBPs such as 
countries in Central and South America, Lower Asia and poorer 
Eastern European countries.  
3.4.2. Least Developed Countries and Beyond 
Neither the Agreement Establishing the WTO nor the TRIPS 
Agreement formally categorize Least-Developed-Countries,289 or 
for that matter any other particular group of developing countries.  
Instead, these agreements merely use declaratory language in in-
distinctive reference to LDCs’ individual development,290 their “fi-
nancial and trade needs,”291 or “their administrative and institu-
tional capabilities.”292  Thus, the WTO is noteworthy for voluntary 
listing LDCs.293 
 
289 The world’s forty-nine poorest countries are currently designated as 
LDCs.  See Least Developed Countries, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
REPRESENTATIVE OF LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, http://www.unohrlls 
.org/en/ldc/25/(last viewed Aug. 26, 2009) (listing the least developed countries 
across the globe); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16.  
290 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 
XI(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (“The 
least-developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations will only be 
required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with 
their individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative 
and institutional capabilities.”).  
291 Id. 
292 Id.  
293 The least developed countries that are members to the WTO are: Angola, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, 
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From a customary public international legal viewpoint, the 
WTO’s definitions of LDCs most likely did not establish customary 
law within international intellectual property law.  As a political 
phenomenon, however, it should be noted that beginning in the 
early 1960s, LDCs did set up a forum in the United Nations from 
which to proclaim their views and, in doing so, further challenged 
the packaged deals offered by the developed countries.  From 1962 
through the mid-1970s, in particular, the United Nations General 
Assembly—dominated by LDCs—passed a series of resolutions in-
tended to emphasize the sovereignty of nations with respect to for-
eign investment.  Even though “General Assembly resolutions do 
not represent authoritative statements of international law, they 
are probative of the state of international law.”294  This is true, par-
ticularly given their ever-changing legal nature with reference to 
foreign investment.295 
Present-day WTO agreements merely recognize that this loose-
ly theorized group of poor countries must benefit from the greatest 
possible flexibility and leniency.  Consequently, WTO agreements 
commonly uphold the position that better-off members must make 
extra efforts to lower import barriers on LDCs’ exports.  Since the 
end of the Uruguay Round agreements in 1994, several decisions in 
 
Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bis-
sau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambi-
que, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.  See Understanding the WTO – Least Devel-
oped Countries, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english 
/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2009). 
294 Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 648 (1998). See, e.g., 
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v.  Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1, 30 (Int’l Arbitral Trib. 1978) 
(“Resolution 1803 (XVII) seems to this Tribunal to reflect the state of customary 
law existing in this field.”).  See also Committee on Int’l Trade and Investment, The 
Protection of Private Property Invested Abroad, 1963 A.B.A. SECTION INT’L AND COMP. 
L. 18 (“The General Assembly is not an international legislature, and its pro-
nouncements are not law, although they may constitute evidence of customary or 
generally recognized law in the absence of vocal protests by disapproving mem-
bers.”).  
295 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 294, at 648 (noting that the United Nations 
General Assembly “passed a series of resolutions intended to emphasize the sove-
reignty of nations with respect to foreign investments”, and the difficulty in 
“claim[ing] customary international law status for norms that are repeatedly con-
tradicted” by such resolutions).  
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favor of LDCs have been taken.  To begin with, the WTO ministers 
agreed on a “Plan of Action for Least-Developed Countries” at a 
meeting in Singapore in 1996.296  Second, a year later, in October 
1997, six international organizations — the International Monetary 
Fund, the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Confe-
rence for Trade and Development, the United Nations Develop-
ment Program, the World Bank, and the WTO — launched the “In-
tegrated Framework,” a joint technical assistance program 
designed exclusively for least-developed countries.297  Third, in 
2002, the WTO further adopted a work program for least-
developed countries.298  Again, under the post-WTO market size 
approximation, the work program contained several broad policies 
that erroneously chose to focus solely on LDCs.  Logically, these 
policies ranged from improved market access to increased technic-
al assistance, such as providing support for agencies working on 
the diversification of least-developed countries’ economies or a 
speedier membership process for LDCs negotiating to join the 
WTO.299 
More particularly, using similarly broad declaratory language, 
the TRIPS Agreement employs a general rule for all developing 
countries.  All Member States are held to the same international 
minimum standards of protection and enforcement.300  TRIPS does 
offer some form of equitable action toward LDCs alone, but it does 
so arguably unequally toward other LBPs, such as in Central and 
South America, Lower Asia and poorer Eastern European coun-
tries.301 
Thus, TRIPS favors LDCs, albeit procedurally, in three ways.  
First, it allows both developing countries and countries-in-
 
296 See Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e .htm (last vi-
sited Aug. 25, 2009) (highlighting the WTO’s special focus on creating agreements 
that are favorable to the needs of least-developed countries, such as the “Plan of 
Action for Least-Developed Countries”).  
297 Id.  
298 Id. 
299 Id.  In addition to the several formal decisions in favor of LDCs, a growing 
number of governments have unilaterally abandoned import duties and import 
quotas on all exports from LDCs.  Id.  
300 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 1 (noting that general principles 
and provisions apply equally to developing and least-developed countries).   
301 See id. art. 66-67 (explaining the special circumstances of LDC members). 
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transition302 (referring mainly to former Soviet Bloc countries 
which were closed to FDI until approximately 1990) a five-year 
grace period within which to fulfill their obligations.303  The TRIPS 
Agreement recognizes technical adjustments that may further de-
lay full compliance with the patent provisions for another five 
years.304  As for LDCs alone, however, TRIPS stipulates a ten-year 
period of immunity from the duty to implement its substantive or 
procedural standards. 
Second, TRIPS endows its Council with the power to “accord 
extensions” of the initial ten-year grace period, upon a “duly moti-
vated” request by an LDC member.  In doing so, the agreement re-
cognizes their “special needs and requirements” but only in a 
broad sense.305  LDCs continue to compete over intellectual proper-
ty-based foreign trade in even terms with countries with much 
higher gross national products (GNP), especially the NICs.306  
Third, developing countries were flatly labeled in reference to the 
 
302 Transition economies within Article 65(3) of the TRIPS Agreement are 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe that formed part of the former Soviet 
bloc.  The TRIPS Agreement refers to them as “member[s] which [are] in the 
process of transformation from a centrally-planned [economy] into a market, free-
enterprise economy and which [are] undertaking structural reform of [their] intel-
lectual property systems . . . .” Id. art. 65(3).  
303 See id. art. 65(2) (stating that, in addition to the general one year period of 
delay awarded to all member states, developing countries are entitled to an addi-
tional four year delay).  
304 See id. art. 70(8), (9) (outlining the procedures that Member states must 
take in extending patent protection beyond the general guidelines).   
305 The TRIPS Agreement notes: 
[i]n view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed coun-
try Members, their economic, financial and administrative constraints, 
and their need for flexibility to create a viable technological base, such 
Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of this Agreement 
. . . for a period of 10 years from the date of application . . . .   
See id.; see also J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to 
a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 363, 373 (1996) (noting that the TRIPS 
Agreement creates a two-tiered approach to distinguish between the obligations 
of developing countries and least-developing countries).  
306 See Simon Lester, The Asian Newly Industrialized Countries to Graduate From 
Europe’s GSP Tariffs, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 220, 230 (1995) (arguing that although 
“preferential tariffs have the potential to help poor countries industrialize and in-
crease their level of economic development . . . [they] are forced to compete on 
even terms with countries that have GNP per capita levels up to fifty times higher 
than their own levels”). 
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topic of technological transfer, with a suggestive mode of differen-
tiation vis-à-vis LDCs.  The drafters of Article 66 of TRIPS de-
scribed the “special needs and requirements” of these countries 
identically.307  Preceding drafts of Article 66 and 67 do not point 
toward any major changes during the drafting stages, suggesting 
that LDCs were for all time granted a number of exemptions in ad-
hering to TRIPS.308 
This kind of affirmative action toward LDCs seems to have 
given rise to a misguided perception of the kind of bargaining that 
involves developing countries and the pharmaceutical industry.  
On the one hand, bargaining with the group of non-LDC develop-
ing countries is thought to generate integrative bargains. 309  The 
notion of integrative bargains refers to the potential for the parties’ 
interests to be combined in ways that create joint value or enlarge 
the pie.310  Potential for integration only exists when there are mul-
tiple issues involved in the negotiation.311  Integrative bargains also 
assume the presence of some bargaining power.312  Thus, interna-
tional patent negotiations are viewed as exchanges between tradi-
tional manufactured goods and agricultural products for codified 
obligations to respect intellectual property rights.313  This paradigm 
has in fact represented the common political science narrative of 
 
307 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 66(1). 
308 See GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 215 (noting that the Brussels Draft is “essen-
tially identical” to the final act).  
309 See David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, Interests: The Measure of Negotia-
tion in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 165 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Ru-
bin eds., 1991).   
310 Id. 
311 Id.  
312 See JONATHAN SACKS, THE POLITICS OF HOPE 198–09 (1997); ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3-24 (1984) (discussing the reasons why 
cooperation emerges among groups); id. at 73–105 (presenting cooperation case 
studies within World War I and in biological systems). 
313 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 159, at 387–89 (noting that the TRIPS Agree-
ment was part of a “package bargain” that included an agreement by the indu-
strialized countries to reduce levels of agriculture export subsidies in exchange for 
the developing countries acceptance); Reichman & Lange, supra note 146, at 15-17 
(arguing that while the “package deal” of offering agricultural products for great-
er access to traditional manufactured goods makes economic sense from a long-
term perspective, the higher standards of international intellectual property pro-
tection will compel developing and least-developing countries to be non-
cooperative and resistant to the TRIPS Agreement).  
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WTO bargaining at large.  On the other hand, for LDCs a more be-
nevolent form of ‘Positional Bargains’– a “take it or leave it” kind 
of agreement – is said to be in place.314 
3.4.3. Positional Bargaining Over TRIPS 
In reality, the developed world adopted what is known as posi-
tional bargaining in negotiating the international intellectual prop-
erty framework with the group of LBP countries.  In bargaining 
theory, positional bargaining is a negotiation strategy that involves 
holding on to a fixed idea, or position, of what one wants and ad-
vocating for it and it alone, regardless of the underlying inter-
ests.315  Each negotiator begins with an extreme position and 
proceeds from there to negotiate and make concessions.  Eventual-
ly, a compromise may be reached on dividing the bargain surplus.  
The WTO’s Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations suc-
ceeded where prior WIPO’s negotiations independent of the inter-
national economic framework failed, particularly regarding devel-
oping countries.316  That success can be explained in that TRIPS 
was presented as an economic package deal, or what Professor 
Donald Harris calls “a treaty of adhesion.”317  Such a dynamic has 
in fact described the bargaining situation with most non-LDCs de-
veloping countries, such as in Central and South America, lower 
Asia and poorer Eastern European countries.318  And LBPs, at 
 
314 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 4-5 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing the concept of positional bargain-
ing and suggesting that it impedes negotiations). 
315 Id.  
316 See, e.g., Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of Rights: Hu-
man Rights to Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL’Y 315, 334 (1996) 
(arguing that developing countries bear the brunt of the TRIPS Agreement’s high-
er standards and, through the potential threat of ostracism, were forced to accept 
its exploiting terms); Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and 
Treaties of Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 681, 724–25 (2006) (arguing that the 
TRIPS Agreement was a treaty of adhesions because it was “accomplished 
through a flawed bargaining process where developed countries coerced develop-
ing countries into adopting the treaty”).  
317 Harris, supra note 316, at 724.  
318 See id. at 725 (“There is no question that at the TRIPS negotiations unequal 
bargaining power existed between the developing and developed countries.”). 
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large, could not and did not resist this positional bargaining 
game.319 
The Uruguay Round and the TRIPS’ bargaining game in par-
ticular remarkably and similarly ‘offered’ LDCs, as well as non-
LDC LBPs, greater access to markets for traditionally manufac-
tured goods and agricultural products.  This offer has come in ex-
change for stiff codified obligations to respect the intellectual 
property rights of the technology-exporting countries.320  That be-
ing said, the “United States has been pushing since the 1994 Sum-
mit of the Americas in Miami for a hemisphere-wide free trade 
zone and asking that developing countries in Central and South 
America eliminate their own barriers, while being able to maintain 
its own protectionist measures.”321  Frederick Abbott lists the Uru-
guay Round bargaining chips employed as including: the reduc-
tion of subsidies for agriculture in industrialized nations, conces-
sions with respect to imports of tropical products, the phasing out 
of quotas of textile products, substantial transition periods, incen-
tives to transfer technology and compulsory licensing.322 
Positional bargaining is not only practiced vis-à-vis LDCs.  It is 
also the systematic practice used by the developed world in nego-
tiations with non-LDC LBPs.  As already alluded to, the products 
derived from plant genetic biodiversity, to mention a chief intellec-
tual property case for LBPs, are major sources of wealth generation 
for developed countries.323  The International Union for the Protec-
 
319 See generally Helfer, supra note 118, at 3–4 (noting that nongovernmental 
organizations are challenging the “moral, political, and economic legitimacy” of 
TRIPS, focusing on the “power-based bargaining strategies” used by developed 
countries to coerce developing countries into such an agreement);  Abbott, supra 
note 159, at 387–89 (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement appears to be a bargain 
between developed and developing countries, but the threat of more restricted 
access to major industrialized markets induced developing countries to accept the 
treaty);  Abbot, supra note 178, at 691–92 (noting that, in the face of resistance from 
developing countries, the United States has “threatened and imposed coercive 
measures on countries it regards as not providing adequate [intellectual property] 
protection).  
320 See Reichman & Lange, supra note 146, at 17.  
321 See Ormachea, supra note 215, at 139 (highlighting Brazilian led-resistance 
to the U.S.’s trade strategy due to the United States’ unwillingness to eliminate or 
reduce its barriers to agriculture competition).   
322 See generally Abbott, supra note 159, at 387–88.  
323 See Chetan Gulati, Note, The “Tragedy of The Commons” in Plant Genetic Re-
sources: The Need for a New International Regime Centered Around an International Bio-
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tion of New Varieties of Plants (“UPOV”) establishes the plant va-
riety protection (“PVP”) framework known as the Plant Breeders’ 
Rights (“PBRs”) regime for UPOV member states.324  Originally es-
tablished by leading developed countries with a head start in plant 
breeding and agricultural biotechnology, PVP is pivotal to food se-
curity in indigenous and local communities.325  UPOV’s legaliza-
tion of private ownership of and proprietary interest in plant varie-
ties stands for a major transition into the commercialization based 
on MNEs investment in R&D in developed countries within bio-
agriculture and plant genetics.326 
Thus, LBPs in which most of the plant genetics are housed only 
collect the rents from the consumption plant genetic resources.327  
While developed countries are critical about LBPs for their destruc-
tion of biodiversity, they are also the principal cause for the inter-
 
technology Patent Office, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 63, 63–64 (2001) (observing 
that there is significant value in plant genetic resources in a world where “the 
strategy of wealth maximization has shifted from the desire to accumulate physi-
cal property to one in which the domination of intellectual property rights has be-
come preeminent”).   
324 Id. at 74. 
325 See Bongo Adi, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology and the Fate of 
Poor Farmers’ Agriculture, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 91, 104–07 (2006) (noting that 
the TRIPS Agreements standards for UPOV are “skewed against developing 
countries [and were] intended to reward plant breeders and did not recognize 
farmer’s rights or community rights”).  For research projects within the food secu-
rity field, see Indigenous Peoples & Food Security, CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN FOOD 
SECURITY, RYERSON UNIVERSITY, http://www.ryerson.ca/foodsecurity/projects 
/indigenous/index.html. 
326 See Chidi Oguamanam, Genetic Use Restriction (or Terminator) Technologies 
(GURTs) in Agricultural Biotechnology: The Limits of Technological Alternatives to In-
tellectual Property, 4 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 59, 60–62 (2005) (noting that today’s plant 
variety protection regime creates “asymmetrical contractual paradigm” where 
breeders’ rights outweigh farmers’ rights); see also FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORG., 
TRACKING RESULTS IN AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN LESS-THAN-IDEAL 
CONDITIONS: A SOURCEBOOK OF INDICATORS FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATION 1 
(2008), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0380e/i0380e00.htm (dis-
cussing monitoring and evaluating agriculture and rural development in develop-
ing and least-developing countries).  
327 See Oguamanam, supra note 326, at 61 (noting that the uniform transna-
tional plant variety protection regime addressed the need of developed countries 
such as the United States and European states to impose limits on the rights of us-
ers or buyers of protected seed in order to facilitate their profitable seed trade). 
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national regime in which this destruction is the most attractive 
economic option available to LBPs.328 
Bilateral agreements over agriculture in LBPs, more widely, 
run into problems with the United States’ indisposition to lower 
agriculture protection.  “[C]oncerns have been raised about impo-
verished corn farmers in Mexico and rice farmers in Honduras and 
Haiti being driven to other employment because of America’s sub-
sidized products.”329   
Rationally, an increase in imports unconstructively impacts 
domestic production.  Although reducing or eliminating agricul-
ture protections is particularly imperative for rural Latin American 
LBPs, the United States has not been flexible on the matter.330  
Thus, LBPs in which most of the plant genetics are housed only 
collect the rents from the consumption plant genetic resources.  
While developed countries are critical about LBPs for their destruc-
tion of biodiversity, they are also the principal cause for the inter-
national regime in which this destruction is the most attractive 
economic option available to LBPs.  Argentina, Kazakhstan, and 
Pakistan, three secondary regional powers that are non-LDCs 
LBPs, illustrate this proposition well. 
Argentina’s lack of adequate and effective intellectual 
property protection has caused some friction in its bilateral 
trade relationship [with the United States].  Argentina has 
been on the Special 301 Priority Watch List since 1996. . . .  
In April 2002, negotiations between the governments of the 
United States and Argentina clarified aspects of Argentina’s 
intellectual property system, such as provisions related to 
the patentability of microorganisms and its import restric-
tion regime.331  
 
328 Id.  
329 See Ormachea, supra note 215, at 150 (arguing that the United States’ hopes 
to create a free trade zone through the FTAA has gone unrealized because of its 
unwillingness to eliminate its barriers to agricultural subsidies).  
330 Id.  
331 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE 2007 NATIONAL TRADE 
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS: ARGENTINA (2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_NT
E_Report/Section_Index.html [hereinafter, NTE-ARGENTINA]. 
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Yet Argentina’s amendment of its patent law in December 
2003, as required by the May 2002 agreement between the two 
governments, still did not lead to its removal from the Special 301 
Priority Watch List.332  What may explain Argentina’s LBP-like 
bargaining situation is its close alignment with the United States in 
the area of agricultural biotechnology, including as co-
complainants in a WTO dispute challenging the EU moratorium on 
transgenic crops and its implementation of the Cartagena Protocol 
of Biosafety.333 
Kazakhstan is a second case of a non-LDC LBP with which po-
sitional bargaining is practiced.  “The government’s effort to diver-
sify the economy away from the energy sector and spur the growth 
of a domestic technology-based industry, along with the WTO ac-
cession process, has led to a strong emphasis on intellectual prop-
erty rights protection.”334  Kazakhstan, however, has been unsuc-
cessful in achieving bilateral trade agreements with a number of 
developed countries, including the United States, the European 
Union and Australia.335  Not surprisingly, for the last thirteen 
years, since January 29, 1996, Kazakhstan has been unsuccessful in 
negotiating membership in the WTO, it being also a non-LDC LBP 
and also a TRIPS transitory country.336 
A third case exemplifying positional bargaining negotiations 
with a non-LDC LBP is Pakistan.  “The United States placed Pakis-
tan on the Special 301 Watch List from 1989 to 2003 due to wide-
spread piracy.”337  Continuing IPR violations prompted Pakistan’s 
placement on the Special 301 Priority Watch List in both 2004 and 
 
332 Id. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE 2007 NATIONAL TRADE 
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS: KAZAKHSTAN (2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_NT
E_Report/Section_Index.html [hereinafter NTE- KAZAKHSTAN] (noting that Ka-
zakhstan is engaged in ongoing negotiations with WTO members and that despite 
the progress that was made in 2006 it still faces many challenges to implementing 
WTO-consistent legislation).  
337 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE 2007 NATIONAL TRADE 
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS: PAKISTAN (2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_NT
E_Report/Section_Index.html [hereinafter NTE- PAKISTAN]. 
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2005.338  These Tier-1 sanction costs were left in place even after a 
twofold Pax-American intellectual property reform.  First, Pakistan 
enacted a patent law in the year 2000 that protects both process pa-
tents and product patents in accordance with its WTO obliga-
tions.339   Second, after August 2005, the United States noticeably 
led threats of sanction against Pakistan.  These threats were posed 
in response to Pakistan’s lack of central intellectual property rights 
regulatory and enforcement authority as well as Pakistan’s failure 
to implement its obligations under TRIPS.  In fear of these threats, 
Pakistan’s president created the Intellectual Property Organization 
of Pakistan, an independent body under the administrative power 
of the Government’s Cabinet Division, which “consolidates into 
one body the authority over trademarks, patents, and copyrights—
areas that were until that time handled by three separate minis-
tries.”340 
To conclude, the effectiveness of the TRIPS positional bargain-
ing situation vis-à-vis LBPs may be understood twofold.  First, this 
positional bargaining situation allowed LBPs to have greater access 
to global markets.341  Second, through the packaging/collective 
signing of TRIPS, LBPs presumably avoided unilateral actions by 
developed countries.342  Oftentimes, in theory as in practice, com-
promises do not satisfy the true interests of the disputants;343 in-
stead, they simply split the difference between two positions, giv-
ing each side a part of what was sought.  Creative, integrative 
solutions, on the other hand, hold the potential to provide every-
one with all of what they desire.344  Positional bargaining is 
 
338 Id.  
339 Id. 
340 Id. 
341 See Arie Reich, The WTO As a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 321, 362 (2004) (discussing the trade-offs faced when deciding whether to 
agree to WTO policies); see also Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the WTO: 
A Comparative Institutional Approach, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130, 130 
(Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005) (asserting that the United States 
and the European Union predominate in economic relations because of their con-
siderable resources). 
342 See, e.g., CORREA, supra note 27. 
343 Reichman & Lange, supra note 146, at 17 (arguing that the main premise 
underlying TRIPS’ positional bargaining reflects the interests of high-tech produc-
ers at the expense of technology-importers).  Such is the case with most, if not all, 
LBPs. 
344 FISHER & URY, supra note 314, at 148. 
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thought to be practiced only vis-à-vis LDCs in the post-WTO era.  
In reality, however, this strict bargaining approach is practiced 
widely with a much larger group of developing countries, namely 
the non-LDCs LBPs.  
In international patent bargaining, arguably, a much larger 
group of developing countries—namely non-LDC LBPs—should 
be regarded as possessing low bargaining power over intellectual 
property-based technologies such as drugs or plant genetics.  In 
light of that perspective, the distinction between LDCs and non-
LDCs developing countries must be qualified as obsolete insofar as 
bargaining over patents is concerned.  In bargaining terms, there is 
little room to argue that LDCs hold weaker bargaining power than 
other poor non-LDC LBPs, such as South American, lower Asian or 
even some of the poorest Eastern European countries.  This propo-
sition can be illustrated by the three elements of bargaining power: 
market power, outside option, and inside options. 
3.4.3.1.  Outside Option 
The first explanation for LBPs’ low bargaining power relates to 
their low outside option value.345  In theory, the issuance of a com-
pulsory license could serve as an outside option at the Tier-2 bar-
gain level, when bargaining with the industry and MNEs in partic-
ular.  It is the case, however, that within the post-TRIPS regime, 
LBPs’ Tier-2 outside option value is particularly limited.  This reali-
ty is the result of two main factors, deriving from LBPs’ short-run 
and long run low payoffs for the issuance of compulsory licenses.  
To begin with, as a short-run or static efficiency concern, LBPs 
may see low payoffs in pursuing their outside option of purchasing 
generic drugs from HBPs, such as India or China.  As India and 
China move to adopt a TRIPS-compliant patent regime, LBPs in-
creasingly face difficulties in conducting parallel imports of drugs 
from generics producers.  The TRIPS Agreement sets forth detailed 
rules that are to be followed by a WTO member nation willing to 
 
345 See MUTHOO, BARGAINING THEORY, supra note 93, at 99–100 (providing an 
overview of bargaining situations with outside options and offering one bargain-
ing solution); see also Abhinay Muthoo, On the Strategic Role of Outside Options in 
Bilateral Bargaining, 43 OPERATIONS RES. 292 (1995) (exploring a bargaining model 
in which two opponents are allowed to leave negotiations and return at a later 
time; concluding that the equilibrium position of the outcome is not affected by 
the option to leave negotiations and return).  
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issue a compulsory license.346  It outlines the prerequisites of paten-
tability and the circumstances under which a nation can issue such 
a license.  The TRIPS Agreement, as explained above, does not 
speak specifically to the issue of compulsory licensing between 
member nations.347  This point is crucial for LBPs with no generics 
manufacturing capacity of their own, which primarily rely on the 
infrastructure of MBPs—India and China—or of developed coun-
tries to get hold of essential medicines. 
In response to this set of concerns, at a WTO meeting in 2001, 
held in Doha, Qatar, the WTO adopted a Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health.348  Government officials have interpreted Paragraph 
6 of the declaration to constitute an exception to the TRIPS Agree-
ment, whereby a country that does not have the capacity to pro-
duce its own generic drugs in the face of a public health crisis may 
obtain the necessary drugs from a country that does have such ca-
pacity.349  By early 2005, the leading supplier of low-cost generic 
AIDS medicine was India.350  As India attempted to attain TRIPS-
compliance, many health agencies stressed that the days of low-
cost treatments for millions of poor patients around the world were 
ending.351  At the close of 2004, it appeared that the Indian gov-
ernment was drafting legislation that would extend beyond the ba-
sic TRIPS requirements and consequently endanger access to me-
 
346 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, at Annex 1C, art. 8(1). 
347 Id. 
348 See Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2; 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm [he-
reinafter Doha Declaration] (providing the text of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health). 
349 The WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health stated that “the TRIPS Agreement can and should be interpreted and im-
plemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public 
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”  Id. 
350 Editorial, AIDS Drugs Threatened, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/05/opinion/05sat3.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq 
=%22AIDS%20drugs%20threatened%22&st=cse. 
351 See Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières, The Beginning of the End of 
Affordable Generics (Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.msf.org 
/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=pressrelease&objectid=4735CF15-
E018-0C72-09099A512392C0F3&method=full_html (stating that India’s revision of 
its patent laws, to include protection for medicines, will increase the costs of me-
dicines). 
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dicines for many poor patients--including by eliminating oppor-
tunities for compulsory licensing for LBPs.352  Numerous NGOs 
and health officials around the world urged the Indian govern-
ment, in this leading case, not to disregard the Doha meeting in-
terpretation of TRIPS.353  India ultimately adopted TRIPS-
compliant legislation that largely preserves its ability to furnish 
generics to developing countries.  
A second explanation for LBPs’ low outside option payoffs de-
rives from their absent long-run innovation-based industries.  
There is increasing evidence that the weight of R&D on productivi-
ty depends heavily on size of the economy.354  This dynamic tends 
to hinder small-economy countries from overcoming their struc-
tural underdevelopment through a strategy of investing in R&D.355  
Currently, LBPs and notably Sub-Saharan Africa have access to 
crucial ARV drugs because most of the ARVs produced in India 
 
352 See Letter from Jim Yong Kim, HIV/AIDS Director, World Health Org., to 
Dr. A. Ramadoss, Minister of Health and Family Welfare of India (Dec. 17, 2004), 
www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india/who12172004.html (last visited Aug. 25. 
2009) (urging the Indian government to interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a man-
ner that would protect public health in light of the states’ concerns that low cost 
antiviral drugs from India may not be available to them for long). 
353 See Letter from U.N. Special Envoys for HIV/AIDS to the Prime Minister 
and President of India, Amendments to the Patents Act Under Debate (Mar. 11, 
2005), www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india/unaids03112005.html (urging the In-
dian government to be flexible in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in order to 
ensure that millions worldwide can continue to rely on generic medicines from 
India); see also Letter from Achmat Dangor, Director of Advocacy, Commc’n and 
Leadership for UNAIDS, to Kamal Nath, Minister of Commerce and Indus. of In-
dia (Feb. 23, 2005), www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india/unaids02232005.html 
(last visited Aug. 25. 2009) (urging the Indian government to reject legislative 
proposals to amend its 1970 Indian Patents Act beyond commitments it made to 
the WTO because the new proposals will affect millions of people’s access to ge-
neric HIV medications). 
354 See Hulya Ulku, R&D, Innovation, and Economic Growth: An Empirical Anal-
ysis (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/04/185, Sept. 2004), available at 
http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04185.pdf (arguing that while in-
novation has a positive effect on per capita output everywhere, market size is an 
important factor in determining the effectiveness of R&D sectors; accordingly, on-
ly larger market OECD countries are able to increase their innovation by investing 
in R&D, and smaller OECD countries promote innovation by using the know-how 
of other OECD countries). 
355 Id. 
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and other developing countries are off-patent.356  Since HIV/AIDS 
constantly mutates, scientists must continuously develop new 
treatments, based on future innovation.357  While barriers exist in 
the creation of effective ARVs for certain parts of Sub-Saharan 
African where there is rampant HIV/AIDS, the concern about the 
Indian Patents Act and other TRIPS-related laws is also related to 
long-run payoff.  These concerns derive from the need for new in-
novative technology and the possibility that HBPs like India will 
innovate and produce new technology to be used by patients in 
LBPs.358  Furthermore, this long-run concern is relevant primarily 
to ‘neglected diseases,’ or diseases of the developing world, and 
particularly LBPs outside LDCs, such as malaria or tuberculosis.  
Besides HIV/AIDS, these neglected diseases have been virtually 
eliminated from the innovation agenda in HBPs and developed 
countries alike.359  Yet, they are still rampant in LBPs in Lower 
Asia, Central and South America, and even poorer parts of Eastern 
Europe.360  As of today, it seems that the new Indian law would 
greatly hinder the ability of Indian firms to sustain an on-going in-
 
356 See Press Release, Press Info. Bureau, Gov’t of India, Kernel Nath’s State-
ment on the Ordinance Relating to Patents (Third) Amendment (Dec. 29, 2004), 
available at http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=6074%20&%20lists 
.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/%202004-December/007318.html (stating that 
currently ninety seven percent of all drugs manufactured in India are off patent). 
357 See WHO Report on Global Surveillance of Epidemic-prone Infectious Diseases, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2000), available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/CSR 
_ISR_2000_1hiv/en (discussing how HIV/AIDS mutates). 
358 See Randeep Ramesh, Cheap AIDS Drugs Under Threat, THE GUARDIAN 
(UK), Mar. 23, 2005, at A2 (quoting Ellen’t Hoen: “But without the Indian drugs 
industry, where will they get cheap drugs from?”). 
359 See, e.g., Letter from U.N. Special Envoys for HIV/AIDS, to the Prime Mi-
nister and President of India, On the Amendments to the Patents Act Under De-
bate (Mar. 11, 2005), www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india /unaids03112005.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (urging the Indian government to carefully consider the 
affect that the President’s Patent Ordinance will have on the millions of people 
needing cheap HIV/AIDS drugs); see also Understanding The WTO: The Agreements, 
Intellectual Property: Protection And Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Aug. 
25, 2009) [hereinafter Understanding The WTO] (explaining the history and pur-
pose of international intellectual property agreements); see also Ramesh, supra note 
358. 
360 See Understanding the WTO, supra note 359 (explaining the history and pur-
pose of international intellectual property agreements). 
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novative policy regarding low-cost medicines for LBPs’ neglected 
diseases. 
3.4.3.2. Inside Option 
The second explanation for LBPs’ low bargaining power in 
trade negotiations relates to the latter’s low value inside options.361  
TRIPS ignores the small differences in bargaining power over 
compulsory licenses between LDCs and non-LDC LBPs, and it 
does so while undermining the latter’s inside option cost structure.  
The present reasoning does not eliminate the production costs or 
the problems associated with distribution and the timely adminis-
tration of medicines within this group of non-LDC LBPs.362  How-
ever, this argument implies low inside option cost considerations 
for most or all LBPs, on three grounds.   
First, the Tier-1 inter-governmental bargain level entails a dis-
turbing institutional constraint within TRIPS, again discriminating 
against non-LDC LBPs by law.  Shortly before the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong, on December 6, 2005, WTO member 
states agreed to accept a protocol amendment to TRIPS.363  This 
amendment sought to provide a permanent solution to implement 
paragraph six of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health.364  If ratified, the new article 31bis of the TRIPS 
Agreement will allow countries with insufficient or no manufactur-
 
361 See, e.g., MUTHOO, BARGAINING THEORY, supra note 93, at 137-38 (explaining 
that a seller’s inside option is the value the seller obtains while the parties tempo-
rarily disagree). 
362 See, e.g., Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral 
Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1886, 
1886-1906 (2001) (discussing the costs of producing medicines and the costs asso-
ciated with patent protection of those medicines); see also Srividhya Ragavan, The 
Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in PhRMA v. Walsh 
and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777 (2004) (detailing numerous exam-
ples of governments taking steps to reduce the cost of medication). 
363 See World Trade Organization, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, Dec. 
8, 2005, WT/L/641 [hereinafter TRIPs Amendment] (accepting the amendment to 
the TRIPs Agreement). 
364 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) (in-
structing the TRIPS council to find a solution to the underutilization of compul-
sory licensing in WTO member countries with limited manufacturing capabili-
ties). 
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ing capacity to import generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuti-
cals.365 
The Enabling Clause of the Hong Kong Declaration is based on 
what is officially called the “Decision on Differential and More Fa-
vorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Devel-
oping Countries,” which was adopted under GATT in 1979.  It 
enables developed members to grant special and more favorable 
treatment to some developing countries.  The Enabling Clause 
represents the WTO’s legal basis for the Generalized System of Pre-
ferences (“GSP”).  Under the GSP, developed countries offer non-
reciprocal preferential treatment (such as zero or low duties on im-
ports) to products originating in developing countries.  Preference-
giving countries unilaterally determine which countries and which 
products are included in their schemes.  Within the Hong Kong 
Declaration vis-à-vis patent-sensitive industries in developing 
countries, this Enabling Clause should be considered a classic post-
WTO legal basis for regional arrangements among developing 
countries and for the Global System of Trade Preferences 
(“GSTP”).  Under such a scheme, a number of developing coun-
tries would exchange trade concessions among themselves. 
This post-WTO policy of favoritism toward developing coun-
tries, however, has not been applied equally towards non-LDCs 
regional LBPs organizations, as within Asia, the Caribbean, or 
South America.  In particular, these include the Southern Common 
Market in Latin America (“MERCOSUR”),366 the Common Market 
 
365 Although the initial deadline for ratification was December 1, 2007, the 
deadline was extended for another two years.  William New, TRIPS Council Ex-
tends Health Amendment; Targets Poor Nations’ Needs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Oct. 23, 
2007, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=798 (last vi-
sited Oct. 8, 2010).  As of this writing, slightly over a quarter of the 151 WTO 
member states, including the United States, India, Japan, China, and most recently 
members of the European Communities, have ratified the proposed amendment.  
See Press Release, World Trade Organization, Countries Accepting Amendment of 
the TRIPS Agreement (Sept. 17, 2010), available at www.wto.org/english 
/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (providing a list of 
countries accepting the TRIPS amendment). 
366 MERCOSUR is a Regional Trade Agreement (“RTA”) between Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción.  This 
treaty was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto.  Its aim 
is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, people, and currency. 
See MERCOSUR, http://www.mercosur.org.uy (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
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for Eastern and Southern Africa (“COMESA”),367 and the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (“AFTA”).368 
Thus, to facilitate the supply of essential medicines to countries 
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, as is the case of 
most LBPs, article 31bis(3) creates a special arrangement for both 
the affected countries as well as those countries belonging to a re-
gional trade agreement.  It does so, however, with implied refer-
ence only to the African agreement.369  Such an arrangement could 
have allowed the large group of LBPs370 to aggregate their markets 
to generate the purchasing power needed to render the develop-
ment of an indigenous generics pharmaceutical industry attrac-
tive.371  It also could have paved the way for the development of 
regional supply centers,372 procurement systems,373 and patent 
 
367 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa is a preferential 
trading area with nineteen member states stretching from Libya to Zimbabwe.  See 
COMESA, http://www.comesa.int (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
368 ASEAN Free Trade Area (“AFTA”) is a trade bloc agreement by the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations supporting local manufacturing in all ASEAN 
countries.  AFTA is composed of the ten countries of ASEAN.  See, e.g., John S. 
Wilson & Benjamin Taylor, Deeper Integration in ASEAN: Why Transport and Tech-
nology Matter for Trade, Trade Issue Brief, THE WORLD BANK, July 2008 (discussing 
the progress of ASEAN countries resulting from economic integration).   
369 See TRIPs Amendment, supra note 363, art. 31bis(3) (creating limited ex-
ceptions to article 31(f) for WTO member countries that are parties to a trade 
agreement in situations where the less developed countries share the same health 
problem). 
370 The TRIPs Agreement distinguishes between developing and least devel-
oped countries.  This Article uses “less developed countries” to denote both de-
veloping and least developed countries.  When referring to the TRIPs Agreement, 
however, this Article returns to the terms “developing countries” and “least de-
veloped countries.” 
371 See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 848 
(2007) (discussing the crucial conditions for a nation to develop “internally com-
petitive pharmaceutical manufacturers”). 
372 See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public 
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under 
the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 973-77 (2007) (discussing 
“[t]he potential benefits of pooled procurement strategies” and the establishment 
of regional pharmaceutical supply centers). 
373 See SISULE F. MUSUNGU ET AL., UTILIZING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC 
HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEWORK xv-xvi (South 
Centre 2004) (advocating the establishment of “regional procurement systems 
where they would jointly conduct tendering through an entity acting on their be-
half and a central purchasing agency managing the purchases on behalf of all the 
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pools and institutions, while facilitating technical cooperation 
within the region.374 
Unfortunately, because article 31bis specifically requires that 
Least Developed Countries make up at least half of the member-
ship of any beneficiary regional trade agreement, the provision 
would benefit only a limited number of developing countries, pre-
dominantly those in Sub-Saharan Africa.375  By referring solely to 
the LDCs classification, the other LBPs countries, such as within 
Asia, the Caribbean, or South America are once again ignored. 
An important example of non-LDC LBPs is presented through 
the Andean Pact countries, referring to five South American devel-
oping countries, namely Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and 
Bolivia, as well as three other Latin American countries, namely 
Chile, Mexico,376 and Cuba.377  Like LDCs, these developing coun-
tries often have made a call for solidarity against the efforts by the 
developed world and the United States to press Andean Pact gov-
ernments into enacting further amendments to protect intellectual 
property rights in Latin America.378  These non-LDCs countries, la-
 
member countries”); see also id. at 70-76 (discussing regional procurement sys-
tems). 
374 See TRIPs Amendment, supra note 363, art. 31bis annex ¶ 5 (establishing 
that the annex to the Agreement “are without prejudice to the rights” of member 
countries except those rights outlined in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31). 
375 See id. art. 31bis(3) (requiring that “at least half of the current membership 
of [the regional trade agreement] is made up of countries presently on the United 
Nations list of least developed countries”). 
376 Mexico, however, is certainly bound by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).  See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 289, 670 (1993).  Under such agreement, Mexico specifically undertook to 
protect IPRs under the stringent standards defined in chapter 17 of the agreement. 
377 See, e.g., Cuba backs Brazil in AIDS drug patent row, THEPHARMALETTER (Mar. 
7, 2001), http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/13177/cuba-backs-brazil-in-aids-
drug-patent-row.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (describing Cuba’s support for al-
lowing Brazil to develop cheaper, generic versions of pharmaceuticals). 
378 See, e.g., Andean Pact Call To Fight Us IPR Pressure, THEPHARMALETTER (July 
5, 1993), http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/81906/andean-pact-call-to-fight-
us-ipr-pressure.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (describing the efforts by Andean 
Pact countries to resist pressure from the United States to strengthen intellectual 
property rights in the Andean region). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/5
BENOLIEL.DOC 11/15/2010  9:09 PM 
2010] POST-WTO IP BARGAINING THEORY 357 
beled herein as LBPs, have similarly implemented changes to their 
patent laws as a result of pressure from the United States.379 
To be sure, foreign trade laws in contexts other than TRIPS of-
ten waive and grant various regional national organizations affir-
mative action-tailored policies, as granted by the General Council 
of the World Trade Organization.380  Recent examples of waivers 
include the EC/France Trading Arrangements with Morocco,381 the 
United States’ Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
(“CBERA”),382 the Canadian Tariff Treatment for Commonwealth 
Caribbean Countries (“CARIBCAN”),383 the United States’ Andean 
Trade Preference Act, and the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement.384 
This narrow interpretation of the 31(bis)(3) Hong Kong Decla-
ration provision, interpreted to include solely LDCs, in fact re-
mains challenged within the WTO’s pharmaceutical bargaining 
game.  While the European Communities “insisted that the [provi-
sion] should be limited to what is effectively sub-Saharan Africa,” 
other LBPs hold a much broader interpretation.385  Although these 
countries may be less poor than the group of LDCs, these remain-
ing LBPs arguably need to be included in the 31bis arrangement, as 
under the TRIPS regime they are provided remarkably little bar-
gaining power vis-à-vis technology-manufacturing MNEs and for-
eign governments alike. 
The holdout effect by the United States toward all bargaining 
LBPs as one was evidently observed in numerous international 
 
379 For the Pan-South American stand, see CILFA, at the 15th Assembly of the 
umbrella organization for Latin American pharmaceutical industries, and 
ALIFAR in Bariloche, Argentina.  See, e.g., North and South Americans Against Pa-
tents, THEPHARMALETTER (May 30, 1994), http://www.thepharmaletter 
.com/file/63017/north-and-south-americans-against-patents.html (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2010) (discussing the opposition in both North and South America against 
pressure from the United States to introduce new intellectual property protection 
in Latin America). 
380 Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement states that such entities may use a no-
tice of planned procurement or a notice regarding a qualification system as an in-
vitation to participate in the deliberations herein. 
381 For the specific decisions taken at the 4th Ministerial Meeting, see World 
Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001,WT/MIN(01)/15 
(2002). 
382 Id. 
383 Id. 
384 Id. 
385 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 372, at 945. 
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trade rounds.  The Doha rules of 2001 notably allowed LBPs to 
break patents to import, but did not authorize them to override pa-
tents for the purposes of export to countries in need.  In December 
of 2002 in Geneva, although 143 of the WTO’s 144 members agreed 
on a solution, the lone holdout—the United States—obstructed the 
agreement.386  American negotiators lobbied to limit covered medi-
cines to those for HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and a few addi-
tional diseases that primarily affect Africa.  Other LBPs, as it were, 
jointly sought a more flexible approach on access to medicines that 
would allow nations to protect public health as they see fit.387  As a 
result, no agreement was reached by close of the talks.388  There 
perhaps could be a need to relax this rigid LDCs-oriented trade 
rule by allowing other LBPs to obtain essential medicines at a more 
affordable cost.389 
Second, low inside option cost considerations remain for LBPs, 
as there have been only a few reported initiatives on South-South 
technology transfers with reference to most LBPs alike.390  This fact 
again contributes to the low bargaining power of countries other 
than LDCs that belong to the LBP category.  Certainly, MBPs such 
as China and India already possessed a manufacturing capacity 
and therefore are perceived to remain outside the scope of this li-
mited LBPs bargaining power narrative.391   
 
386 Jeffrey Sparshott, U.S. Refusal Thwarts WTO Drug-Patent Talks - Bush Seeks 
Supporters of Interim Plan to Ease Enforcement for Poor Nations, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 25, 
2002, at C10. 
387 See Editorial, A Global Medicine Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003 (describing 
the need for a flexible system of medical access). 
388 After the fiasco in Geneva, the Bush administration, in balance, pledged 
not to bring trade pressure against countries that export cheap drugs for 
HIV/AIDS and other resource-poor country epidemic diseases.  Id. 
389 This Article describes only the positive theory of bargaining, and does not 
focus on possible normative ramifications. 
390 Joan Rovira, Creating and Promoting Domestic Drug Manufacturing Capaci-
ties: A Solution for Developing Countries, in Negotiating Health in Negotiating Health, 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 227, 235 
(2006).  There are, however, a few examples for South-South trade worth mention-
ing.  To illustrate, Thailand offered to help Ghana and Zimbabwe to set up facto-
ries to produce HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals.  Id.  Brazil, in comparison, offered a co-
operation agreement, including technology transfer, to developing countries for 
the production of generic ARV drugs.  Ellen ‘t Hoen, supra note 196, at 32. 
391 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, Communi-
cation from Kenya, the Coordinator of the African Group, Elements of a Para-
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 Article 66 of the TRIPs Agreement, in particular, requires de-
veloped countries to provide incentives for their businesses and in-
stitutions to help create “a sound and viable technological base” in 
Least Developed Countries, realistically referring to other LBPs, by 
promoting and encouraging transfer of technology.392  However, it 
is unclear how these LBPs could enforce Article 66, even with the 
assistance of the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process.  
Likewise, “[a]though the Doha Declaration is full of verbal com-
mitments and plans for capacity building, it is silent about how to 
fund the ambitious technical assistance programs.”393  “Further-
more, its legal nature as a ‘work program’ is particularly vague,” 
further undermining LBPs’ inside option.394  With little LBP bar-
gaining power, it was only natural that developed countries, MBPs 
and HBPs with ARV manufacturing capabilities eventually signed 
technology transfer agreements with the few LBPs that wished to 
manufacture generics locally.395  LBPs’ inside option value further 
diminish as a result. 
The disparity between MBPs and HBPs on the one hand, and 
LBPs, on the other, was also apparently perceived during the dis-
cussion of solutions to implementing paragraph 6 of the Doha Dec-
laration.  There, some LBPs underscored the importance of build-
ing local manufacturing capacity.396  Their demands eventually 
created tension towards HBPs and MBPs alike.  The African Group 
strived for an explicit agreement proposing the solution of building 
domestic manufacturing competence.397  HBPs and MBPs, like Bra-
 
graph 6 Solution, IP/C/W/389, ¶ 15(a) (Nov. 14, 2002) (evidencing the belief on 
the part of the African Group that only long-term solution to paragraph 6 is build-
ing up domestic manufacturing capacity).  
392 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 66(2). 
393 Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Confe-
rence in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 226 
(2004). 
394 Id. 
395 See, e.g., UNAIDS, 2004 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 104 (2004) 
(discussing efforts to bring local pharmaceutical production to low- and middle-
income countries). 
396 See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical 
Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317, 334 (2005) (discussing 
the desire of some developing countries, especially those in Africa, to increase 
domestic manufacturing capacity). 
397 BHAGWATI, supra note 29. 
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zil and India, for their part, already had manufacturing know-how 
and consequently believed otherwise.398  
LBPs bear low inside option value in the Tier-1 bargain for a 
third and additional reason deriving from the fact that changes in 
patent laws in MBPs with manufacturing capacity, such as India, 
further undermined LBPs’ inside option.  LBPs heavily depend on 
drug imports from MBPs.399  Although LDCs are not obliged under 
the WTO rules enshrined in the 2001 Doha Declaration to grant or 
enforce pharmaceutical product patents until at least 2016, other 
developing countries saw this transition period end in January 
2005.  This list includes countries with significant manufacturing 
capacity, such as India, a major source of WHO prequalified gener-
ic ARVs.  They were required to introduce new pharmaceutical pa-
tent legislation in order to comply with WTO rules.  This require-
ment may be viewed to create fundamental bargaining 
implications for LBPs.  Nonetheless, as long as the present LBPs’ 
price crisis is unresolved “it is unclear how these recent or newer 
drugs may be made available at sustainable and affordable prices 
in the developing world,” further undermining their inside option 
value.400  
On the Tier-2 bargain level, further evidence for the overall 
demise of LBPs’ inside option may be found.  Under the current 
bargaining situation, access to life-saving medicines, in particular, 
for the LBPs truly depends on the goodwill of MNEs towards LBPs 
in tandem.  MNEs voluntarily offer their most discounted prices to 
LBPs including non-LDC LBPs.  However, MNEs have little or no 
economical incentive to do so.401  In reality, many LBPs’ endemic 
diseases could be prevented or treated with vaccines or pharma-
ceuticals that are not accessible to the populations in most LBPs.  
To illustrate, almost 18 million people, mostly in LBPs stretching 
from Africa to Central or South America, are infected with river 
blindness (onchocerciasis) which is curable by administering a sin-
 
398 Id. 
399 See MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE 
REDUCTIONS: A PRICING GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 7 (10th ed. 2007) (discussing India’s role in creating and selling generic 
antiretroviral medications).  
400 Id. at 8. 
401 See id. at 8–9 (discussing the discounts originator companies may provide 
to LDCs).  
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gle oral dose of Ivermectin (trade name B Mectizan) per year.402  
Moreover, the drugs isoniazid and co-trimoxazloe effectively treat 
tuberculosis403 and pneumonia, respectively, but are rarely availa-
ble to poor people in many LBPs outside sub-African LDCs.404  In-
terventions for these and many other LBPs-based diseases may be 
more cost effective and entail less risk than for the most expensive 
HIV therapies emphatically undermining their bargaining power 
within TRIPS. 
3.4.3.3. Market Power 
Most LBPs alike have little or no market power when bargain-
ing with MNEs directly.  To start, with regard to Tier-1 bargaining 
with the developed world, and particularly the United States, most 
if not all LBPs are regulation-takers.  As William Lovett notes, “the 
preferential ‘edge’ for LDCs and NICs that was built into the origi-
nal GATT (1947), GATT-Part IV (1965), and various GATT (1979) 
Codes, such as the Subsidies Code, has not been adequately offset 
by United States presidential administrations and trade authori-
ties,”405 and “[a] double standard that favors developing nations is 
implicit in these arrangements.”406  Political developments dimi-
nished the authority of existing international bodies in this area—
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) 
and the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organiza-
tion (“UNESCO”)—while at the same time inconsistently dismiss-
ing GATT’s basic purposes and premises.407  In the post-World 
 
402 See The Magnitude of River Blindness, THE CARTER CENTER http://www 
.cartercenter.org/health/river_blindness/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010), 
for a discussion on the enormous impact of river blindness on endemic countries 
and how Merck’s Mectizan has effectively treated the disease.  
403 See Rajesh Gupta et al., Responding to Market Failures in Tuberculosis Control, 
293 SCI. 1049, 1049 (2001) (discussing methods to lower costs of anti-tubercular 
drugs in low-income countries). 
404 See Karen Zwi et al., Cheaper Antiretrovirals to Treat AIDS in South Africa: 
They are at Their Most Cost Effective in Preventing Mother to Child Transmission, 320 
BRIT. MED. J. 1551, 1551 (2000) (arguing that the reduction of drug prices is effec-
tive, but access to these drugs remain unavailable in certain areas of South Africa).  
405 William A. Lovett, Current World Trade Agenda: GATT, Regionalism, and 
Unresolved Asymmetry Problems, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2006 (1994). 
406 Id. at 2002. 
407 See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT’s Uruguay 
Round: Comparative Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World 
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War II era, as Lovett notes: “[T]he United States and United King-
dom were key players in early GATT rounds, and collective sense 
of responsibility for newly liberated colonies and Latin American 
nations led them to concede non-reciprocal leeway for more subsi-
dies, protectionism, and multiple exchange rates to less developed 
countries.”408  Furthermore, “[t]he basic theme of providing un-
conditional most-favored-nation treatment under Article II strong-
ly favored the interests of weaker and smaller trading nations, 
[such as] most NICs and LDCs.”409  
Today, however, LDCs continue to face substantial asymme-
tries rooted in the GATT,410 uneven economic development 
through the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”),411 regional dis-
crimination, and divergent industrial policies in the WTO.  When-
ever LBPs fail to comply with the United States-led policy concern-
ing the issuing of compulsory licensing, American MNEs evenly 
 
Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 179–80 (1993) (assessing 
the different reactions of developed and developing countries to the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
408 Lovett, supra note 405, at 2005. 
409 Id. at 2005 n.12.  See also William A. Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade 
Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, 1 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135, 139 (1993) (discussing 
how the broad range of subsidies, preferences, and tariffs granted by GATT fos-
tered two development strategies among FDCs.).  The asymmetry problem also 
has been analyzed extensively in WILLIAM A. LOVETT, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY: 
TRADE EQUITY AND COMPETING INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 8–11, 52–53, 75–96, 105–28 
(1987). GATT, however, “(at least until 1994) and United States national trade law 
still allowed considerable leeway for sensible United States adjustments and off-
sets to foreign subsidies, restrictions, and discounting.”  Lovett, supra note 405, at 
2006.  Had the United States used its own GATT and national-law-trade remedies 
willingly, thereby overcoming local interest groups and other exogenous con-
cerns, “most of the asymmetry problem” for LDCs would have been resolved.  Id.  
410 As Wesche observes, structural realism would indicate that LDCs’ in-
volvement generates significant losses, leading them to refrain from participating 
unless forced to do so.  However, in GATT’s Uruguay Round, developing coun-
tries did choose to participate.  See Lisa M. Wesche, The Impact of Uncertainty on 
Developing Countries’ Decision to Negotiate in Multilateral Institutions,  Pre-
sented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 
(Aug. 29–Sept. 1, 2002), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta 
/p65528_index.html (examining why the developing countries cooperatively par-
ticipated in negotiations at the Uruguay Round).  
411 See LOVETT, supra note 409, at 38–40 (providing a history on the IMF, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later the World Bank, 
and GATT).  
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pressure their government to issue economic sanctions towards all 
LBPs alike.412 
LBPs also have virtually no market power in Tier-2 bargaining 
with MNEs.  In that sense, LBPs are also price-takers.413  The pri-
mary explanation for this phenomenon is that LBP pharmaceutical 
consumer markets tend to be small.414  Host country market size is 
one of the most critical factors in attracting foreign direct invest-
ment (“FDI”), and is one that places LBPs at a significant disadvan-
tage.415  In fact, most pharmaceutical FDI flows to the developed 
world.416  Pharmaceutical MNEs derive their above-average profit-
ability from the continuous release of new drugs.  The global mar-
ket is estimated at approximately USD $500 billion, and the leading 
12 companies—all of which are headquartered in developed coun-
tries—account for approximately 45% of total sales.417  
In conclusion, there are three central explanations for LBPs’ 
low bargaining power.  The first of the three relates to the fact that 
LBPs face low outside option payoffs, due to both static and dy-
namic inefficiencies.  LBPs increasingly face difficulties in access-
ing generic medicines produced in India and China.  Additionally, 
LBP markets provide implied incentives for drug innovation over 
neglected diseases, particularly in India, which is currently their 
main supplier.  The second explanation for LBPs’ low bargaining 
power involves their limited inside options based on three factors:  
the existence of a disturbing institutional constraint in the TRIPS 
Hong Kong Declaration that discriminate against non-LDC LBPs; 
the limited availability of South-South technology transfers; and 
 
412 See also Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in 
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA’S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM 1–4 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) (discussing the back-
ground and exercise of Section 301 actions by the United States).  See generally 
Shell, supra note 118, at 843–44 (describing the dispute resolution system imple-
mented after the Uruguay Round revisions to GATT).   
413 ”Price-takers” is a financial term describing parties who are forced to ac-
cept whatever price the market sets, and lack the ability to affect or shift the mar-
ket price.  EDNA CAREW, THE LANGUAGE OF MONEY 3, at 260–61 (1996). 
414 See John Macdonald, The Top Ten and Emerging Pharmaceutical Markets, 
BUSINESS INSIGHTS, available at http://www.globalbusinessinsights.com/content 
/rbhc0018m.pdf (last visited, October 21, 2010).  
415 LIPPOLDT, supra note 218, at 4–6. 
416 Id. at 9.  
417 Fórum de Competitividade, supra note 172, at 13.  
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the fact that changes in patent laws in countries such as India fur-
ther undermine LBPs’ inside option.  Finally, the low bargaining 
power over compulsory licenses by LBPs is mainly a function of 
the fact that these countries have very little, if any, market power 
in price and regulation negotiations with MNEs and their home 
governments.  That is, when it comes to bargaining over interna-
tional patent regulation and international prices of patented goods, 
LBPs are by and large both regulation-takers and price-takers.  
4. CONCLUSION 
This article puts forth a positive theory of bargaining power 
based on the bargaining situation that has developed in the post-
WTO era.  The typology presented is rendered possible by the de-
mise of the pre-WTO bargaining models of MNEs-host developing 
country relations developed in the 1970s and 1980s.418  During the 
post-WTO era these models have lost their explanatory power, a 
phenomenon that is particularly evident in negotiations between 
developing and developed countries over access by the former to 
medicines produced or developed in the latter.  Numerous policy 
considerations ensue from this Article’s analysis. 
For a start, lack of innovation carries paradoxical implications 
for certain developing countries in bargaining over TRIPS policies.  
A paradigm based on two-tiered and multi-party negotiations ar-
guably stresses the special situation of NICs in this regard.  NICs 
differ from other developing countries in that they possess sizeable 
and desirable markets, often coupled with an industrial capacity to 
produce generics.  In particular, innovative NICs suffer a paradox-
ical weakening, rather than boosting, of bargaining power over the 
prospects of issuing compulsory licenses.  This notion explains 
why non-innovative NICs are modeled as HPBs to denote their 
higher levels of bargaining power, whereas innovative NICs are 
modeled as MBPs indicating medium levels of bargaining power.  
This dynamic is particularly relevant to the case of compulsory li-
censes, which serves as the working example here. 
Furthermore, in highlighting certain specificities within NICs, 
the positive bargaining theory developed herein deemphasizes the 
 
418 See Ramamurti, supra note 17, at 24–25 (discussing shifts in FDI trends in 
developing countries, particularly a significant increase in FDI between 1990 and 
1998). 
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practical relevance of the LDC carve-out contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement.  It does so by considering all non-NICs as low-
bargaining power countries, or LBPs.  Under the existing state of 
affairs, access to medicines by the majority of developing countries 
depends on the goodwill—or perhaps, reputational concerns—of 
the pharmaceutical industry.  The industry, however, bears little 
economic incentives to promote access in these countries.419 
A third ramification, as shown above, flows from the argument 
that the Tier-1 inter-governmental bargaining level entails a revers-
ible institutional favoritism towards LDCs.  It thus may be argued 
that this bargaining situation discriminates against the remaining 
LBPs, particularly within the 2005 Hong Kong declaration.  In at-
tempting to facilitate the supply of essential medicines to countries 
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, as is the case for 
most LBPs, the proposed Article 31bis(3) to the TRIPS Agreement 
creates a special arrangement not only for affected countries, but 
also for those belonging to a regional trade agreement—however 
the implied reference is only to the African ones.420  These LBPs 
now include numerous Central and South America, Lower Asia or 
even poor Eastern European countries.  Specifically, these regional 
agreements presently consist of the Southern Common Market in 
Latin America (“MERCOSUR”), the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (“COMESA”), and the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (“AFTA”). 
Instead, the Hong Kong declaration should have allowed the 
large group of LBPs421 to aggregate their markets to generate the 
purchasing power needed to make the development of an indigen-
 
419 See Médecins Sans Frontières, supra note 399, at 9 (arguing that insufficient 
competition allows prices to remain high for drugs and these prices only fall as a 
result of public pressure or generic competition). 
420 General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 
2005), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm [herei-
nafter TRIPS Agreement Amendment]. 
421 The TRIPs Agreement distinguishes between developing and least devel-
oped countries.  This Article uses “less developed countries” to denote both de-
veloping and least developed countries.  When referring to the TRIPs Agreement, 
however, this Article returns to the terms “developing countries” and “least de-
veloped countries.” 
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ous pharmaceutical industry attractive.422  It also should have 
paved the way for the development of regional supply centers,423 
procurement systems,424 and patent pools and institutions, while 
simultaneously facilitating technical cooperation within the re-
gion.425  If ratified, the new Article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement 
will allow countries with little or no manufacturing capacity to im-
port generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals.426 
Beyond these three policy ramifications, it must be noted that 
there exist several constraints on this Article’s model.  First, and 
regrettably, by virtue of being a situational model, it does not—and 
cannot —reflect the long-run dynamic efficiency implications of 
the post-WTO regime.  While the developed countries’ emphasis 
on the protection of intellectual property rights has been heavily 
criticized as a “‘beggar thy neighbor’ approach,”427 the TRIPS 
Agreement could be read to reflect a static economics efficiency of 
the structure of intellectual property, and particularly patent law.  
This Article, therefore, does not address whether—or how—the 
TRIPS Agreement could be read for long-run efficiency, thereby al-
lowing adjustments in national intellectual property regimes de-
signed to reflect their specific innovative growth dynamics.428  An 
 
422 But see Yu, supra note 371, at 848 (discussing how there is no guarantee 
that aggregated LDC markets generating enough impetus for significant devel-
opment of an indigenous pharmaceutical industry).  
423 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 372, at 973–77 (discussing the potential 
benefits of pooled procurement strategies and the establishment of regional 
pharmaceutical supply centers). 
424 MUSUNGU et al., supra note 373.  
425 TRIPS Amendment, supra note 363, art. 31bis. 
426 Although the initial deadline for ratification was December 1, 2007, the 
WTO granted a two-year extension.  William New, TRIPS Council Extends Health 
Amendment; Targets Poor Nations’ Needs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 23. 2007), 
www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=798. 
427 Frederick M. Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of TRIPs: A Challenge for the 
World Economic System, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 521 (1998). 
428 There is noticeably important evidence suggesting that, at least in the 
United States, patent rights over research opportunities have begun to hinder 
long-run efficiency by chilling innovation.  See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargain-
ing over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, 
in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR 
THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (indicating that in 
some cases, patent rights have stifled research by increasing transaction costs); 
Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20 
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explanation for the present model’s short-run focus lies within in-
novation theory.  All things being equal, patents affect efficiency 
by spurring innovation while generating a deadweight loss.  Fur-
thermore, it is well understood that the first effect is positive and 
dynamic, while the second is negative and static.429  TRIPS, on the 
other hand, hinders the ability of policymakers to choose a protec-
tion level that strikes the right balance between the dynamic effi-
ciency gain and the static efficiency loss.  This is particularly so 
given the developmental inequality among HBPs, MBPs and LBPs, 
which is demonstrably relevant. 
It may be contended, based on the present positive model, that 
strong protection for intellectual property rights may have signifi-
cant negative allocative consequences in developing countries 
without contributing to—and in fact even impeding—their tech-
nological development.430  Thus, the HBP-MBP-LBP underlying 
developmental inequality shifts the balance between static and dy-
namic efficiencies, such that short-term access and affordability to 
innovative-based goods takes priority over long-term innovation 
policy goals where necessary.431  As Joseph Stieglitz notes in his ar-
ticle “Knowledge as a Global Public Good”:  “The gain in dynamic 
efficiency from the greater innovative activity is intended  to bal-
ance out the losses from static inefficiency from the underutilization 
of the knowledge or from the underproduction of the good pro-
tected by the patent.”432  In the case of health care, the goods pro-
tected by the patent are the pharmaceuticals.  The article’s model 
thus leaves TRIPS’ lawmakers to achieve merely a contextual poli-
cy of balancing minimum standards with flexibilities in the short-
 
WIS. INT’L L.J. 523, 528 (2002) (stating that patents create tension within the econ-
omy by creating barriers to entry and increasing litigation costs). 
429 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC 
GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 311 (Inge Kaul et 
al. eds., 1999); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated 
Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1458–60 (2002). 
430 Carlos M. Correa, Managing the Provision of Knowledge: The Design of Intel-
lectual Property Laws, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING 
GLOBALIZATION 410, 414 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003). 
431 Stiglitz, supra note 429, at 311. 
432 Id. at 311.  
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run, among HBPs and LBPs as non-innovative developing coun-
tries, and among MBPs as well.433 
This article’s modest static innovative hypothesis is also acutely 
relevant to, as Michael Mireles notes: “[The ongoing] debate [of] 
the merits of the Bayh-Dole Act, which allows recipients of gov-
ernment funding to take title of inventions developed with that 
funding, and its purported consequences since the Act’s incep-
tion.”434 
The adoption of the Act in non-innovative developing coun-
tries, namely HBPs and LBPs, however, could lead to an increased 
focus on commercializing technology directed toward the local 
needs of developing countries.  Regrettably, the result of equal 
enactment of such legislation in these developing countries may 
prove unlikely to have the same purported dynamic innovative 
impact on a similar scale to that which the Bayh-Dole Act suppo-
sedly had in the United States.435 
 
433 But see Claudia Chamas et al., Current Issues of IP Management in Health and 
Agriculture in Brazil, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND 
AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1563 (Anatole Krat-
tiger et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that Brazil should strengthen IP laws in order to 
maximize innovation and technological development). 
434 Michael S. Mireles, The Bayh-Dole Act and Incentives for the Commercializa-
tion of Government-Funded Invention in Developing Countries, 76 UMKC L. REV. 525, 
526 (2007).  See generally University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006) (outlining the scope, policy, and objectives of the Bayh-
Doyle Act). 
435 See Chris Bull, Managing Intellectual Assets at Universities: The South African 
Government is Considering the Introduction of Legislation Similar to the US Bayh-Dole 
Act Governing Intellectual Property Arising from University R&D, MANAGING INTELL. 
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